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CHAPTER 1 
UK ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE SINCE 1979 
1.1 Introduction : a government 
committed to radical change 
The present United Kingdom government first took of-
fice in May 1979. The economic situation it then faced 
was extremely difficult. The United Kingdom had experi-
enced a long period of relative economic decline particu-
larly apparent in the post-war period and accelerating in 
the 1970s. 
More urgent problems were largely of domestic origin, 
and reflected the failure in the 1970s to establish a social 
and economic consensus capable of  delivering reasonable 
rates of growth with low inflation.  Instead, social  ten-
sions  in  labour relations  were  acute,  and  wage  settle· 
ments in the private and public sectors  were very high 
and accelerating.  A cyclical peak in economic  activity 
had recently been passed and a downturn was  in pros-
pect.  International  fmancial  confidence,  following  the 
1976 crisis which culminated in borrowing from the IMF 
and after the 1978 breakdown in the government-unions 
entente, was extremely fragile. Added to this the second 
oil shock of 1979 increased inflationary pressures and de-
flated demand. On the other hand, the UK had begun ex-
porting crude oil in 1976, moved into surplus in its oil 
trade in 1980, and could look forward in the 1980s to  a 
position of  being a considerable net oil exporter. 
This  background  of relative  economic  decline  and 
short-term crisis fostered the election of the new govern-
ment pledged to the mtroduction of policies radically dif-
ferent in nature and  scope from its predecessors.  Such 
policies challenged the established economic and social 
consensus and the "conventional wisdom". The main ele-
ments were. at the macroeconomic level, a commitment 
to a monetarist cowller-inf1ation policy and a reJection of 
intervention  in  exchange  markets  and  of  short-term 
counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy.  At  the  structural  level 
many of the tenets associated with monetanst supporters 
were also embraced : P  beljef m maximising the role anct 
efficiency of markelS  and of minimising the role of the 
state (particularly as regards the shares in GDP of p11blic: 
expenditure, taxatmn and actlvliy accounted for by public 
corporations  and  as  regards  employment in the  public 
sector). 
There were no obvious links between these policy stan-
ces and Community membership.  Indeed,  the  commit-
ment  to  a  completely  independent  monetary  policy 
entailed the  rejection  of full  participation in the EMS, 
which had been  inaugurated in March  1979  : the  new 
govermnent confirmed the decision of its predecessor to 
remain  outside  the  EMS's  centrepiece  exchange  rate 
mechanism (ERM). Major elements in the reorientation 
of policy undertaken by the  UK (and US)  nevertheless 
foreshadowed more general changes of stance in coun-
tries within and outside the Community. These came to 
include  the  commitment  to  public  expenditure control, 
tax reform and reduction, and emphasis on improving the 
supply side of their economies by enhancing the role of 
market mechanisms. Within the Community many ideas 
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for  improving  the supply side and combining this with 
trade integration came to  be encapsulated in the  single 
market programme published in 1985. 
1.2 Overview : successes and missed 
opportunities 
Judged from  a mid-1990 standpoint,  the UK's econ-
omic record since 1979 presents an uneven picture, with 
undoubted successes marred by equally evident failures. 
In retrospect some elements  of the  sub-optimal perfor-
mance,  particularly  regarding  inflation,  seem  to  have 
been avoidable. 
Economic circumstances at the beginning of the gov-
ernment's term of office in 1979 were unfavourable.  The 
onset of the cyclical downturn from 1979 coincided with 
higher  oil  and  other  commodity  prices  and  cost  push 
pressures arose from inflationary wage claims. Inflation-
ary pressures were exacerbated by the new government's 
major  switch  from  direct  to  indirect  taxation.  It  was 
against this background that the government attempted to 
limit monetary growth via raising interest rates. The ex-
change rate appreciated strongly in real terms (Graph 1.1) 
and a deep, partly policy-induced recession resulted. Fis-
cal policy was not used to offset the fall in demand and, 
indeed, the March 1981 budget was strongly deflationary. 
Graph 1.2 : Contributions to GOP growth by sector. 
The manufacturing sector bore the brunt of recession, ex-
periencing  a very  large reduction  of capacity  and em-
ployment (of the 4,2% fall in total output between 1979 
and 1981, 3,4% points were attributable to a 14,2% de-
cline  in  manufacturing  and  the  rest  to  construction  -
Graph 1.2). Inflation fell rapidly, from an annual peak of 
over 16% in 1980 to 5% by 1983  (private consumption 
deflator  - Graph  1.3).  However,  unemployment  rose 
equally quickly,  from  under  5%  of the civilian labour 
force  at the turn of the decade to  10-ll%, where it re-
mained until1987 (Graph 1.4). 
The recovery in output from 1981, which began to be 
reflected  in  the  total  employment  figure  from  1983, 
marked the beginning of a long, strong upswing which 
continued until  1988. The upswing was  associated with 
significant structural changes in the economy. A reduced 
manufacturing sector experienced a recovery in  output 
with very rapid productivity growth as working practices 
became more flexible;  the decline  in  employment  was 
largely arrested and on occasion even reversed.  Profita-
bility recovered to levels much closer to  those in other 
major  industrialised  countries.  Rises  in  manufacturing 
output did not, however, keep pace with demand and the 
UK experienced an inexorably rising deficit in its trade in 
manufactures : from a surplus of 2, 7% of GDP 
1  (1 0% of 
manufacturing value-added) in 1980 to a deficit of 3,8% 
of GDP  (16%  of manufacturing  value-added)  in  1988 
1)  Throughout this study, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, the average measure of GDP at market pric~~ is used. There re~ain  con-
siderable uncertainties about the precise scale and structure of growth because of large and frequ~nt  revlSl~ns to the UK  ~allonal ac-
counts  statistics  in recent years  and  important discrepancies  within the accounts.  Recent  publishe~ ~at10nal acco~ts mcorporate 
substantial explicit adjustments (particularly, increases in expenditure on fixed investment and stockbuildmg) to reconcile more closely 
the different measures of GOP. -3-
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Graph 1.6 : Oil. -5-
(Graph 1.5). In a trend which promised longer-term re-
lief, the latter part of  this period  saw considerable inflows 
of Japanese and other direct investment in manufactur-
ing.  This  was notably the  case in the motor industry, 
where established companies had been relatively unsuc-
cessful in matching overseas quality and productivity le-
vels. 
To a certain degree, some pressure on the manufactur-
ing sector from early in the 1980s could have been ex-
pected  from  the  build-up  in  the  oil  surplus  and  a 
tendency,  neglecting  changes  emanating  from  interna-
tional capital flows, for the real exchange rate to appreci-
ate in consequence. The increase in oil and gas  output 
expansionary (Graph 1. 7). The chief motor was private 
consumption,  fuelled  by high  real  wage  growth,  suc-
cessive tax changes and liberalisation in the provision of 
credit Consumer confidence increased sharply  once it 
had become clear that the recession had been surmounted 
and it seemed that continuing real income growth was as-
sured. This in tum stimulated the demand for credit, es-
pecially  for  mortgage  fmance.  Real  wealth  increased 
rapidly  with  very  strong  rises  in residential  property 
values and the  level of the stock market (private share-
holding being favoured by the government's privatisation 
programme and tax incentives for equity holding). Real 
consumption growth averaged 4  1/2% p.a. in the period 
1983  to  1988.  Fixed investment by business,  a  much 
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was itself a major structural change. In terms of its pro-
portionate significance to the economy,  the "offshore" 
economy was most important during the frrst half of the 
1980s, masking the underlying deterioration in the cur-
rent account and peaking in terms of its share of current 
price GDP in 1984 and in terms of physical output in 
1986. From the collapse in oil prices in 1986 and with the 
begimrlng of a secular decline in production, this signific-
ance waned swiftly, and in 1989, in the wake of  accidents 
affecting production, oil and gas extraction accounted for 
less than 2% of  current price output against 7% five years 
earlier (Graph 1.6). 
As regards  the  onshore economy,  the  long  upswing 
was dominated by  the growth of private domestic  d~­
IIUind, particularly from 1983 when fiscal changes were 
~  Fixed Investment 
~  Goods & serv. bal. 
Graph 1. 7 : Contributions to GOP growth. 
smaller  volume of expenditure  than  consumption,  ex-
panded by an annual average growth of 7  1/2% in this 
period, with negligible or negative growth in 1983  and 
1986.  Public  fmal  expenditure,  by  contrast,  remained 
under tight control and contributed little to the expansion: 
govermnent consumption and fixed investment as a pro-
portion of GDP falling from almost 24% in the  early 
1980s to 21% by 1988. 
The  consequences of this expansion of demand were 
distributed fairly evenly in output growth throughout the 
economy (Graph 1.8). Exceptions were agriculture and 
energy (below average growth) and construction (above 
average growth); among s~rvic~s the growth of the fman-
cial services sector was particularly marked. The substan-
tial net employment growth was entirely in services, with -6-
GDP  Output growth by sector 
AGRICULTURE 
PRODUCTION 
Energy  &  water aupl.  --------------------
oil &  a••  extract. -
other -
Manufacturing  ---------------
metala, mlnerala -
ohemicala -
mech.  eng lneerlng -
alae. engineering -
motor vehlclea -
ot~:~r:~d·~,rn\ : 
textllea -
p:&-:, ~=~t~~~P. : 
CONSTRUCTION 
SERVICE INDUSTRIES 
diatribution -
tranaport  -
communication  -
bankint' finance  -
owne~uJHod:'3~: : 
education, health -
other aervioea -
GDP(O) 
Non-oil GDP(O) 
I 
!-
I  I  I  I  I  I 
., oh.  over period 
- 1171- 1181 
[X) 1181 - 1181 
I 
-30-20 -10  0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 
Source: CSO 
much of the growth accounted for by a growth in female 
participation and characterised by a growth in part-time 
and  contract  employment.  Productivity  growth  in ser-
vices was low to negative and for the whole economy 
low (Graph 1.9). 
Graph 1.8 : GOP - Output by sector. 
The upswing peaked in mid-1988. The expansion in 
demand in that year, some 7%, was clearly far in excess 
of the  growth  in  capacity,  which  was  already  over-
stretched. The inflationary pressures were most evident in 
the ballooning of the trade deficit (Graph 1.10). Under-
lying inflation began to rise sharply as margins further in-
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creased, with the acceleration in wage growth following. 
Monetary policy became increasingly restrictive in con-
sequence,  with  a  progressive  tightening  of short-term 
rates through 1989 (policy issues are the subject of  Chap-
ter 2). 
The consequences of the change to a highly restrictive 
monetary policy allied with an underlying cyclical slow-
down are still in the process of working themselves out. 
So far the results have been uneven,  with demand and 
output growth having slowed but with inflation having 
worsened and the external account deficit showing only a 
partial  improvement.  Performance  in  1989  and  early 
1990  has  demonstrated  continuing  underlying  weak-
nesses which have yet to be surmounted.  Chief among 
these is the persistence and indeed aggravation of infla-
tionary pressures,  and the  lack of a convincing  policy 
framework for eliminating them. More long-term in na-
ture is a question mark about the suitability of the pro-
ductive structure, particularly the adequacy in extent and 
quality of the tradeables goods and services sector and 
notably  of manufacturing.  A  third  related  issue is  the 
need to improve the  quality and occupational and geo-
graphical flexibility of the workforce. 
These weaknesses - at least the first and third - are rec-
ognised and acknowledged by the government, which has 
explicitely  oriented  its  overall  policies  to  remedying 
them. Much of the necessary change is very long term in 
nature, such as improving the educational and vocational 
standards of the working population. It is difficult, never-
theless,  to escape the conclusion that important oppor-
tunities over the past ten years have been missed. This 
Graph 1.10 : Visible trade balance. 
applies particularly to the failure to build on early success 
in achieving a marked reduction in inflation to below the 
Community average. From 1986, in particular, the gov-
ernment implicitly seems to have been satisfied with a 
still moderately high rate of inflation (4-5% p.a.), rather 
than achieving  a convincing further reduction.  Tacitly, 
persistent nominal wage growth far above productivity 
growth and high rates of credit expansion incompatible 
with price stability of current production and assets, with 
the  inevitable  recurrent  recourse  to devaluation,  have 
been accepted. This approach has not resulted in an ex-
cessively high  •steady  state' rate  of inflation,  but in  a 
creeping acceleration which ultimately has had to be re-
ined in with restrictive policies prejudicial to sustained 
investment and employment expansion. 
1.3 Demand and output 
The important policy differences between the UK and 
its Community partners referred  to  in the  introduction 
have been partly responsible for the cyclical differences 
between the UK and the other economies. For the United 
Kingdom,  1987 and  1988,  it is now  apparent in retro-
spect, marked the fmal phase of the long cumulative up-
swing that followed the sharp recession which reached its 
trough at the tum of 1980-81. The previous cyclical peak 
had been in 1978-79 2, marking the end of the faltering 
upswing which had followed the first oil shock.  The sec-
ond oil shock in 1979 reinforced the cyclical downturn, 
after a period of exceptional growth in the second quarter 
of 1979. 
2)  Whole yearGDP growth peaked at 3,7% in 1978 dropping to 2,2% in 1979, but there was an exceptiooal increase in output in the sec-
ond quarter of 1979, which also marks the peak of the CSO's coincident cyclical indicator. -8-
The 1979-88 cycle places the United Kingdom in a 
class apart from the Community as a whole, particularly 
the ERM countries. Both the depth of the early recession 
phase and the--$!I'ength of the subsequent recovery were 
more intense in the UK. Most importantly, also, 1988 did 
not  appear  to  mark: a  pronounced cyclical  peak else-
where, where growili continued robustly. For the 1979-88 
period as a whole UK GDP increased by 2,0% p.a.  With-
in the period, however, UK GDP fell by 3,1% between 
1979 and 1981  and subsequently grew by an average of 
3,1%  p.a.  Growth  in  1989  was  2,3%  (but  only  2% 
through  the  year  to  the  fourth  quarter),  while  Com-
mission forecasts for 1990 suggest growth of only a little 
over 11/2%, recovering towards 2 1/2% in 1991 (Graphs 
1.2 and 1.7). 
The relatively fast expansion of output in the UK from 
1982 up until  1988 reflected rapid growth of domestic 
private sector demand. Examination of Graph 1. 7 would 
suggest that this period could further be divided : 1982, a 
year of technical  cyclical  recovery  which had already 
begun in 1981, 1983 to 1985, at the end of which there-
flationary impetus from 1983 was weakening, and 1986 
to 1988, years of unsustainably high demand growth cul-
minating in the extraordinary growth of 1988. Growth in 
the initial  1983 to 1985 period was further distorted by 
the miners' overtime ban and subsequent strike which 
lasted from 1984 to early 1985. This is estimated to have 
cut 1984 output by about 1% (cf. Graph 1.2), with lower 
stockbuilding  and net fuel  exports,  and to have raised 
1985 output growth by a smaller amount. 
The external contribution to growth was negative in all 
years from 1982 to 1989 except 1985 (and is only likely 
to again tum positive in 1990). The principal demand im-
petus came from growth of private consumption. Busi-
ness fixed investment also grew fairly rapidly up to 1985 
'and then stabilised in 1986. Investment growth again re-
sumed very strongly from 1987 and in 1988 aggravated 
overall demand pressures, expanding by over 20%. Pri-
vate residential investment accelerated from 1986. Public 
expenditure, both consumption and investment, remained 
tightly constrained by the authorities and made a much 
smaller direct contribution to the growth process (1983 
being a notable exception, with a significant boost from 
both current and capital spending). 
The dominant role of privau consumption in overall 
growth owes as much to the weight of consumption in 
GDP (63% in 1989) as to its rate of growth (4% on aver-
age from  1982 to 1989, compared with 5,8% for total 
fixed investment). The saving ratio fell sharply, chiefly 
associated with increased borrowing (mostly  mortgage 
loans), influenced by fmancial deregulation (bank lend-
ing controls were abolished in mid-1980 and  hire pur-
chase  controls  in  mid-1982).  Consumer  confidence 
benefitted from  falling  inflation  and rising  real  wages 
and, from 1983, rising employment. Momentum became 
clearly unsustainable from 1986 : two years of 5  1!2% 
p.a._growth followed by 7% growth in 1988. 
Some of the causes of the most recent upturn in private 
consumption are discussed in Box 1 on saving. They ap-
pear to  involve  a  combination of increased  consumer 
confidence,  wealth  (particularly  because  of  higher 
residential  property  prices),  borrowing  and  real  wage 
growth. The origins of the growth surge thus appear to lie 
partly with a general recognition that the performance of 
the economy was improving favourably, allied with rapid 
growth in real incomes. This process was reinforced by 
the rapid expansion of credit opportunities available to 
households. 
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Graph 1.11  : Fixed investment by sector. -9-
Fixed inllestment, as noted above, provided the initial 
impetus to the beginning of the upturn from late. 19~  1. 
Non-manufacturing  business  investment  was  the  chief 
component, but private residential investment was also 
important. In 1983 both the latter and also public invest-
ment sustained the recovery when business investment 
stagnated, hit by falling North Sea commitments (Graph 
1.11). Business investment recovered in 1984 and 1985 
before again falling back in 1986, a year of weak invest-
ment activity overall. The more recent recovery in invest-
ment dates from 1987, when non-oil, non-manufacturing 
business investment grew rapidly (15%). Manufacturing 
investment in terms of its contribution to total demand is 
of relatively  minor  significance  (accounting  only  for 
some 20% of  total business investment in 1985 and under 
15% of total flXed  investment).  Its importance for the 
overall growth of productive potential and in relation to 
competitive strength is greater, however. Manufacturing 
investment collapsed after peaking in 1979. At its trough 
in 1982 its level was only a little over 60% of its level 
three years earlier. Recovery thereafter, from a very low 
base,  averaged  about  7% p.a.  up  to  1989,  about  3% 
points  faster  than the growth of manufacturing output. 
However, this still left the level of manufacturing invest-
ment in 1989 only a little above that ten years earlier. 
Investment growth accelerated in 1988 (19% for total 
business investment against 11% in 1987) and overall in-
vestment was boosted by private residential investment 
(10%). The latter cooled equally abruptly in 1989 from 
tighter  monetary  policy  but  business  investment  still 
grew quite sharply (8%). Indicators for  1990 point to a 
weaking  in most sectors,  probably  leading  to  a  slight 
overall fall in investment expenditure. North Sea capital 
expenditure, after falling substantially in recent years, has 
again begun to expand vigorously. Total offshore invest-
ment is now being buoyed by the Channel tunnel project. 
The significant sectoral shifts in the pattern of invest-
ment growth through the upswing phase of the cycle pre-
clude a  simple interpretation of the  aggregate figures, 
although these do indicate a  sustained support for de-
mand except in 1986 when the pattern of business invest-
ment  was  distorted  by  the  phased  change  in  the 
corporation tax regime.  The  domestically-led nature is 
clear from the  leading role of non-manufacturing busi-
ness investment. The expansion of manufacturing capac-
ity indicated a strengthening of confidence but came too 
late to create sufficient capacity at the end of the cycle 
(indeed, the strength of demand for capital goods itself 
contributed  to  the  deterioration  in the  trade  position). 
Growth in investment in equipment outstripped growth in 
non-residential  construction  investment,  an  indication 
that investment was of a more capital-deepening rather 
than widening nature, and again a pointer to the overall 
level of  capacity growing too slowly relative to demand. 
Total domestie demand expanded more rapidly than 
output in the upswing (an average of 4  1/4% p.a. in the 
seven years to 1988 compared with under 3 1/2% p.a. for 
GDP). The difference was explosive in 1988, when de-
mand expanded by 7 1/2%. There has thus been a steady 
deterioration in the real o'tlersetll balance arrested only 
temporarily in 1985. The resulting negative contribution 
to GDP growth averaged 1/2% between 1982 and 1987 
and a massive 3 1/2% in 1988, declining to 1% in 198~. 
Imports  have risen  strongly  in volume  terms  since 
1982. The exceptional growth of 12 1/2% in 1988 was a 
sign, with rising inflationary pressure, of overheating in 
the economy which led to the major tightening of mon-
etary policy. Demand growth from 1989 slowed and is 
projected to continue to do so in 1990, with Commission 
forecasts of a moderate 2% rise in 1991. Exports have 
risen more slowly than imports, and actually fell in 1988, 
with some diversion to home demand probably occur-
ring.  The balance of payments is discussed  in Section 
1.6. 
Changes in the structure of output are shown in aggre-
gate in Graphs 1.2 and 1.8. While the 1980-81 recession 
was concentrated virtually exclusively in manufacturing 
and construction, with other branches of output virtually 
stable, the recovery since  1981  saw output growth dis-
tributed fairly  widely.  The 14%  loss  in manufacturing 
output in the two recession years was more than made up 
by growth to 1989 (31%, i.e. 13% higher than in 1979). 
At a more disaggregated level changes in relative out-
put performance are naturally more striking. Among the 
primary  sector  activities,  agricultural  output  expanded 
rapidly up to 1984, then slipped back, under the influence 
of policies at Community level. Total energy and water 
supply output was little changed between 1979, 1981 and 
1989. However, these years include the build-up of off-
shore oil tmd gas extraction to its peak in 1985, its sub-
sequent decline and then abrupt output falls in 1988 and 
1989 following major accidents in production equipment 
(Graph 1.5). Since the output weights are presently 1985-
based, only the year after the value of oil and gas output 
peaked in relation  to  GDP,  changes  in oil  output  are 
given much greater significance than would result from 
choice of a more recent base year : in 1985 oil and gas 
extraction had a 6,2% GDP weight, against a  share of 
current price factor income of under 2% in 1990. Other 
points to note are the scaling back of the coal industry 
with the widespread closure of capacity after 1984, and 
the expansion of water supply which has accorded with 
that of  total GDP. 
Most individual manufacturing sectors have expanded 
output since 1979. This is particularly so for chemicals, 
electrical  engineering,  transport  equipment  other  than 
motor vehicles,  paper  and  printing  and  miscellaneous 
manufacturing.  Exceptional  losses have been  sustained 
by textiles (including artificial fibres), mechanical engin-
eering, miscellaneous metal goods industries and motor 
vehicles. The decline of the motor industry (only 5% of 
total manufacturing) had been arrested by the late 1980s, 
with output on an increasing trend and considerable in-
ward investment flows (from Japan and France) and by 
retained profits from established US manufacturers. This 
followed substantial public subsidies given earlier to the 
remaining  UK  manufacturer  (now  Rover),  effectively 
then publicly owned and later sold to the UK private sec-
tor. -10-
Output of the construction industry has been strongly 
pro-cyclical,  progressing  towards  boom  conditions  in 
1988 and 1989. Short-term prospects are for a sharp con-
traction,  with private dwellings construction already in 
retreat and business investment, particularly for capital-
widening (which favours the industry) being scaled back. 
Public sector and utility projects (water and sewerage, 
roads and the Channel tunnel) are nevertheless sustaining 
underlying output. 
Analysis of the service sector is rendered less exact by 
the difficulties of measuring output and the low level of 
disaggregation. It is clear from Graph 1.8 that the major 
proportion of output growth during the  1980s was  ac-
counted for by services, a product largely of their higher 
weight in total output (58% in 1985), and to a smaller ex-
tent to faster output growth in total (33% between 1979 
and 1989 against 25% for total GDP). The clearest identi-
fied expansion was in financial services, output of which 
almost doubled over the period.  Other major increases 
were in distribution, conununications and services not in-
dividually  specified  Largely  within  the  public  sector, 
output of education and health services  is  recorded  as 
growing by over 15%. 
financial services was perhaps more double-edged, part-
ly reflecting the growth of the City's international role, 
but probably also unsustainable expansion in the wake of 
the 1986 'Big Bang' and earlier fmancialliberalisation. 
Overall,  expansion of manufacturing  capacity syste-
matically lagged demand from 1982 (Graph 1.5), sugges-
ting  that  output  growth  was  too  strongly  weighted 
towards non-tradeable services,  despite  a  simultaneous 
trend decline in the real exchange rate. This strongly sug-
gests  continuing  inadequate  non-price  performance 
and/or a failure to take advantage of strong domestic de-
mand growth. Further evidence on the domestic aspect is 
given by a market sector analysis of  production industries 
output growth. During the recovery period (from 1982 to 
1989)  consumer  goods  industries  grew  less  than  two 
thirds as quickly as investment goods industries;  growth 
of production of 'other durables'  (i.e.  other than cars) 
was particularly weak. Yet during this period growth of 
durable consumption,  narrowly  defined,  grew  by three 
quarters in volume compared with 65% for fixed invest-
ment. Taking account of  clothing and footwear consump-
tion (officially classified as non-durables) equalises the 
growth rate of demand for consumer durables and fixed 
investment.  Within  the  former  demand  category,  con-
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Output performance in the 1980s brought the economy 
closer to its  underlying potential,  and was reflected in 
profiltlbility first recovering and then attaining record le-
vels  (Graph  1.12).  The progressive withdrawal of sub-
sidies and other forms of intervention were important in 
reducing capacity in inefficient sectors of the economy 
such  as  coal-mining,  shipbuilding  and  motor vehicles. 
Competitive pressures also led to a sharp contraction of 
textiles and  a relative decline of footwear and clothing 
production. On the other hand, strength in other sectors 
such as those dependent on higher technology led to sub-
stantial output growth (e.g. aerospace). The expansion of 
Graph 1.12: Company sector profitability. 
sumption of goods other than cars, furnishing and cloth-
ing jumped by over 100% during these seven years, de-
mand  which  at  the  margin  must  have  been  supplied 
mainly by imports. This overall picture is supported by 
evidence  from  import  penetration  ratios  (further  dis-
cussed in section 1.6). Ratios of imports to total demand 
(home demand plus exports) were held stable for motor 
vehicles  as  the domestic  industry recovered For most 
other consumer goods industries, except furniture, import 
penetration increased. Import penetration for investment 
goods also increased, but with more differentiated results. (3) 
- 11-
1.4 Tbe labour market and productivity 
I, 
Demographie  factors  were  of muted  influence  in 
boosting the supply of labour during the 1980s. The resi-
dent  population  in  the  15-29  years  old  group  rose 
.  throughout the period, but to a limited extent, and then 
chiefly in the first half of the decade : this group totalled 
12,5 million in 1979, 13,3 million in 1984 and 13,5 mil-
lion in 1987. Numbers in the 45-64 group were in decline 
after 1984. In total the population of  working age rose by 
of 1980, only stabilizing onto a new (and still gently de-
clining)  trend  in 1983.  Between  the  fourth quarter  <>! 
1979 and the second quarter. of 1983 manufacturing em-
ployment was reduced by over a fifth (the so-called "sha-
keout") compared to an output fall of about 13%.  The 
1111elllploy11UIIt rate had remained around 4% since the 
mid-1970s  up  to  early  1980,  but  rose  progressively 
through the fii'St half  of the 1980s, only peaking at 11,2% 
(national defmitions) in 1986 as the gain in employment 
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1/2-3/4% p.a. in the 1979-84 period and up to 1989 by 
about half that rate. By 1989 the working age population 
had largely stabilised (Graph 1.13). 
Of more significance for labour supply were changes 
in participotio11  l'lllios,  particularly  the  expansion  of 
women's labour force participation (and some decline in 
that of men). In  Great Britain the participation ratio for 
women of  working age (16-59) rose by 7% points to 71% 
between 1981 and 1989, while that for men dropped mar-
ginally to 87%. Women's employment was favoured by 
the pattern of output growth in the 1980s, particularly the 
growth of  services. A continued increase in women's par-
ticipation is responsible for the bulk of the officially esti-
mated increase in the labour force during  the  1990s : 
women are expected to account for over 90% of the 0,8 
million increase between 1989 and 2001. 
At the beginning of the decade, the 1980-81 recession 
was of a sufficient severity to induce a significant fall in 
employment  and  a  major  increase  in  unemployment. 
Prior to the recession, e"'ploy.,e11t  peaked in the fourth 
quarter of 1979 at 25,5 million. The  trough was only 
reached in mid-1983 at 23,6 million, a loss of approach-
ing 2 million jobs. The fall was concentrated in manufac-
turing. Although manufacturing had long tended to shed 
jobs, the pace accelerated markedly from the beginning 
•  • 
Graph 1.13 : Employment and unemployment 
fell somewhat short of the expansion in the workforce 
(Graph 1.4). Rates recorded for men were higher than for 
women (the former rising from around 5% to over 13% 
compared with a rise from around 3% to 8 1/2% for the 
latter), in contrast to the experience in most Conununity 
countries. 
A pronounced decline in unemployment and an even 
stronger growth in employment were two of the most 
positive features of the post 1981 recovery. Unemploy-
ment  fell  steadily  from  mid-1986  to  reach  5,6%  by 
March 1990; total employment expanded by an average 
of 1 3/4% p.a. between mid-1983 and mid-1987 and by 
over 3% p.a. in the two years to mid-1989. 
From its 1983 trough total employment increased by 
3,13 million in the five years to June 1989, including a 
very substantial proportion of self-employed (1,02 mil-
lim) (fable 1.1). While employment in industry and con-
struction fell  by 0,45 million over this  period service 
sector employment rose by 2,2 million, of  which 0,8 mil-
lion was in fmancial services. Women in particular bene-
fitted from the expansion in employment, their numbers 
increasing by 1,6 million, including about four ftfths of 
the  0,8 million increase in part-time employment The 
number of male employees changed little until 1987, but 
has recently also been climbing. - 12-
Table 1.1 :Employment and unemployment 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Changes in civiHan employment 1 
(millions) 
Total  -0,98  -0,43  0,29  0,45  0,30  -0,02  0,43  0,81  0,72 
Employees In employment  -1,10  -0,48  -0,34  0,18  0,19  -0,04  0,20  0,69  0,47 
-men  -0,76  -0,35  -0,26  -0,05  0,01  -0,16  -0,05  0,27  0,00 
-women  -0,34  -0,12  -0,08  0,23  0,17  0,13  0,24  0,42  0,47 
-agriculture, forestry and fishing 2  -0,01  0,00  -0,01  -0,01  . 0,00  -0,01  -0,01  -0,01  -0,01 
-production md  constrction industries  -0,72  -0,38  -0,37  -0,15  -0,07  -0,18  -0,11  0,08  -0,01 
.  of  which : manufactming  -0,70  -0,35  -0,33  -0,12  -0,05  -0,13  -0,07  0,07  0,01 
-services  -0,24  0,03  0,05  0,33  0,27  0,19  0,29  0,61  0,47 
Self-employed  0,11  0,05  0,05  0,28  0,11  0,02  0,23  0,13  0,26 
Part-time employment  0,22  0,14  0,12  0,21  0,08  0,16 
-men  0,06  0,04  0,02  0,08  0,03  0,00 
-women  0,16  0,11  0,09.  0,14  0,06  0,16 
Unemployment rate 
(% of  labour force) 3  9,1  10,6  11,6  11,6  11,8  12,0  10,7  8,5  6,7 
1) June to June. Defined here as the sum of changes in employees in employment and of changes in self-employment (the 
national defmition also includes among the employed participmts in work-related government training programmes). 
2) Great Britain. 
3) Annual average, SOEC standardised definition. 
Souru :UK  official statistics, Eurostat (unemployment rate). 
Since 1986 the fall in unemployment, by some 5 1(2% 
of the  workforce up to March 1990, has been substan-
tially  more rapid  than in the rest of the Conmunity. 
While part of the fall in the registered number of unem-
ployed  undoubtedly  reflected  the  deterrent  effect  of 
tougher registration criteria and  the mopping up of the 
otherwise potentially unemployed on government spon-
sored employment schemes, the scale of the reduction 
points to the genuine underlying improvement in the la-
bour market  · 
Labour produeti~ity, driven by improvements in the 
manufacturing sector, increased at a significantly faster 
pace  than  in  the  1970s.  Manufacturing  productivity 
growth, given strong output growth, averaged 4 1(2% p.a. 
from  1979  to  1989,  faster  than  the  1960-73  period 
(3  1(2%  p.a.). and sharply higher than  the  intervening 
period (3/4% p.a.). This performance is partly due to cy-
clical factors,  and  is weakening with slower growth of 
production.  A  more interesting question,  however,  the 
answer to which will not be clear for some time, is how 
much of the cyclically adjusted increase represents "one-
off' elimination of overmanning  and a  move to more 
flexible  working practices and how much represents a 
shift to a sustainable higher growth path. 
Table 1.1  :Employment and unemployment. 
By contrast measured service sector productivity has 
not  undergone  any  dramatic  change  in  recent  years 
(Graph  1.9,  which  excludes  distortions  arising  from 
changes in oil and gas production), though measurement 
problems might preclude any such effect being evident 
The growth of  whole economy productivity, as a result of 
high employment growth, actually turned negative in the 
latter part of 1989. Although this was largely the result of 
the decline jn oil and gas output, it pointed to the much 
less impressive productivity results outside manufactur-
ing and consequent inflationary pressures. 
1.5 Inflation 
Through the 1970s, following the frrst oil price shock, 
counter-inflationary  performance  in  the  UK  was  the 
worst  of any  major industrialised  country  apart  from 
Italy. The average rise per year in the private consump-
tion deflator during the period from  1974 to 1979 was 
15,6%,  against  12,2%  in the Conununity  as  a  whole, 
4,  7% in Germany and 10,9% in France. From 1980 to the 
end of 1982, under the combined weight of the new pol-
icy regime introduced by the incoming government, the 
recession and labour shakeout and exchange rate appreci-
ation, inflation fell abruptly. The amtual rise of the pri-- 13-
vate consumption deflator dropped from a peak of 16,2% 
in 1980 to 4,8% in 1983. 
The major success of the UK in braking the high level 
of inflation at the beginning of  the decade was not, how-
ever, carried forward. Inflation up to 1988 moved within 
a fairly limited range of 3 1/2-5 1/2% p.a., with the aver-
age annual rise in the private consumption deflator for 
1983-87 being 4,7%. 
Inflation has been resurgent since early 1988. The dete-
riorating trend is exaggerated if  changes in the most pub-
licised price index, the all-items Retail Prices Index (RPI) 
are taken as the measure of inflation, since changes in 
mortgage interest rates have generally amplified move-
ments in other elements in the index since late 1987. 
Nevertheless, the RPI, excluding the effect of mortgage 
interest costs, and other price indices, such as manufac-
turers' output prices and the GDP deflator, tell an essen-
tially similar picture : inflation bottomed out at 3 1/2-4% 
p.a. during 1987, then rose steadily during the course of 
1988 and 1989. The momentum has accelerated in 1990 
towards what is expected to be a peak. Thereafter policy 
should succeed in achieving some moderation. 
Apart from the depreciation of sterling in 1986 which 
partly offset the potential gains from lower oil prices and 
the relative decline of the dollar, the sources of poor in-
flationary performance are home-grown. The rise in wage 
costs failed to decelerate in response to better price per-
formance in the mid-1980s, earnings per head growing 
remarkably steadily at around 7 1/2% p.a. before acceler-
ating to over 9% during 1988 and 1989. In the manufac-
turing sector, with rapid productivity growth, this implied 
moderate growth of unit labour costs up until 1989 when 
output growth came to a halt;  for the whole economy, 
with no differentiated pattern of  earnings growth between 
manufacturing and services, unit labour cost growth has 
been  much higher,  about 5% in  1987 rising  to 9% in 
1989. Added to this has been a substantial expansion of 
proru tnflTgiiiS, particularly in manufacturing. This was 
especially the case in 1985-86, when output prices only 
moderately reflected cheaper imported inputs, but conti-
nued through  1987 and  1988. The strength of demand 
and the high level of capacity utilization enabled produ-
cers to  widen profit margins and probably made them 
less  inclined  to  resist  wage  pressures.  For the  whole 
economy this recovery in profitability to a more interna-
tionally comparable level encouraged a  higher level of 
investment.  On  the  other  hand,  given  the  failure  to 
achieve wage moderation, it contributed to inflation fail-
ing to fall to the extent registered in other major countries 
and then accelerating. 
The intractability of  wage pressures leading to inflation 
is further explored in Box 2  to this chapter.  Tentative 
conclusions there from looking at the behaviour of the 
UK labour market are that nominal wage growth reacts 
significantly to expected inflation, real wage pressures, 
labour market imbalances and (negatively) to the propor-
tion of long-tenn in total  unemployment.  For the UK 
mismatches between labour supply and demand (occupa-
tionally and geographically) have long been recognised 
as significant in stimulating wage growth. In current cir-
cumstances this implies a  willingness by employers to 
accede to high nominal wage demands in order to retain 
staff, even if  profits are squeezed if  product and service 
prices are more restrained by the weakness of demand. 
This  is  important  in  relation  to  the  government's 
counter-inflationary strategy, which consists essentially 
in applying pressure on the corporate sector, via weaken-
ing demand, to restrain wage growth. Evidence so far has 
been disappointing : nominal wage rigidity has remained 
characteristic. Results would appear to suggest that only 
a  major regime change, downwardly influencing  infla-
tionary expectations, and greater flexibility in the supply 
of  qualified labour will succeed in drastically and perma-
nently lowering wage inflation. 
1.6 The balance of payments 
The United Kingdom entered the 1980s with its current 
balance of payments in a position of  strength, due princi-
pally to its transition from net oil importer to net exporter 
at a time of high real oil prices following the second oil 
price shock. Its position in the mid-1970s had been ex-
tremely weak, with the current deficit reaching 4 1/2% of 
GDP in 1974 after the first oil price shock.  However, 
following  the domestic austerity measures of 1976 and 
the build-up of oil production (the first exports from the 
continental shelf were in 1976,  with self-suficiency at-
tained in 1980) the current account recorded a surplus of 
1 1/2% of GDP in 1980, rising to 2 1/2% the following 
year (fable 1.2). 
1981  marked a peak for the  current account surplus. 
Within  two  years  deficits  were  again  recorded,  and 
though a moderate surplus (0,7% of GDP) was recorded 
in 1985 (the year when the oil surplus peaked) the current 
account otherwise recorded annual outturns of progress-
sively deepening deficits. The deterioration in 1988 was 
spectacular, with a current deficit of 3,2% following  a 
deficit of 1,6% in 1987, and even more so in 1989 (3,8% 
of GDP). Commission forecasts show the deficit falling 
back in 1990 but then stabilising at a high level. 
The main components of the current account - oil and 
non-oil visible trade and invisibles - have all contributed 
to  the  worsening  in  performance.  The  non-oU  trtule 
deftcit has grown from a small surplus in 1981 to 4,8% of 
GDP in 1989. The surplus on trade in oil, which reached 
a maximum of 2,3% of GDP in 1985, has fallen with de-
clining production and the generally much lower level of 
oil prices; in 1989, in the wake of accidents further de-
pressing production, it was only 0,3% of GDP (Graph 
1.10). The net surplus on invisibles has also tended to de-
cline, falling from 1,6% of GDP in 1981 to 1,3% in 1988 
and 0,8% in 1989 as net receipts from services and of in-
terest, profits and dividends (IPD) declined 
Strong internal demand growth appears  to be an im-
portant determinant of the worsening of the trade bal-
ance.  Since the beginning of the 1980s, growth in the 
UK has  generally  exceeded  that  of its  main partners. 
Compared with the Community, the difference has been -14-
. 
Table 1.2:  Balance of  Payments 
(% ofGDP)  1979  1980  1981  1981  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
1  1991
1 
. 
1. Current account  -0.3  1,2  2,6  1,7  1,3  0,6  0,9  0,0  -1,0  -3,2  -3,8  -3,0  -2,8 
1.1 Visibles  -1.7  0,6  1,3  0,7  -0,5  -1,6  -0,9  -2,5  -2,6  -4,5  -4,5  -3,3  -2,9 
of which : non-oil  -1,3  0,5  0,1  -1,0  -2,8  -3,7  -3,2  -3,5  -3,6  -5,1  -4,8 
1.2 Jnvisibles  1,4  0,6  1,3  1,0  1,8  2,2  1,8  2,5  1,6  1,3  0,8  0,3  0,1 
of which: 
Services 2  1,9  1,6  1,5  1,1  1,3  1,3  1,9  1,6  1,4  0,9  0,8 
Interes~ profits and dividends 
3  0,6  -0,1  0,5  0,5  1,0  1,4  0,8  1,4  1,0  1,2  0,9 
Transfers  -1,1  -0,9  -0,6  -0,6  -0,5  -0,5  -0,9  -0,6  -0,8  -0,8  -0,9 
2. Non-bank capital nows (net)  -1,7  -2,0  -3,6  -2,8  -2,6  -5,9  -3,7  -4,6  1,3  -1,4  -3,4 
2.1 Direct investment  -1,5  -0,2  -1,2  -0,4  -0,7  -1,9  -1.3  -1,8  -2,5  -2,5  0,1 
2.2 Portfolio investment  0,3  -0,8  -1,7  -2,7  -1,8  -2,6  -3,0  -3,6  4,0  0,4  -5,4 
2.3 Other net trans. of  non-govt.  -0,4  -0,8  -0,7  0,2  0,2  -1,1  0,8  0,9  -0,3  0,7  1,9 
sector 
2.4 Net transactions of  general  -0,2  -0,1  0,0  0,1  -0,4  -0,2  -0,2  -0,1  0,2  0,0  0,1 
government 
3. Net overseas transfers of  1,8  0,4  -0,3  1,4  0,9  3,2  2,2  2,7  0,6  3,1  3,1 
UK banks 
4. Subtotal (1+2+3)  -0.1  -0,4  -1,3  0,2  -0,5  -2,1  -0,7  -1,9  0,9  -1,5  -4,0 
Financed by : 
S. Change in official reserves 
4  -0,5  -0,1  1,0  0,5  0,2  0,3  -0,5  -0,8  -2,9  -0,6  1,1 
6. Balancine item 5  0,6  0,5  0,3  -0,7  0,3  1,8  1,2  2,7  2,0  2,0  3,0 
1) Economic forecasts of  the Commission Services, April-May 1990. 
2) Includes net labour income frolll-ab:o~_ 
3) Including unremitted profits. 
4) Increases in  reserves : (-). 
5) Including allocations of SDRs (1979, 1980 and 1981). 
Source : CSO. 
particularly marked :  over 1  1/2% p.a. on average be-
tween  1981  and 1989, with differences of over 4% in 
1983 and 1988.  This explains in part the strong growth 
in import volumes (excluding oil, over 8  1/2% p.a. be-
tween 1981  and 1989) and possibly a diversion of pro-
duction capacity from exports to the domestic markeL 
Nevertheless, cyclical differences alone are insufficient 
to explain the deterioration of the current balance fully. 
Exporters' cost competitiveness improved until the end 
of 1986. Since then, however, the position has worsened 
sharply, as a pronounced strengthening of the exchange 
rate has aggravated the tendency for UK unit labour costs 
to rise faster than in its main partners. Relative unit la-
bour costs in manufacturing measured in a common cur-
rency (the measure of the real exchange rate shown in 
Graph 1.1) thus rose by some 20% between the fourth 
quarter of 1986 and the  end of 1989. Whole economy 
Table 1.2 : Balance of payments. 
unit labour cost comparisons are even worse, because of 
a smaller difference in productivity performance in non-
manufacturing : against other Community countries the 
relative  UK increase  was  12%  in  1988  and  a  further 
4  1/2% in 1989. Nominal depreciation from early 1989 
has however, offered some relief, and 1990 on average 
should show a fall on 1989. 
An analysis over a longer period suggests in addition 
that more fundamental factors have influenced the UK's 
commercial  performance.  Import  penetration  ratios  in 
virtually all the principal sectors of manufacturing have 
increased significantly since the beginning of the 1980s, 
in total rising from 28% in 1981  to 35% in 1987 and 
1988 and 36% in March 1989. Some rise in such ratios is 
in itself to be expected from the trend towards increased 
international trade specialisation and  is thus a  common 
feature in most industrialised countries. For international -15-
comparison, the increase in the ratio over a longer period, 
between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, was 12% points 
in the UK (23% to 35%), 10% for France (20% to 30%) 
and 7% for Germany (15% to 23%). What is of concern 
is rather the  speed of increase  in  the  UK,  relative  to 
manufacturing  export performance,  the  kt1els  attained, 
and the fact that it occurred at the same time that signifi-
cant margins of domestic capacity remained unused in 
certain industries. These factors are evidence of an inade-
quate domestic supply response to the changes in domes-
tic demand. 
The trend in manufactured exports is more encoura-
ging: the steep decline in world market share before 1982 
was substantially arrested up to 1987; though the share 
slipped again in 1988 much of the slippage was recouped 
in 1989.  On balance, however,  apart from cyclical ef-
fects, it seems that the underlying tendency for trade per-
formance  to  worsen  continues  to  reflect  structural 
weaknesses accumulated in earlier years. 
Despite substantial identified direct and portfolio net 
outflows, the current deficit has  been fmanced without 
undue difficulty, partly through net bank borrowing and 
partly through unidentified net inflows. The latter is the 
balance of payments  balancing item,  which the  auth-
orities think principally reflects additional private capital 
inflows,  and which in recent years  has assumed huge 
dimensions: in 1989, for example, 3,2% of  GDP, or four-
ftfths of the current deficit This large unidentified ele-
ment implies that the UK capillll account is not at all 
well identified, possible reflecting the scale of fmancial 
transactions given London's fmancial role. It is striking, 
nevertheless,  that  the  "basic balance"  (current account 
and net direct investment and portfolio flows) has been 
consistently negative because of net "long-term" capital 
outflows. The identified short-term fmancing (essentially 
bank fmance) is cumulatively reducing net overseas earn-
ings (as seen in the reduction in I, P, D receipts in 1989) 
and further exposing the exchange rate (and thus domes-
tic stabilisation policy) to changes in foreign exchange 
market confidence. In the short- to medium-term, recent 
capital market trends (excluding the large repatriation of 
funds seen in 1987 after the world stock markets crisis) 
will probably continue, with institutional funds and direct 
investment giving  increasing weight to overseas, espe-
cially European, markets. In the absence of a substantial 
current account strengthening the UK's international pay-
ments  situation  will  continue somewhat fragile,  while 
buttressed by a very strong external asset position (UKL 
94,0 billion at end-1988). -16-
BOX 1.1 
SAVING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Substantial shifts have been occurring in personal sec-
tor saving behaviour and in the sectoral pattern of saving 
in the whole economy in recent years. The persontd &aV• 
ing  ratio  declined  sharply  between  1980  and  1988 
(Graph 1.14 A). In 1988 the saving ratio1 reached only 
A 
4,1% of  personal disposable income, the lowest since the 
1950s, before recovering somewhat in 1989. The decline 
started when real personal incomes were being squeezed 
during 1981 and 1982, but continued throughout the sub-
sequent period of rapid real  income growth. However, 
B 
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Graph 1.14 : Saving and investment. -17-
the estimates of  personal saving derived from the income 
and expenditure accounts (which are subject to wide mar-
gins of error and have undergone substantial revisions in 
recent periods) may overstate the steqmess of the  de-
cline; other estimates derived from fmancial transactions 
and investment data (admittedly also subject to mcer-
tainties and lacking full coverage) confirm the decline in 
the saving ratio but suggest that it has been more gradual 
and less marked. 
Among the factors which influenced personal saving in 
the 1980s were : 
•  the marked slowing in the  injllllion  rt11e  between 
1980 and 1983 which lessened the need to save in 
order to maintain the real value of  accumulated sav-
ings (real balance effect); 
•  the expansion of  emploJ111enl from 1983 onwards 
and the decline in unemploJ111ent from 1986 which 
had a  favourable impact on ·consumer confidence 
and weakened the precautionary motives for saving; 
•  a more general improvemera..t in JHrceptions offu-
tun pros~ciB, reflected in the rapid increases in 
the prices of equities and property held by the per-
sonal sector (wealth effect); 
•  den!guiMion tuUl innoNiion in the .financial sec-
tor,  which have widened the opportunities for and 
greatly facilitated personal borrowing; the stock of 
fmancialliabilities of the personal sector rose from 
73% of personal disposable income at end 1983 to 
over 110% at the end of the third quarter of 1989; 
the decline in the saving ratio is a reflection not so 
much of a  slower rate of asset accumulation but 
rather of  a faster expansion of  indebtedness; 
•  delllllgl'tllllak (e.g. age structure) and social devel-
op~UIIts which have led to a rapid rise in the num-
ber  of  households,  despite  slowing  population 
growth; the setting up of  new households, as well as 
a very active housing market, is associated with in-
creased spending on consumer durables, etc.; 
•  actuarial surpluses in private sector pension funds 
in recent years made possible a  reduction in em-
Table 1.3: Saving and investment by_sector 
(% ofGDP)  1980  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Gross saving 1 
-Households  8,8  6,3  5,6  3,7  2,5  3,2 
-Enterprises  9,1  12,2  12,2  12,5  12,7  10,8 
-General government  -o.sl  -0,4  -0,5  0,3  2,1  2,6 
Total  17,4 i 
I  18,1  17,4  16,5  17,3  16,6 
; 
Capital transfers (net receipts) 
-Households  0,1  0,1  -0,0  -0,1  -0.3  -0,2 
-Enterprises  0,2  0,0  0,0  -0,1  -0,0  -0,3 
-General  government  -0.4  -0.3  -0,1  0,1  0,2  0,3 
Gross investment 
1 
-Households  3,9  4.3  4,8  5,2  5,6  4,9 
-Enterprises  10,6  10,9  10,5  11,1  13,2  13,7 
-General  government  2,4  2,0  1_,_8  1,6  1,2  1,7 
Total  16,9  17,2  17,1  17,9  20,0  20,2 
Net lending (  +) or net borrowing (-) 
-Households  5,0  2,1  0,8  -1,5  -3.3  -1,9 
-Enterprises  -1,1  1,5  1,7  1,4  -0,5  -3,0 
-General government  -3,4  -2,7.  -2,4  -1,2  1,1  1,3 
Total domestic  o,s  0,9  0,1  -1,3  -2,7  -3,6 
Counterpart : 
-Balance of  current transactions with the rest of  world  1,2  0,9  -0,0  -1,0  -3,2  -4,1 
-Unexplained residual  -0,7  0,0  -0,1  0,3  o.~  0,5 
1) Excluding stock appreciation. 
Table 1.3 : Saving and investment by sectOr. -18-
ployers' contributions to these funds (equivalent to 
some 2% of personal disposable income between 
1983  and  1988), recorded as  a  reduction in both 
personal income and saving. 
Although personal saving has declined, relative to both 
personal income and GDP as a whole, there have been 
some offsetting movements in saving by other domestic 
sectors (Graph 1.14 B). In particular the enurprise &ec-
tor 2  benefiting from  a  recovery in profits,  has seen a 
substantial rise in its saving relative to GDP since 1980, 
partly compensating the fall in personal saving. At the 
same time the genel'lll goPemment sector moved from 
being a dissaver in the early years of the decade to mak-
ing positive saving after 1987. For the whole economy, 
therefore, saving as a percentage of GDP has remained 
reasonably stable (varying within the range 16 1/2- 18% 
since 1980). 
2)  Including public corpontiona. 
The upward movement in the inve&tment ratio since 
1981 and especially its upsurge in 1988 (particularly con-
centrated in the private business sector) led to a swing of 
5,4% of GDP in the whole economy saving{mvestment 
balance over the period  to  1989 (Graph  1.14 C).  The 
counterpart of  this was the deterioration in the current ex-
ternal balance, which moved from a surplus of 2,6% of 
GDP in 1981  to a deficit of 4,1% in 1989, a recorded 
swing of 6,7% of GDP (Graph 1.14 D). Deficiencies in 
the statistics mean that not all the change in the current 
account can at present be explained by the movements in 
domestic  saving  and  investment,  especially  in  1988, 
when the saving/investment deficit widened by 1,3% of 
GDP while the current external deficit was 2,1% of GDP 
larger than in the previous year (Table 1.3). -19-
BOX1.2 
THE LABOUR MARKET AND WAGE INFLATION 
Wage inflation has been a prominent aspect of British 
macroeconomic performance and, despite regulatory re-
forms introduced in the 1980s, continues to characterize 
recent trends. We review here some characteristics of the 
UK labour market which help explain the persistence of 
wage  inflation  during  the  1980s.  FirSt,  we  look  at 
labour market imbalances, and subsequently we provide 
some econometric evidence on wage determination. 
Brown and Wadhwani (1990) argue that the intended 
counterinflationary effect of  the labour market legislation 
of the 1980s failed to materialize. Union/non-union wage 
differentials did not narrow and over much of the period 
wage increases were stubbornly high despite record  le-
vels of unemployment (see Graph 1.15 which shows the 
rise in average earnings in manufacturing compared with 
the  unemployment rate).  The firSt  point to note is  the 
UK  unemployment and wages 
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Graph 1.15 : Unemployment and wages. 
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Graph 1.16: Long-term unemployment as% of total unemploym. -20-
Phillips curve-type behaviour of wage changes and un-
employment. The sharp increase in excess supply of la-
bour in the early 1980s was accompanied by an equally 
sharp deceleration in wage inflation. However, with the 
unemployment rate stabilizing at over 10% in the period 
between the  beginning  of 1982  and  the  end  of 1986, 
wage inflation did not decelerate significantly. This beha-
viour is consistent with the predictions of the hysteresis 
hypothesis, according to which high levels of unemploy-
ment  have  little  effect  on  wage  settlements;  instead, 
changes in unemployment determine wage changes.  In 
its weak form hysteresis predicts that the level as well as 
the change in unemployment determine wage inflation. 
On the basis of this hypothesis, the neoclassical predic-
tion that wage growth would accelerate once unemploy-
ment  falls  below  the natural  rate  has  no  explanatory 
power since the natural rate follows the actual rate of un-
employment. Wage inflation in this case does not reflect 
disequilibrium in the labour market.  Work at the  IMF 
(1988) fmds strong support for the hysteresis hypothesis 
in the case of the UK. 
played little or no role in wage determination. However, 
the evidence discussed below casts doubt on this proposi-
tion. Wage pressures may also reflect labour market im-
balances  and  a  deterioration  in the role  of the  labour 
market in job and worker allocation.  There is evidence 
that the relationship between unemployment and vacan-
cies has shifted outwards substantially in the 1980s sug-
gesting  that  labour  market  imbalances  have  indeed 
worsened. Graph 1.17 shows the time path of the unem-
ployment and vacancy rates in the 1980s, and Graph 1.18 
presents  the  vacancies-unemployment  (V  /U)  relation-
ship, over the period 1971-1989. The first graph clearly 
indicates that during much of the 1980s rising vacancies 
and  rising  unemployment  coexisted.  When  the  labour 
market allocates workers to  jobs efficiently, rising vac-
ancies (unemployment) should parallel falling unemploy-
ment (vacancies); in other words, changes in aggregate 
demand are mirrored in changes in vacancies and, in the 
opposite direction,  in unemployment.  Graph  1.17  sug-
gests that this was not a characteristic of the labour mar-
ket in the 1980s. 
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One aspect of hysteresis is the role of "insiders"('  out-
siders" in wage determination (Blanchard and Summers 
(1987)). According to this view wages are determined by 
union members ("insiders") without any influence from 
the excess supply conditions in the market for non-union 
workers  ("outsiders").  Graph  1.16  shows  the  ratio  of 
long-term unemployed to all unemployed workers in the 
1980s. This ratio rose sharply in the early 1980s and con-
tinued to stay high (close to 44%) through the rest of the 
decade. Casual empiricism would suggest that the  coex-
istence  of high  unemployment,  high  long-term  unem-
ployment, and high wage inflation is consistent with the 
hysteresis prediction.  In other words,  the long-term un-
employed,  who  have  contributed  substantially  to  the 
overall  increase  in  unemployment  in  the  1980s,  have 
Graph 1. 17 : Vacancy and unemployment rates. 
The shift in the V  /U relationship is most prominently 
shown in Graph 1.18. The efficiency of labour allocation 
appears to have been particularly high in the first part of 
the  1970s.  However, this relationship has  shifted deci-
sively to the right; the shift implies  that for a given level 
of  vacancies  (unemployment)  the  labour  market 
produced  more  unemployment  (vacancies)  over  the 
1980s. This is evidence of a decline in the matching pro-
cess and thus of reduced efficiency in labour allocation. 
Jackman,  Layard  and  Pissarides  (1989)  suggest  that 
the labour market imbalances shown by the shifting V  /U 
relationship reflect a decline in the effectiveness of the 
unemployed in searching for new jobs ("search effective-
ness");  and Layard  and  Bean (1989)  argue  that  micro 
studies point to  the  decline in the search efficiency of -21-
The V-U relationship in the UK 
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"outsiders" in fmding jobs (further discussion of the im-
portance of the V  /U relationship can be found in Blan-
chard and Diamond (1989)).  The implication for wage 
determination is that an increase in labour demand (vac-
ancies), for a given level of labour supply (unemploy-
ment), puts significantly more pressure on wages when 
labour market efficiency is reduced than when efficiency 
improves. This phenomenon appears to be a crucial fea-
ture of the labour market record of  the 1980s. 
The importance of these hypotheses for wage determi-
nation  in manufacturing  in  the  1980s  were  evaluated 
using a quarterly econometric model estimated over the 
period 1982 to  1988;  data from the recession period of 
the early 1980s were excluded. The dependent variable is 
the quarterly rate of change of nominal wages in manu-
facturing,  annualized  (NOMW  AGE).  The  explanatory 
variables  are  :  expected  inflation  (PYEXP,  the  fitted 
value of the quarterly change of the GDP deflator (at an 
amtual rate) on its past value over eight quarters);  manu-
facturing  productivity  growth  (OR);  the  percentage 
change in import prices (PMQ) at annual rates; the ratio 
of long-term to  total unemployed (LORA  TE/LURE);  a 
real wage resistance variable,  the deviation of nominal 
wage change from the change in the GDP deflator lagged 
two  quarters  (NOMW  AGE(  -2)  - PYDOT(  -2));  and  a 
, variable  representing  the  structural  component  of 
changes in the V  /U relationship (VUST). Tile latter is ap-
proximated by the deviation of the cyclical component of 
the V  /U relationship from the absolute value of the V  /U 
relationship (the cyclical component is, in turn, the fitted 
value of the V  /U variable on the deviation of actual from 
potential output and on its value lagged one quarter); this 
deviation is  interpreted  as  the  structural  component of 
V  /U movements. OLS results, predicated on the complete 
absence  of money illusion  (i.e.a  coefficient of one on 
PYEXP), are as follows: 
Graph 1.18: The vacancy-unemployment relationship. 
NOMWAGE=  PYEXP+7,293  -t0,128*(PQM) 
(1,90)  (2,20) 
-t0,143*(GR(-3))  -0,483*(LORA  TE/LURE) 
(1,76)  (2,94) 
-t0,582*(NOMW  AGE(-2))-PYDOT(-2) 
(4,44) 
-t0,309*(VUSn 
(3,32) 
R2 = 0,72, DW = 1,75, SER = 2,17, n= 1982:Q1- 1988:Q4 
(absolute t-statistics in parentheses) 
Tile results suggest that the nominal wage is composed 
of an expected domestic inflation component, compensa-
tion for import price movements, and productivity gains. 
The  results  confirm  that  three  shocks  impinge  on the 
wage function : the ratio of long-term to total unemploy-
ment,  which is found to have exerted a substantial re-
straining effect on wage growth (a  1%  increase  in the 
ratio LORATE/LURE slows  wage  growth by  approxi-
mately one-half of a percent);  real  wage resistance,  in 
that past real wage gains are partially reflected in current 
wage movements;  and the structural component of the 
V  IU relationship, which suggests that a  1%  increase in 
structural imbalances would accelerate wage growth  by 
one third of one percent. 
The  results  cast  doubt  on the  hysteresis  hypothesis 
about the role of long-term unemployed in wage determi-
nation;  more importantly, they confirm that labour mar-
ket imbalances have been an important factor in  wage 
growth. This factor must have been particularly import-
ant  during  the  post-1987  period  of high  employment 
when  labour  shortages  became  especially  pronounced 
This evidence, as well as the anomalous behaviour of the 
structure of excess demand in the labour market in the 
1980s,  suggest  that the  UK  labour  market remains  an 
area where further policy initiatives would be warranted. 
! -22-
CHAPTER2 
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980s 
2.1 Introduction 
The character of British economic policy in the  1980s 
was radically different from that in previous decades. The 
coming  into office of the Conservative government in 
1979 not only aimed at breaking the tradition of "stop-
go" policies which were prominent during previous ad-
ministrations,  but also provided a  different  intellectual 
approach to managing the economy. 
This revisionism was partly a reflection of the ascend-
ancy of monetarism and of classical fmancial principles 
in academic and in policy centres. These ideas found fer-
tile ground in the UK where rising inflation, deteriorating 
labour market conditions, a worsening industrial relations 
climate,  and  inadequate  policy  responses  had charac-
terized recent economic history. 
The overriding objective of economic policy in 1979 
was the  reduction and containment of inflation,  which, 
after running at an average 4,2% p.a. in the period 1966-
1969, had accelerated to  12,9%  in the subsequent  ten 
years and reached 21,9% in May 1980 (all-items Retail 
Prices Index). The government's approach to containing 
inflation was enshrined in the Medium-Term Financial 
Strategy (MTFS), a framework within which monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate policies were to be formulated. 
In it, monetarist principles were reflected in the fact that 
the  government  adopted nominal  targets  for monetary 
growth and expected to reduce the rate of inflation by 
gradually reducing the rate of monetary growth. The ob-
jectives of reducing public borrowing - itself subject to 
target - and stabilising the ratio of debt to GDP were con-
sistent with the principle that current deficits should be 
expected to be offset by future surpluses; as a result, gov-
ernment deficits were not regarded as contributing to in-
flation. In addition to subjecting macroeconomic policy 
to the constraints of  the MTFS, the government pursued a 
series of other reforms  aimed at improving  the supply 
side of the economy.  These included reforms aimed at 
the  tax  system,  fmancial  and  labour  markets  and 
measures to privatize certain public sector activities. 
Perhaps the crucial innovation in British economic pol-
icy in the 1980s was not the commitment to combat infla-
tion 1 , but the priority placed on the supply side of the 
economy and the reduced emphasis on demand manage-
ment. Furthermore, the recognition that policy commit-
ments needed to be credible was an essential ingredient 
in the design and adoption of the MTFS. Following the 
Labour government's Letter of  Intent to the IMF in 1976, 
the MTFS represents the second and most important de-
velopment in recent British fiscal history, and it is par-
ticularly significant in that it adopted flSCal  restraint in 
1981 at a time when output was below potential. 
2.2 The philosophy and performance of 
theMTFS 
The central feature of the  publicly  announced econ-
omic strategy in 1979 was gradualism. The tightening of 
monetary and fiscal  policy embodied in the MTFS  in-
volved  a  gradual  reduction  in  nominal  GDP  growth 
brought about by a  reduction in the growth of money 
supply, sterling M3; a reduction in the level of  real gov-
ernment spending within four years to five percent less 
than the level in the 1979-80 fmancial year; and a reduc-
tion in the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) 
from 4  3/4% of GDP in 1979-80 to 1 1/2% of GDP in 
1983-84.  The proposed course of monetary  and fiscal 
policy  implied  a  sharp  decline  in  the  public  sector's 
stimulus to economic activity and a significant tightening 
of  macroeconomic conditions. 
The MTFS is a nominal framework, within which in-
flation  and real  activity are determined by supply-side 
developments,  in turn influenced by government initia-
tives. The rationale for the MTFS was that the consist-
ency of short-term policy actions should be judged in the 
context of a medium-term framework which, in addition, 
would enhance the credibility of the government's policy 
commitments  and  reduce  uncertainty  about  future 
policies.  As a result,  it was  expected that the benefits 
from  policy  credibility  would  also be manifest  in the 
short-run and would minimize the output costs of the pr<r 
posed anti-inflation strategy 2• These considerations are 
particularly  relevant  in  the  light  of the  stabilisation 
failures of the 1970s. 
The intent of the MTFS was to combine monetary and 
fiscal policy in a coordinated manner to reduce inflation. 
The necessity for policy coordination was based on the 
recognition that a decline in monetary growth was an es-
sential prerequisite to reduce inflation while, at the same 
time,  it was contended that pressures on interest rates, 
emanating from fiscal deficits in the early 1980s, had to 
be contained by reducing the presence of the public sec-
tor in capital markets. In other words, coordination im-
plied that the projected interest rate increases associated 
1) 
2) 
Such commitments were common throughout the 1970s; the Labour Govermnent'  s announcement of monetary targets to combat infla-
tion in 1976 is an indication of  the determination involved. 
In retrospect, the output cost of the 1981-85 disinflation was substantial A measure of  output cost ev~uated in the light of the d~e 
in inflation is the "sacrifice ratio". In the UK the ratio of cumulative increase in 1Dlemployment over 1ts 1980 level to 1985, relatJ.ve to 
the  decline in inflation during this period, amounts to 1,8; this is lower than Germany's and France's (6,8 and 2,1, repectively) but 
higher than other countries' and quite high in absolute value. See Bean and Symons (1989), Table 3. -23-
with monetary restraint would not be amplified by fis-
cally-induced pressures on fmancial markets. 
In setting PSBR targets, the government takes account 
of several factors, including the desired balance between 
fiscal  and monetary policy, the phase of the economic 
cycle, international and domestic fmancial  and interest 
rate developments, oil revenues,  and  privatisation pro-
ceeds. The latter are treated as negative expenditure and 
thus reduce the PSBR; consequently, the reported PSBR 
data have at times overestimated the extent of fiscal ad-
justment actually  occwring.  However,  the  PSBR anc, 
more recently the PSDR (public sector debt repayment 
i.e. a negative PSBR) targets take account of prospective 
privatisation proceeds, and attention has been  drawn to 
the PSDR excluding privatisation proceeds )n order to 
represent the fiscal stance more accurately 3. 
Table 2.1  reports the respective four-year projections 
and outcomes for the PSBR presented in successive bud-
get statements  over  the  period  1980-1989.  As  can be 
The data also reveal that the PSBR targets may not 
have constituted a rigid policy course. In the 1980-81 re-
cession the PSBR amounted to 5,3% of GDP, over 2 per-
centage  points  higher  than  projected  in March  1980. 
Bean and Symons (1989) argue that this overrun is less 
pronounced than could have been expected under pre-
vious  administrations,  indicating  the reluctance of the 
goverment to engage in short-term stabilisation at the 
cost of abandoning its connnitment to the  publicly an-
nounced policy course and to medium-term objectives. 
On the other hand, discrepancies between actual and tar-
get values of the PSBR reflect the cyclical sensitivity of 
the variable and suggest that strict adherence to the pre-
announced objectives may be suboptimal when forecasts 
of the economy can be inaccurate. Adjustment of PSBR 
objectives due to cyclical developments would, however, 
erode the credibility gains inherent in the policy in the 
rrrst place. 
The initial disinflation and the inflation acceleration in 
the  post-1986 period raise several  questions  about the 
Table 2.1: United Kingdom medium-term financial strategy (MTFS) 
Projections and outcomes for the public sector borrowing requirement 
(financial years; % of  GDP) 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Projections 
MTFS 1980  4 3/4  31/4  3  21/4  11/2 
MTFS 1981  6  41/4  31/4  2 
MTFS 1982  41/4  3 1/2  23/4  2 
MTFS 1983  2 3/4  2314  21/2  2 
MTFS 1984  31/4  21/4  2 
MTFS 1985  31/4  2 
MTFS 1986  2 
MTFS 1987 
MTFS 1988 
MTFS 1989 
MTFS 1990 
Outturn  4,8  5,3  3,3  3,1  3.1  3,1  1.6 
Source : Fmancial Statement and Budget Report, various issu~. 
seen,  the  goal  of reducing  the  PSBR/GDP  ratio  was 
reached and, in fact, a surplus was achieved in 1987-88. 
This  success encouraged the government to set a  zero 
PSBR for  the 1989-90 fiscal  year. However, the emer-
gence of a surplus equivalent to 3,0% of  GDP in 1988-89 
prompted the adoption of a gradual approach to the zero 
PSBR objective; the March 1990 MTFS projected a sur-
plus  declining  to  the  equivalent of 1/2%  of GDP  by 
1991-92 and falling to zero subsequently. 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
2  1 3/4  1 3/4 
2  1 3/4  1 3/4 
1 3/4  1 3/4  11/l  1 1/l  1112 
1  1  1  1  1  1 
-3/4  -3/4  0  0  0 
-3  -2 3/4  -1 3/4  -1  -1/2 
11/4  1/2  0  0 
0.9  -0.9  -3 0  -1.5 
Table 2.1  : Medium-term financial strategy (MTFS). 
contribution of the MTFS and its exact role in influenc-
ing the government's key policy objective, the control of 
inflation.  As can be seen in Table 2.2,  nominal  GDP 
growth declined from 17,9% in 1979 to 6,9% in 1986 but 
accelerated  to  11,3%  in  1988.  The  inflation  rate  (as 
measured by the GDP deflator) fell  to a  low  3,5% in 
1986, partly reflecting the decline in oil prices; however, 
inflation accelerated to 6,7% in 1989. What has been the 
role of  the MTFS in these developments ? 
3)  A general discussion of the fiscal and budgetary implications of  privatization can be fotmd in Mansoor (1988). I 
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Table 2.2 : UK GDP, volumes and  prices  / 
1\ 
\  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
N~lGDP2.3  17,7  16,9  10,0  9,5 
RealGDP 2  -.  2,8  -2,2  -1,3  1,7 
GDP deflator 3  14,4  19,5  11,4  7,6 
1 Forecasts of  the Commission services, April-May 1990 
2 Average estimate, tparket prices 
9,1 
3,6 
5,3 
(%change) 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
1  1991
1 
6,9  9,5  7,2  9,9  11,3  9,4  8,0  7,9 
2,1  3,7  3,6  4,7  4,5  2,3  1,6  2,4 
4,6  5,6  3,5  5,0  6,5  6,9  6,3  5,4 
3 After removing distortion arising from introduction of  local authorities' Community Charge 
Of the two elements in the MTFS, the role of  monetary 
restraint  is  uncontroversial  :  moderation  in  monetary 
growth is a necessary condition to reduce the trend rate of 
inflation. However, the role of fiscal  (PSBR) targets is 
less  certain.  The  evidence  that  public  sector  deficits 
and/or debt affect real interest rates,  as  argued by the 
MTFS plan, is ambiguous 
4
• In particular, since interest 
rates are primarily determined in international fmancial 
markets, fiscal targets may be of  questionable importance 
in interest rate determination. 
Another possible reason for the fiscal targets relates to 
the  issue  of  sustainability  of fiscal  deficits  and  the 
possible interaction between fiscal deficits and inflation; 
this relationship is weakened by the government's com-
mitment to fiscal targets. According to Sargent and Wal-
lace (1981), a low rate of current monetary growth may 
raise  expectations  about  future  inflation  through  debt 
monetization in the presence of large prospective fiscal 
imbalances, unless it is accompanied by fiscal restraint. 
Sargent (1981) argued that the MTFS was not credible 
because the plan, based on targetted monetary growth 
and large fiscal deficits, was not feasible 5• Begg (1987) 
and Bean and Symons (1989), however, pointed out that 
the role of  printing money to fmance goverment spending 
is trivial in the UK context and the corresponding risk of 
future monetization was insignificant. The link between 
deficits and inflation, or the sustainability of projected 
deficits, were thus unimportant issues in understanding 
the role of fiscal targets in the MTFS. Begg (1987) went 
further to note that "the announced PSBR targets bear so 
little relation to the information one would really wish 
Table 2.2: GOP, volumes and prices. 
about the sustainability of the currently envisaged fiSCal 
programme that they cannot seriously be viewed as en-
hancing the credibility ... of medium-term fiSCal  policy. 
They do, however, have an important implication for the 
... contingent aspect of policy." In reviewing the case that 
fiscal  targets strengthened the conduct of monetary re-
straint, he found that "the fiscal component of the MTFS 
was (n)either necessary (n)or sufficient for the conduct of 
tight monetary policy". This view was echoed by Bean 
and Symons (1989) who commented that a number of in-
dustrial countries have successfully implemented disin-
flationary programmes without fiscal correction, and that, 
while "fiscal correction may often be an essential part of 
a  disinflationary programme, particularly where capital 
markets are thin and seignorage is important, it is not ob-
vious that it was necessary in the British case". 
The importance of the fiscal targets should be seen in 
the light of the change in regime in 1979. The PSBR tar-
gets were an attempt to establish a credible anti-inflation-
ary policy by promising to switch off the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers 6,  to tighten fiscal policy should inflation rise 
unexpectedly 7,  to promote productivity growth, and to 
remove economic  disincentives.  In the process,  short-
term demand management was rejected from the policy 
choices while the government's credibility was enhanced 
by the fiscal restraint amidst the  1981  recession.  Begg 
(1987) contended that the fiscal targets contributed indi-
rectly  to  the  anti-inflationary  stance  by  promising  to 
tighten the real fiscal stance, and not to ease fiSCal policy, 
should real interest rates rise, in an attempt to reduce the 
burden of debt. The fact that only marginal adjustments 
4)  The empirical literature coocemed with the effect of  fiscal variables on interest rates is very large but deals primarily with the US situ-
ation. 
5)  Sargent (1981) noted that "a minimal requirement that a plan be credible is that it is feasible in the first place. A restrictive "k-percent" 
rule for the (monetary) base and a pennanent and large government deficit just are not feasible. On this view, in order that the current 
British plan be viewed as credible it is necessary that the large prospective govermnent deficits over the next several years be counter-
balanced by prospective surpluses down the line. It is difficult to point to much either in current legislation or, equally important, in the 
general British political climate that could objectively support such an outlook. On this view, the large government deficits that have 
accompanied the government  •  s medium-tenn financial strategy raise serious questions about whether the plan has the logical coherence 
that is necessary for the plan to be credible to the public". Sargent's concerns have proved to be unfounded: the public sector, instead 
of running unsustainable, inflation-inducing, deficits has been repaying public debt since the 1987-88 financial year. Furthennore, Bean 
and Symons (1989) argue that the coocems were misplaced, since in 1979 the pennanent fiscal deficit was zero. 
6)  This is Buiter and Miller's (1983) poinL 
7)  Since the fiscal targets were announced in nominal tenns, based on inflation and GDP projections, an unexpected increase (decrease) in 
inflation corresponds to a tighter (easier) real fiscal stance. -25-
to the PSBR tar~e~ have ~n  xfde over the past ~n 
years supports this mterpretat10n.,  ' 
Since the fiscal component cqilld only indirectly con-
tribute to the anti-inflationary s~e,  the recent accelera-
tion  of inflation  may  be  attqbuted  to  past  monetary 
policy errors or to the absence of an inflation target in the 
medium-term strategy or both~ A review of the conduct 
of monetary policy is presented in the next section. On 
the other hand, the fiscal targets are too vague about their 
inflation  implications  and  so  may  be  inadequate  to 
moderate inflation expectations and to secure price sta-
bility. A nominal anchor, such as an explicit inflation tar-
get or ERM participation 8, may be required to promote 
price stability in the medium term. 
2.3 Monetary policy 
The essential instrument of monetary policy in the UK 
is the short-term rate of interest: the commercial banks' 
base lending rates are determined through changes in the 
rate  at  which the  Bank of England purchases eligible 
Treasury and commercial bills from discount houses 9• 
Direct controls which were occasionally employed in the 
1970s have not been used since 1980. Reserve require-
ments are minimal (0,45%) and are set by prudential con-
siderations, not for reasons of monetary control. Higher 
reserve ratios  are regarded as  being detrimental  to the 
competitiveness of the British banking system. The ex-
change rate has also been used to  influence monetary 
conditions, particularly after the breakdown of monetary 
targetting. 
A policy intended to offset excessive growth in the de-
mand for bank credit by the private sector was in place 
until1985. The policy, known as "overfunding", required 
that government securities be sold to the non-bank public 
to offset the extra liquidity associated with the increased 
demand for bank credit. In effect, "overfunding" aimed at 
stabilizing interest rates 10• However, since short-term in-
terest rates could be controlled by the Bank of England 
with the intent of influencing growth of the monetary ag-
gregates,  the  policy  of "overfunding"  made no  inde-
pendent contribution  to  liquidity  or monetary  control. 
Since 1985 a policy of "full funding" has been pursued so 
as to produce a neutral impact of government fmance on 
liquidity.  The new  policy requires  that  transactions  in 
government debt in the course of  financial year equal the 
balance of maturing  debt,  and  any  ch~ge in official 
reserves; however, this rule has not been applied rigid-
lyll.  ; 
I 
Monetary  targets  have played  a  central  role  in the 
MTFS  and  have been  key instruments in the govern-
ment's anti-inflation policy. Monetary targets were frrst 
announced in 1976 with the Labour Government's Letter 
of Intent to the IMF. However, during the 1980s, the UK 
experienced the same difficulties as other industrial coun-
tries  in interpreting signals  from  the behaviour of the 
monetary aggregates  about interest rates and aggregate 
spending. As a result, the monetary aggregate monitored 
as a policy guide has changed several times and, also, in-
formation from other economic and fmancial indicators 
has been used to supplement information from the mon-
etary aggregates. While initially broad monetary aggre-
gates  were targetted,  from  1986 an explicit target has 
only been set for the monetary base, MO, a narrow aggre-
gate comprising mainly currency in circulation. 
Table 2.3  summarizes the  experience with monetary 
targetting since 1980; it also shows other variables which 
at the same time have been subject to a target range. It is 
clear that M3 overshot its range or advanced very close to 
its upper range systematically during the 1980-86 period. 
M 1 was no more successful and a broad liquidity aggre-
gate, PSL2, grew above its target range as well. MO, on 
the other hand, posted within-target growth in the four 
years  1984-87 but grew  above the range in  1988  and 
1989. The authorities have placed more emphasis on MO 
because the narrow  aggregate has displayed  mo~e sta-
bility.  This is  also reflected  in the  fact that  the  target 
bound for annual growth in the aggregate has been re-
duced by 3 percentage points, from 4-8% in 1984 to 1-
5% for the post-1988 period. 
The difficulties encountered in the conduct of mon-
etary policy implemented with a targetting procedure are 
reflected in the frequency with which the choice of tar-
getted aggregate has changed. While initially sterling M3 
exhibited a stable relationship with spending and interest 
rates, in 1982 and 1983 it was necessary also to use infor-
mation from M1 and PSL2; in the period 1984-1986 both 
sterling M3 and MO were targetted while M1 and PSL2 
were dropped; from 1986 on, only MO has been formally 
8)  Issues related to ERM participation are addressed in the next chapter. 
9)  See Goodhart's (1989) discussion, particularly pp. 31:7-328. 
10)  Goodhart (1989) provides an extensive analysis of "overfunding". The policy was motivated by the apparent trivial response of mon-
etary aggregates to changes in interest rates; in the event. Bank of England measures to offset movements in monetaiy aggregates were 
necessary. 
11)  A discussion of  funding policy can be found in the 1990-91 "Financial Statement and Budget Report", HM Treasury, March 1990. -26-
Table 2.3 : Target and actual monetary growth in the MTFS 
(growth rates in %) 
Monetary Aggregate 
£M3  M1  PSL2  MO  Other variables 
Target ] Actual  Target j Actual  Target I  Actual  Target 1  Actual 
MTFS 1980  7-11  19112  PSBR 
MTFS 1981  6-10  12 3/4  PSBR 
MTFS 1982  8-12  111/4  8-12  121/4  8-12  11112  PSBR 
MTFS 1983  7-11  9 3/4  7-11  14  7-11  12112  PSBR 
MTFS 1984  6-10  12  4-8  5112  PSBR 
MTFS 1985  5-9  16112  3-7  3112  PSBR;  NominalGDP 
MTFS 1986  11-15  14112  2-6  4  PSBR;  NominalGDP 
MTFS 1987  2-6  5 3/4  PSBR;  NominalGDP 
MTFS 1988  1-5  61/4  PSBR;  NominalGDP 
MTFS 1989  1-5  6  PSBR;  NominalGDP 
MTFS 1990  1-5  PSBR;  NominalGDP 
Source : Financial Statement and Budget Report, various issues. 
targetted. However, information from the PSBR as well 
as from movements in nominal GDP relative to target (or 
"broad objective",  as  the path for nominal  GDP is de-
scribed) has supplemented the evidence from the mon-
etary  aggregates  since  1985.  Since  1987,  the exchange 
rate has also played an important role in the detennina-
tion of monetary policy. Clearly, the broader the spec-
trum of variables monitored, the less easy it becomes to 
explain policy unambiguously. 
The sources of instability characterizing the relation-
ship  between  monetary  aggregates,  interest  rates,  and 
nominal spending have been institutional and regulatory 
changes, competition and fmancial innovation. At the in-
itial stage, sterling M3  was chosen as  the intermediate 
target because a stable money demand function for this 
aggregate was  found to have existed in the  1960s and 
1970s 12. However, the aggregate displayed instability as 
soon as it was targetted. Two developments are important 
here: the abolition of exchange controls in 1979, and the 
removal of the supplementary (non-interest bearing) spe-
cial deposits (SSD  or "the Corset")  in  1980;  these had 
Table 2.3 :Target and actual money growth in the MTFS. 
been  adopted in  1973 in response to accelerating infla-
tion. The removal of the Corset was regarded as essential 
to prevent intermediation being driven outside the bank-
ing system in the event of a prolonged use of the SSDs. 
Adaptation to the deregulated environment of the 1980s 
meant that the cost of holding money, and the portfolio 
opportunities which emerged, could not be represented 
by simple money demand relationships commonly used 
in the design of monetary targetting procedures. Further-
more, overshooting of targets was likely to be a reflection 
of changing  behaviour  with  respect  to  holding  money 
balances, particularly in an environment of disinflation, 
and not an excess supplr: of money which could have in-
flationary implications  3. How difficult it was to inter-
pret monetary policy  at  a  time  of structural  change in 
money demand can be seen from the experience with the 
targetting  of sterling  M3  in  1981.  While  above-target 
growth would have suggested that monetary policy was 
easy, interest rates were rising, the exchange rate was ap-
preciating and output was declining substantially below 
potential;  the  growth  of sterling  M3  was  inconsistent 
with the tightening of monetary conditions under way. 
12)  It is questionable how stable the sterling M3 function was in the fint place. Goodhart (1989) noted that the stability of the function had 
brokm down in 1972-73 and had remained unstable ever since. The reason why the authorities chose this aggregate as an intermediate 
target in 1979 was that the surge in prices and nominal spending in 197  4-75 were attributed to earlier changes in sterling M3, confirm-
ing the presumed link between money and nominal variables. 
It is clearly essmtial to have a stable relationship between nominal spending and the targeted variable. With velocity of circulation con-
stant, the growth of the monetary aggregate can be projected on the basis of real expenditure and inflation. Assigning them specific 
value yields the target range for the monetary aggregate. In tum, the path of the monetary aggregate ~erves as a leading indicator of 
movemenu in spending and in inflation. H growth is placing the aggregate above iu target range it could signal the need for a tighte-
ning of policy; assuming that the monetary aggregate is responsive to interest rate movemenu, monetary contraction would require 
higher interest rates. The breakdown in money demand relationships in the 1980s has rendered this framework obsolete. 
13)  A change in money holding behaviour may occur if  people are willing to hold more money than previously at given levels of income 
and prices; in this case the ratio of income to money, or the income velocity of circulation, declines. Greater holdings of money balan-
ces, held willingly, do not constitute an inflationary threaL (5) 
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As  information from  the monetary  aggregates conti-
nued to represent inadequately prospective inflation and 
nominal spending developments  and the  state of mon-
etary tightness, the authorities gave more prominence to 
the exchange rate. This has been particularly pronounced 
since 1987 when several factors impinging on the inter-
national  value of sterling  became less  important  :  the 
smaller role of oil in the UK economy and the initial de-
cline in inflation and in inflation differentials between the 
UK and other industrial countries. In addition, commit-
ment to international cooperation and to exchange rate 
stability  implied  that policy should be framed  with  a 
view to the exchange rate as well. From February 1987 to 
February 1988, the  sterling exchange rate was not per-
mitted to exceed 3 DM. It was recognised that maintain-
ing exchange rate stability might not always be consistent 
with interest rate objectives, although following the Oc-
tober 1987 crash of world stock markets there were addi-
tional fears of a threat to stability that incited UK and 
other countries' authorities to depress interest rates. The 
consequent decline in rates, nevertheless, contributed to 
easing monetary conditions to an extent, viewed in retro-
spect, inappropriate given the strength of demand The 
re-emergence of  inflation in 1989 may in part be a conse-
quence of the monetary ease pursued during this period. 
Real  interest rates remained high during most of the 
1980s. During the period of disinflation at the beginning 
of the decade the real 3-month Treasury bill rate was ne-
gative. However, the rapid decline in inflation and  the 
slow downward adjustment of short-term rates, reflecting 
to some extent the determination of the authorities  to 
contain inflation, led  to rapid increases  in real interest 
rates. From a trough of -0.83% in the second quarter of 
Graph 2. 1 : Yield curve and inflation. 
1981, the real3-month Treasury bill rate rose to 7,25% in 
the first  quarter of 1985;  its  average value to the flrst 
quarter of 1990 was 4,82%. 
Much of the movement in real short-term interest rates 
was due to  the volatility of nominal rates.  Long-term 
yields displayed much less volatility during the  1980s. 
Developments  in  the  differential  between  long- and 
short-term interest rates can be indicative of movements 
in inflation expectations; a steepening (flattening) of the 
yield curve is a reflection of deteriorating (improving) 
expectations about inflation prospects during the term of 
the f'mancial instrumenL Graph 2.1 shows the differential 
between the 20-year Govenunent bond and the 3-month 
Treasury bill rates and the inflation rate measured by the 
year on year rise in the RPI since 1980. The f'mt point to 
note is that the yield curve bas been inverted during sev-
eral quarters; in the beginning of the period, in the mid-
1980s, and since the spring of 1988 the differential has 
been negative. These have been periods when actual in-
flation  was high or accelerating  and  inflation expecta-
tions were deteriorating,  and  monetary policy acted to 
counter  these  developments.  One  explanation  for  the 
failure of the bond market to reflect adequately these in-
flation  developments  may  indicate  the  credibility  the 
authorities enjoyed; bond yields did not rise commensur-
ately with inflation because market participants had con-
fidence  in  the  government's  anti-inflationary 
commitment. The prompt increases in short-term interest 
rates during these periods and the tightening of monetary 
conditions are consistent with this interpretation. How-
ever, the graph also suggests that monetary policy fol-
lowed rather than anticipated inflation developments. The 
inflation accelerations in the second quarter of 1983, in ----l 
Index o1  monetary conditions 
and the inflation rate 
1980  Ql ..  0  % p.a. 
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the third quarter of 1986, and at the beginning of 1988, 
were accompanied by some steepening in the yield curve, 
before  the  differential  turned  negative.  According  to 
some  analysts,  debt repayment has  also contributed to 
keeping down yields in some segments of the tenn struc-
ture;  this,  however,  implies  non-substitutability  among 
foreign  and domestic  assets  and  segmented bond mar-
kets, which may be less plausible in an area of increasing 
international fmancial integration. 
Graph 2.3: Sterling effective exchange rate. 
Since interest rates and the exchange rate together can 
be viewed as  monetary policy  transmission  agents,  an 
index of  monetary cond1,tions combining both is shown jn 
Graph 2.2 together with the rate of inflation. The compo-
nents of the index. the 3-mon.th Treasury bill rate and the 
Bank of  England's nominal effective exchange rate index 
for  sterling,  are presented in Graph 2.3.  The monetary 
conditions  index,  which  is  defined  as  zero  in the  first 
quarter  of 1980,  represents  the  contractionary  (expan--29-
sionary) impact on aggregate demand of movements in 
the interest rate and in the exchange rate 14• To the extent 
that price changes reflect deviations of output from its 
potential, an inflationary (deflationary) shock can be off-
set by appropriate monetar} restraint (ease). Consequent-
ly, the index of  monetary conditions reflects the course of 
anti -inflationary policy. 
As can be seen from Graph 2.~. in at least three epi-
sodes dwing the  1980s interest rates and the exchange 
rate moved in opposite  directionS~ indicating offsetting 
impacts on demand In late 1980, the expansionary effect 
of interest rate declines was offset by an appreciation of 
sterling; although the latter had a dramatic impact on the 
manufacturing sector (see Chapter 1), it also contributed 
to disinflation.  The decline in sterling from mid-1985 
was resisted temporarily; the impact of the recovery of 
the currency from its trough in the fourth quarter of 1986 
was partly balanced by the interest rate declines in the 
aftermath  of the  October  1987  stock  market  episode. 
Since the spring of 1989, the exchange rate has weakened 
while short-term interest  rate~ have risen substantially. 
Movements in the index closely parallel movements in 
the inflation rate.  Graph 22 shows the easing of mon-
etary conditions since the beginning of 1980, effected by 
exchange depreciation and declines in interest rates, and 
the  decline  in inflation.  However,  while inflation dis-
played a gentle upward trend from the end of 1986 to the 
beginning of 1988, and then accelerated, monetary condi-
tions continued to indicate a trend easing of policy until 
the spring of 1988.  The exchange appreciation in late 
1987 and early 1988 was not contractionary to the extent 
required to restrain demand; in addition, interest rate de-
clines associated with stabilizing sterling at around 3 DM 
during this period contributed to the buoyancy of  demand 
and eased monetary conditions. The inflation potential of 
I 
I 
these circumstances was fVentually  shown in the price 
increases which followed Subsequently in 1988, mon-
etary conditions tightened significantly, primarily as are-
sult of the interest rate increases implemented from May. 
Monetary conditions were flat through 1989 as inflation 
reached a plateau; the inflation acceleration in 1990 has 
not prompted any further tightening of monetary condi-
tions. 
2.4 Fiscal and budgetary policy 
The adoption of targets for the PSBR and the intention 
to adhere to them represent a choice not to influence ag-
gregate demand through fiscal policy. However, because 
the  targets are specified in nomlnal terms and inflation 
can rise or fall  unexpectedly the stance of fiscal policy 
must be evaluated in real terms. The recent inflation ac-
celerati~  for example, has reduced the value of the debt 
repayment (PSDR) and has made the contribution of the 
fiscal  stance, in real terms, less contractionary.  This is 
one of  several considerations in evaluating the net expan-
sionary contribution of the public fmances to the econ-
omy ts. 
Table 2.4 shows indices of fiscal  policy since 1979. 
The PSBR is  the  actual  borrowing  requirement which 
treats privatization proceeds as a negative capital expen-
diture;  the  public  sector  fmancial  surplus  (PSFS)  or 
deficit  (PSFD)  treats  them  as  a  form of fmance  and, 
therefore, provides a more accurate picture of the press-
ures the public sector exerts on capital markets; the cycli-
cally and inflation adjusted public sector fmancial surplus 
(PSFSC)  is  the  OECD's estimate of the cyclically ad-
justed budget deficit after taking account of the impact of 
inflation on outstanding government net debt, and gives 
an indication of the  discretionary component of fiscal 
policy. The data reveal that there can be considerable dif-
14)  The index is based on the hypothesis that deviatioos of real output from its base (or target, or potential) value can be offset by interest 
rate and/or exdlange rate deviations from their base values; this is the IS curve written in deviatioo form: 
log(y) -log(y*) = -aCR-R*)- b(log(EXCH) -log(EXCH*)) + u- u* 
where: 
y = real output or demand 
R =nominal rate of  interest 
EXCH =nominal exhange rate index, foreign currency per unit of dootestic currency 
u =  disturbance term 
a = interest semi-elasticity of demand 
b = exchange rate elasticity of  demand. 
Starred variables represent base case values. Oearly. a positive disturbance (u-u*>O) which raises output above y* can be offset by an 
increase in interest rates (R-R•>O) or an exchange rate appreciatioo (EXCH- EXCH*>O) or some combination of  both. The index can 
be rewritten as : IMC = (R-R*) +(alb) (log(EXCH) -log(EXCH*)) x 100. 
This is presented in graph 2.2. The base chosen was the fmt quarter of 1980 when interest rates peaked; the exchange rate peaked in the 
first quarter of 1981. 1be index should, therefore, be interpreted in tenns of movements from the base. For example, Graph 2.2 shows 
that. relative to the peak of disinflatiooary ccnditions at the beginning of 1980, mooetary ccnditions generally eased up to the end of 
1984. While the nominal index is useful in representing short-tenn policy movements, over.longer periods when price stability is less 
assured a real index of  monetary ccnditions should be use.d, 
V aloes for the parameters were obtained from the OECD INTERLINK model (Richardson, 1987). According to this, a one percentage 
point decrease in short-tenn interest rates, which fixed exchange rates, raises real UK GOP by 0,4 percent; a 10 percent exchange rate 
depreciation, with fixed interest rates, raises real GOP by 0,9%. The slope term i'l 0,09,U,4 = 0,225 : the interest rate effect is almost 
five times as large as lhe exchange rate effect 
15)  See the discussion in Heller. Haas and Mansur (1986) as well as the notes edited by Blejer and O.u (1988); see also Seth (1989) and 
Yarrow ( !989), -30-
Table 2.4: The public finances since 1979 
Calendar year  PSBR 
1979  6,4 
1980  5,1 
1981  4,1 
1982  1,8 
1983  3,8 
1984  3,2 
1985  2,1 
1986  0,6 
1987  -0,3 
1988  -2,5 
1989  ··1.8 
PSBR : pub~c  sector borrowing requirement 
PSFS: pub.ic sector fmancial surplus 
(balances as % of  GDP) 
PSFS  PSFSC 
F 
-4,3  -
-4,5  2,8 (2,9) 
-3,1  3,4 (0,6) 
-2,7  2,9 (-0,5) 
-3,4  0.1 (-2,8) 
-4,0  -0,2 (-0,3) 
-2,7  0,4 (0,7) 
-2,0  -0,1 (-0,5) 
-1,0  0,0 (0,1) 
1,3  1,5 (1.6) 
...  1,6 (0,0) 
PSFSC : cyciically and inflation adjusted PSFS, OECD estimates; in parenthesis is the change in this ratio which ts also an 
indicator of  fiScal stance 
Source : C  Bean and J. Symons (1989) : Table 2;CSO;and OECD (1989). 
ferences in the measure of the fiscal position according to 
the way privatization proceeds are treated 16• More im-
portantly, the real fiscal position adjusted for cyclical fac-
tors  indicates  that,  contrary  to  the  expansionary  fiscal 
stance indicated by the positive PSBR data up  to  1986, 
fiscal policy was contractionary throughout the 1980s. In 
particular, the fiscal stance moved from a cyclically-ad-
justed deficit of 0,1% of GDP in  1979  to a surplus of 
2,8% of GDP in  1980,  at  a time of a severe economic 
downturn. The surplus grew to 3,4% of GDP in 1981 but 
has subsequently declined noticeably. In  1988  and 1989 
fiscal  policy  once  more  became  contractionary.  The 
severe fiscal  contractions of the early  1980s constitute 
major errors from the perspective of counter-cyclical de-
mand management.  However,  the  government  had  re-
jected  aggregate  demand  management  as  a  policy 
objective and, consequently, the budget deficit was only 
important  in  the  context of the  MTFS  targets.  At the 
same time,  and in view of the inability to develop and 
implement monetary policy based on stable money to in-
come relationships,  fiscal  policy  may  have  assumed  a 
more direct role in the process of disinflation during the 
1980s. 
Together with the objective of reducing the PSBR to 
GDP ratio there has been the broader objective of reduc-
ing the presence of the state in economic activity. To ac-
complish  this,  targets  for  a  declining  share  of public 
sector expenditure in GDP have been set and tax reforms 
intending to reduce the burden of taxation and to remove 
tax-related  distortions  affecting  private  decisions  have 
Table 2.4: The public finance since 1979. 
been adopted 
17
• The approach has been to alleviate the 
tax burden by introducing reform measures to parallel the 
path of  expenditure containment. 
Originally the government intended an absolute reduc-
tion in expenditure in real terms. In practice, small annual 
real increases were accepted up to 1984-85, a year during 
which expenditure was boosted by the miners' strike. In 
the  January  1985  and  1986  public  expenditure  white 
papers expenditure held constant in the medium-term was 
planned. However, from 1987-88 an objective to permit 
moderate real increases in public expenditure below the 
rate of increase of GDP was adopted.  The buoyancy of 
the economy actually led to an appreciable reduction in 
the share of public expenditure in GDP. As can be seen 
in Table 2.5, this ratio fell from 45% in 1984 to 38% in 
1988. There have been significant changes in the shares 
of individual  public  expenditure  components  in  GDP. 
Compared to  1979,  transfers  to enterprises  (subsidies), 
debt interest  and gross fixed  capital formation  are  ap-
preciably lower. The share of current transfers to persons 
at ftrst rose but subsequently has fallen back.  Govern-
ment consumption has remained broadly stable. The fall 
in unemployment and the recovery in profits have been 
the main factors  in the decline  in  the ratio  of current 
transfers to GDP, while the decline in the stock of na-
tional debt and the easing in interest rates underlie the 
fall  in interest  payments.  While  defence  expenditures 
have been curbed, spending on health and education has 
grown at the same rate as GDP. On the other hand, the 
overall decline in the share of  public investment spending 
16)  See Mansoor (1988) on considerations in evaluating the budgetary importance of  privatization. 
17)  A detailed discussion of tax refonn is presented in Box 2.1. -31-
Table 2.5 : General Government expenditure and receipts 
Current transfers 
To enterprises 
To households 
To the rest of  the world 
Interest payments 
Government consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Total expenditure 
Indirect taxes 
Direct taxes 
Social security contributions 
Other current receipts 
Total receipts 
1) Commission projections April-May 1990 
Source : CSO, Commission services. 
1979 
14,0 
2,4 
10,6 
1,0 
4,4 
19,7 
2,6 
--
41,1 
15,0 
12,8 
5,8 
4,2 
37JJ 
masks  some  important  increases  in  real  spending  on 
roads,  railways,  and  health  while  capital  spending  on 
education and housing has fallen;  the former reflects de-
clining enrolments and the latter the increased emphasis 
on private rather than public housing construction. 
A key element in the tax reform plans was the reduc-
tion in the burden of taxation. As can be seen from Table 
2.5, however, the overall share of tax receipts has risen 
from 37,8% of GDP in 1979 to 39,5% in 1988, although 
it is projected to fall to 38,9% this year. The share of all 
revenue sources has risen, more so that of indirect taxes. 
(Not shown is the decline in revenues related to oil pro-
duction.) VAT rates were increased from 8 to 15 percent 
in 1979. However, the base on which indirect taxation is 
applied constitutes only 56% of consumer spending; if 
measures were adopted to widen the base, revenues from 
this source would be likely to rise significantly. 
While the overall level of taxation has not changed sig-
nificantly since 1979, major tax reforms have changed 
the structure of individual taxes. Personal and corporate 
tax  rates,  and  employee  social  security  contributions, 
have been reduced significantly. The potential decline in 
revenue associated with these measures has been offset 
by reforms aimed at broadening the corporate tax base. In 
addition, rapid economic growth has also contributed to 
enhancing revenues.  While the adopted measures have 
promoted rationalization of the tax system and have gone 
(% ofGDP) 
1984  1988  1990
1 
16,2  13,5  13,9 
2,3  1,3  1,1 
13,3  11,6  11,2 
0,6  0,7  0,7 
4,9  3,9  3.0 
21,6  19,7  19,4 
2,1  1.2  1,7 
-- -- --
45,4  38,3  37,1 
16,2  16,2  15,8 
14,4  13,1  13,4 
6,9  6,9  6,1 
3,9  2,9  2,6 
-- --
41,5  39,1  38,9 
Table 2.5 : General government expenditure/receipts. 
far in removing distortions,  further  important steps re-
main to be taken. 
The  success  with  which  the  PSBR  objectives  have 
been met prompted the government to announce in the 
March 1987 MTFS a medium-term projection for public 
borrowing to remain at  1% of GDP.  Revenue buoyancy 
made this short-lived, and the following year's MTFS re-
placed it with a medium-term projection of a zero PSBR 
(after the surplus of 3/4% of GDP recorded in 1988-89). 
A balanced budget is expected to promote a stable envi-
ronment within which private decisions are made and, at 
the same time, to be a simple and clear policy rule. How-
ever, it is not certain that this objective is consistent with 
likely  public  expenditure  requirements  in  the  medium 
tenn. In particular, the aging of the population and the 
rise in public pension liabilities should be taken into con-
sideration in the setting of fiscal targets; furthermore, the 
path of oil revenues should also be reviewed in this con-
text. The decline in the private saving rate and the sav-
ing(mvestment balance may also be elements of concern. 
If  developments in these areas reflect institutional and/or 
policy distortions (fmancial deregulation and tax  -related 
distortions, for example) fiscal policy could be designed 
with a view to correcting these anomalies.  Further, the 
desirability  of sustaining  a  certain and predictable  tax 
policy over the medium-term, and the likelihood that ex-
penditure requirements will increase, suggest that a sur-
plus rather than a balanced budget target may be more 
appropriate for the coming years. -32-
The public sector net debt to GDP ratio declined rapid-
ly during the 1960s and 1970s, from 123,2% in 1960 to 
48,7% in 1979, chiefly through the impact of inflation. 
The rate of decline slowed down in the early part of the 
1980s reflecting the sharp increase in real interest rates 
and the slowdown in inflation. However, additional pro-
gress was made during the second half of the decade as 
borrowing was reduced. While the commitment to me-
dium-term fiScal objectives has undoubtedly been the key 
factor in the process of  fiscal consolidation, political fac-
tors may also have been importanL In particular, the elec-
tion of majority governments, with terms of office long 
enough to implement policy changes, has been found to 
be an explanatory factor of the speed at which fiscal con-
solidation has taken place in several OECD countries 18• 
In the case of  the UK the repeated election with clear ma-
jorities of the present government has made the commit-
ment to medium-term fiScal objectives possible. 
2.5 Supply-side policies 
The United Kingdom can justly lay claim to have been 
the leader within the Community in efforts to improve 
the supply side of the economy. In the assignment of ob-
jectives  at  the begirming  of the present  government's 
term of office, improving the supply side was recognized 
as  the  key  to  improving  long-term  economic  perfor-
mance; it was also clear to most observers that such per-
formance  had progressively  fallen  behind most of the 
UK's main partners, and the need for improvement was 
correspondingly greater. Ten years later, the Treasury es-
timated in the  1989 version of the MTFS that the me-
dium-term potential growth rate of the non-oil economy 
was 3% per armum, and of the whole economy, taking 
account of the peak in oil production having been passed 
in 1985, 2  3/4%. This is significantly higher than that 
achieved over the cycle from  1973  to  1979  (1 ,5%)  or 
from 1979 to 1988 (2,1 %). While many supply side im-
provements by their nature will take time to bear their 
full fruits (e.g. educational reform), this higher potential 
growth rate is indicative of  the progress made. 
Supply-side policy, an umbrella term covering a wide 
range of policies, is reviewed below under the following 
headings: 
•  the labour market; 
•  measures to encourage enterprise; 
•  markets for goods and services; 
•  financial markets. 
A  review  of  the  success  of  supply-side  policies, 
measured by productivity  gains,  is  also presented.  Fi-
nally, tax reform and privatization, key supply-side initia-
tives, are discussed in two boxes. 
2.5.1 The labour market 
Measures to refonn the pattern of  industrial relations 
and curb trade union power have been the most visible 
aspects of  labour market policies. A series of  reforms em-
bodied  particularly  in the  Employment Acts of 1980, 
1982 and 1984, removed most of the legal immunities 
previously enjoyed by trade unions. The chief measures 
have been  to prevent supportive industrial action being 
taken other than in the enterprises directly concerned, to 
make unions liable centrally for the actions of branches, 
to require the direct election of union officials and to re-
quire membership  ballots  on  official  strike  calls.  The 
government has also announced its intention to legislate 
to end the pre-entry "closed shop", where potential em-
ployees are required already to be union members. Using 
internationally comparable data for the decade  1978-87 
(the latest available) days lost through industrial disputes 
in the UK fell from an average of 540 days per thousand 
employees in the period 1978 to 1982 to 400 days in the 
period 1983 to 1987 (data for the UK alone indicate a 
modest rise  from  1987  to  1989).  Though this  is  still 
somewhat higher than in many major industrial countries 
(lower than in Italy or Canada, but significantly higher 
than in Germany, France, the USA and Japan- see Graph 
2.4) the UK seems to have shed its former image as  a 
country particularly subject to such unrest. Trade union 
membership fell continuously from an all-time peak in 
1979 of 13,3  million. ;By  1988 numbers were down to 
10,2 million, a fall of 23%. 
A  more flexible  attitude  to work practices  has  also 
been encouraged, leading to fewer problems over restric-
tive practices and demarcation disputes. These changes 
are often swmned up as representing an increased "ability 
for managers to manage" and have almost certainly been 
major factors in improving productivity and encouraging 
investment by foreign as well as domestic firms.  Their 
impact on wage bargaining is less clear. A tighter labour 
market and the recent acceleration of inflation have seen 
a renewed tension in wage bargaining and will be a more 
severe test of  the new structures in place. 
Attempts to influence pay bargaining have been made 
via tax incentives to increase employee equity and profit-
related  schemes.  Privatization has  also  played a  role, 
typically favouring  some distribution of shares to em-
ployees and in certain instances taking the form of man-
agement  buyouts.  Pension  arrangements  have  been 
liberalised, with personal ('portable') and corporate pen-
sion schemes encouraged. Similarly, reform of personal 
18)  Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that difficulties in economic management in the post-1973 period, associated with coalition govern-
ments, were an important factor in explaining the process of fiscal adjusbnent. Once it was recognized that the slowdown in economic 
growth and the rise in unemployment would be more than transitory, OECD governments embarked upoo different courses of fiscal 
consolidatioo, depending upon their prevailing political characteristics. The UK, together with Gennany and Japan, are notable cases of 
vigorous fiscal adjustment in the 1980s. The election of majority govermnents during the 1980s made fiscal correction in the UK 
possible. -33-
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taxation has been directed towards improving incentives 
and encouraging work effort. 
Changes made or proposed in education recognise that 
standards in the UK have fallen behind those of other 
countries in key areas such as numeracy, and give rise to 
below-potential performance later in working life.  Not-
able initiatives include the setting of a national core cur-
riculum,  reform  of  the  examination  system  and  the 
promotion of 'city technology  colleges',  the  latter at-
tempting to integrate local enterprises into vocationally-
oriented schooling. 
Extra effort is being placed on training. This is an area 
where the UK lacks a  strong craft- or employer-based 
tradition. The Youth Training Scheme was introduced in 
1983. The employment training programme (E1) began 
in September  1988  to provide  training  for the unem-
ployed, especially those out of work for six months or 
more; take-up of  places, provided with the cooperation of 
employers and voluntary bodies, has so far been some-
what disappointing. A White Paper published in January 
1989 proposed a more comprehensive approach centred 
on local employer-led groups (Training  and Enterprise 
Councils,  TECs)  coordinating  a  range of programmes 
suited to the local labour market and backed up by a na-
tional training agency. In all a network of 82 TECs are 
planned, of which 10 were already operational in April 
1990. 
2.5.2 Encouraging enterprise 
Measures taken to favour greater enterprise include re-
form of the corporate tax system, the aiding of business 
start-ups and the growth of small fmns, and a significant 
change in the thrust of  regional policy. 
Graph 2.4 : Working days lost. 
The corporall! tax system  was changed radically with 
proposals made in the 1984 Budget, moving to a broader 
base with lower rates. The corporation tax rate was re-
duced progressively from 50% for the 1983 fmancial year 
to  35%  from  1986;  fixed  investment  accelerated  tax 
allowances were also phased out by 1986. Business start-
ups and small businesses have been promoted by softer 
corporate and value-added tax structures and a number of 
special  schemes.  The  Business  Expansion Scheme fa-
vours equity funding of small fmns; the Loan Guarantee 
Scheme eases the supply of loan fmance; a third scheme, 
the Business Development Initiative, subsidises consult-
ancy advice. Apart from  government measures, the de-
velopment  of  venture  capital  and  relative  ease  of 
fmancing via such means as leveraged buy-outs (the lat-
ter also for larger companies) has progressed further in 
the UK than in the rest of the Community. The net result 
has been to promote greater fmn mobility.  Total  VAT 
registrations, for example, rose by 30% between  1980 
and 1987; the net stock of  business registered rose stead-
ily from some 1,3 million to over 1,5 million. 
Regional policy has become significantly more selec-
tive. The former automatic regional development invest-
ment grants have been abolished.In their place have been 
introduced selective investment grants  and Consultancy 
services. In effect, more reliance is now placed on a mix-
ture of  intervention and market incentives. 
2.5.3 Markets for goods and services 
As part  of the  broad policy  objective  to encourage 
greater competition, specific actions  affecting  the mar-
kets for goods and services have also been taken. These 
include deregulation and liberalization, and moves in the 
direction of a more explicit competition criterion as  the -34-
basis of  reviewing proposed mergers and restrictive prac-
tices. 
Deregulation and liberalisation have had most scope 
for impact in the market for services. One channel for 
change has been  the privatization progranme (see Box 
2.2). While perhaps public fmance and labour union con-
cerns were present in the earlier years of the programme, 
in later years more attention has been given to stimulat-
ing the competitive environment in which the enterprises 
operate. The forthcoming privatization of the electricity 
industry, for example, provides for a competititive split-
ting  and.  deregulation  of generating  capacity  whereas 
there was comparatively little basic change made in the 
gas industry when it was privatised in 1986-87. A poten-
tial conflict of interest is, however, apparent : the more 
monopoly profits are guarded in the proposed structure of 
an enterprise being privatised, the greater should be the 
returns to the government on its sale. 
Services such as  transport (air and  buses), legal ser-
vices (property conveyancing, with further reform pro-
posed of general legal services) and telecommunications 
have been subject to extensive deregulation. The public 
sector, especially local government and  the health ser-
vice,  has been  encouraged to  adopt a  more rigorously 
competitive approach to the provision of services, often 
contracting out where in-house provision was previously 
quasi-automatic. 
Evidence from international price studies indicates that 
services, at least to fmal consumers, remain expensive in 
the UK relative to the price of final output. This suggests 
that there is scope for the refonn programme to be carried 
forward and extended, as the government is planning to 
do in the area of legal services. The internal market pro-
gramme, which is discussed in more detail  in the next 
chapter, is also of  importance in this respect. 
The UK's approach towards  mergers and restrictive 
practices has been characterised by a  greater degree of 
official discretion as regards what is best in the  "public 
interest"  than,  for  example,  in  the  USA  or Gennany 
where the impact on competition has been the key crite-
rion. This emphasis is changing to some extenL A review 
of mergers policy published in March 1988  concluded 
that the potential effect on competition within the UK 
should be the main consideration in evaluating the refer-
ence of a proposed merger to the Monopolies and Mer-
gers Commission; the fundamental structure of national 
merger control nevertheless remained intact.  However, 
the impact of Community involvement in merger control 
is increasing, and will continue to do so following the 
adoption of the December  1989 regulation discussed in 
Chapter3.  · 
2.5.4 Financial markets 
Financial markets and the fmancial system have been 
subject to wide-ranging reform. Foreign ezcluuage eoil-:-
trols  were abolished in 1979, exposing domestic  coni~ 
panies  to  the  need  to  earn  more  internationally 
comparable rates of  return; the abolition of  divitle1Ul e011-
troll in the same year can be seen in this light as a com-
plementary  measure.  Identified  capital  outflows  have 
been considerable, enabling the UK to build up a consid-
erable stock of overseas assets  at the time of earning 
large but temporary oil surpluses. 
The ending of exchange controls helped reinforce Lon-
don's  predominance  as  the  chief  European  fmancial 
centre. This was also aided by the "Big Bang" stock ex-
elu.lnge reforms of October 1986. These reforms, made 
by the institutions concerned Wlder the threat of govern-
ment intervention, ended a number of  restrictive practices 
as regards dealing in stocks and shares and membership 
of the exchange and enhanced the introduction of new 
teclmology.  Regulation of the securities and life assur-
anee business was reformed in 1986. The generally com-
petitive  environment  has  attracted  considerable 
secondaJy dealing of non-UK securities. Sterling capital 
markets were further deregulated in 1989, including the 
abolition of  the queuing system for new issues. 
More domestically oriented financial deregulation has 
included giving building societies much more scope to 
compete with banks and other credit institutions over a 
wider range of services, to raise capital in the wholesale 
markets and to change their status from mutual to public 
companies. This has intensified competitive pressures in 
credit markets, which had already been given an earlier 
impetus by the  abolition of hire plli'Ciu.lse  controls  in 
1982. 
2.5.5 Supply-side reforms and productivity 
performance 
Is the remarkable productivity performance of the UK 
economy during the 1980s merely a consequence of the 
long economic cycle, or have supply-side reforms con-
tributed  to  a  pennanently  higher  path of productivity 
gains ? This question is critical in Wlderstanding prospec-
tive inflation developments and the sustainability of  rapid 
real wage gains, such as those observed in 1989. For in-
stance, if  the productive potential of the economy has in-
creased in a pennanent fashion, then rapid growth in real 
wages is sustainable; if, however, the productivity gains 
have been a mere reflection of the strength of the econ-
omic recovery and are not permanent then rapid wage 
growth is inconsistent with stable output growth. 
The channels through which supply-side reforms could 
have influenced economic efficiency and productivity are 
nwnerous.  Reform  of the  personal  and  corporate  tax 
structures should affect both the quantity and the quality 
of labour supply, and have a beneficial impact on invest-
ment activity. Measures directed towards improving the 
flmctioning of the labour market and enhancing the flexi-
bility of working arrangements should have contributed 
to the allocative efficiency of  labour. Training and educa-
tion activities improve the quality of the labour input, 
while fmancial market reforms make possible a more ef-
ficient allocation of  savings and encourage new and inno-
vative forms of intermediation and investment fmancing. 
There may also be indirect efficiency gains related to the 
recognition that the government would not provide shel--35-
ter to inefficient and  troubled firms,  and the  threat of 
competition has forced rationalization.  Recent research 
estimates that the underlymf rate of productivity growth 
is between 3,5% and 5,5% 
1 
• 
It is very difficult to measure the effect of some of the 
possible forces acting on efficiency, particularly since a 
high degree of  interdependence is present However, sev-
eral studies have attributed the increase in productivity to 
the change in the climate of  industrial relations and to the 
reforms directed towards improving the flexibility of the 
labour market. According to Bean and Symons (1989), 
increased efficiency in the utilization of the labour input 
lies at the heart of the British productivity performance in 
the 1980s. They contend that the decline in union power, 
either because of  legislation or  because of  the 1981 reces-
sion, reduced the degree of ovennanning, which was a 
central  feature  of the  pre-1980  period.  In particular, 
multi-unionism  and  bargaining  with  individual  unions 
over manning levels rather than employment had led to 
19)  SeeP. Spencer (1987) for an asseasmenL 
an increase in the labour requirements per unit of output 
and for given production techniques, and had raised la-
bour costs leading to a reduction in the level of output 
and substitution  away from  "expensive"  labour.  How-
ever, with the advent of the labour market reforms and 
the decline of  ovennaming the productivity performance 
of  the economy dramatically improved. 
This does not suggest  that  the pace of productivity 
gains will be maintained in the  future.  The curbing of 
union power was an once-and-for-all phenomenon and 
cannot be expected to be the source of continuing pro-
ductivity gains. Furthermore, it is possible that a transi-
tory, cyclical element, is present in the decline of union 
strength, and the return to high employment may renew 
its  potency.  Sustainable  productivity  gains  are  deter-
mined by  the  human  capital  embodied in  the  labour 
input. Govermnent initiatives towards education and vo-
cational and technical training are crucial in this context -36-
BOX2.1 
TAX REFORM IN THE UK 
Key tax reform measures introduced since 
1979 
•  Personal income 
Two tax rates : top marginal tax rate, 40% for taxable 
income over UKL 20 700 (1990/91 Budget); basic rate of 
personal income tax, 25%  - medium-tenn objective is 
20%;  standard personal allowances raised by a third in 
reai terms between 1978n9 and 1990/91. 
•  Capital taxation 
Inheritance tax top rate 40%. 
•  Social security contributions 
Four rate bands for employees and employers; top em-
:'Jloyee contribution rate 9%; lower contribution rate for 
low-paid  workers;  ceiling  for  employers'  contribution 
abolished; national insurance surcharge abolished. 
•  Means-tested social security benefits 
Rationalization of the income tax system and the Fam-
ily Credit, Income Support, and housing benefits; assess-
ment  of  all  income-related  entitlements  on  after-tax 
rather than gross income; unemployment benefits subject 
to income tax; tightening of work-test principle. 
•  Household income 
Effective April 1990, spouses are taxed independently 
on all  income,  including  capital  gains;  extra personal 
allowance for married couples retained. 
•  Household savings 
Abolition of investment income surcharge; real capital 
gains taxed at personal income tax rates with tax exemp-
tion of UKL 5 000 per annum; introduction of Personal 
Equity Plans in which up to UKL 4 800 investment per 
annum in equities bear no tax liability if  held for a year; 
Business Expansion Scheme (BES) offers tax relief for 
up to UKL 40 000 per annum in new equity in unquoted 
UK trading companies; up to UKL 500 000 can be raised 
by any one finn through BES; Profit Related Pay encour-
aging profit sharing, with tax relief granted; tax exempt 
special savings accounts (TESSAs) to be available from 
January 1991. 
•  Pension savings 
Measures to encourage personal pensions; measures to 
enhance pension transferability between different pension 
plans organized by employers;  greater individual con-
tributions to occupational pension plans within existing 
tax exemption limits; limit to tax  -exempt contributions to 
pension schemes, established after March 14, 1989, based 
on an annual salary of UKL 60 000, adjusted annually at 
the rate of inflation; limit of two thirds (UKL 40 000) of 
the annual  salary;  limit of UKL 90 000 tax-free lump 
sum  withdrawal  from  pension plans  established  after 
March 14, 1989; these limits apply also to new members 
of  existing plans. 
•  Housing 
Imouted income  from  owner-occupied housing,  and 
capi~l gains on principal residence continue to be un-
taxed; interest payments of up to UKL 30 000 on loans 
secured by principal residence can be deducted from per-
sonal income taxes;  residential property tax  (rates)  re-
placed  by  Community  Charge  (poll  tax)  largely 
independent of individual economic circumstances and 
unrelated to property. 
•  Corporate taxation 
Enlargement of corporation tax base through the re-
placement  of  accelerated  depreciation  provisions  by 
economic depreciation and through changed treatment of 
stocks (abolition of stock relief);  reduction of tax rate 
from 52% to 35%; tax rate for small business lowered 
from 42% to the basic personal tax rate. 
•  Business privileges 
Limitations on entertainment expenses;  tightening of 
tax rules regarding company cars. 
•  Interest payments on debt 
Nominal interest payments deductible from corporate 
tax base at the new lower rate of  35%. 
•  Dividend payments 
Tax relief for shareholders at the new lower basic per-
sonal income tax rate of 25% for taxes paid at the corpor-
ate level. 
•  Local business taxation 
From 1990 nationally uniform tax rate on rental value 
of business property the proceeds of which are pooled 
and distributed to local authorities in proportion to their 
adult populations. 
•  Indirect taxation 
Increased  VAT rate from 8% to 15%, covering only 
56% of consumer spending; 30% is subject to zero tax 
while another 15% is exempt. 
Key objectives 
Several tax reform measures adopted in OECD coun-
tries in the 1980s were initiated in the United Kingdom. 
Key objectives of tax reform have been to reduce the 
share  of  tax  revenues  in  GOP,  improve  efficiency, 
remove tax-related disincentives, and provide tax incen-
tives to offset market distortions and attain social objec-
tives,  e.g.  encourage  share  and  house  ownership  and 
alleviate poverty. To achieve these  the government has -37-
proceeded in a piecemeal fashion implementing various 
reforms in successive fmancial years. 
Reform of the tax system has been a central feature of 
the economic policy adopted in 1979, reflecting the em-
phasis placed on the  supply side of the economy. The 
government recognized that the tax system could retard 
economic growth by affecting the quality and quantity of 
labour supply, and by distorting the allocation of capital 
away from its most productive uses towards tax-favoured 
:.nvestments.  In addition,  it could discourage  entry  of 
·  1arious individuals (married women, low-income wor-
kers,  young  workers  etc.)  into  the  labour market and 
could perpetuate current and life-time income and wealth 
inequality. Tax reform was seen as an instrument to en-
ha."lce the supply potential of the economy rather than. to 
promote income redistribution. 
Main features 
A significant shift towards enhancing the share of indi-
~ect taxation in total revenues occurred in 1979 when the 
standard VAT rate was raised from 8% to 15%. The in-
crease in revenue permitted reductions in the top margi-
nal  personal  tax  rate from  83%  (98%  for  investment 
income) in 1979 to 40% in 1988, the second lowest in the 
OECD and the lowest in the EC. The basic personal tax 
rate has been reduced by 8 percentage points to 25% and 
is intended to decline to 20% in the medium term. 
Reform of the corporate tax system involved a reduc-
tion of tax rates from 52% to 35% and an enlargement of 
the  tax  base through  the  introduction of economically 
meaningful depreciation allowances. The ceiling on em-
ployers'  social  security contribution  was  abolished  as 
was the national insurance surcharge. The enhanced cor-
poration tax liability made possible the lowering of the 
social security contribution for low-paid workers.  In ad-
dition, the tax rate for small business was reduced from 
42% to the basic personal rate of 25%. Nominal interest 
payments on corporate debt continue to be deductible at 
the corporate rate of 35% while taxes paid at the corpor-
ate level are credited to reduce the tax liability of reci-
pients of dividends. The latter measure, credited at the 
basic personal tax rate of 25%, is intended to relieve the 
double taxation of  dividend income. 
Reform of local taxation has two elements : local busi-
ness taxation is now levied at a nationally uniform rate 
and the proceeds are distributed to local authorities ac-
cording to their proportion of adult population; and a uni-
form poll tax (the "Community Charge") levied on local 
residents,  irrespective of their economic circumstances 
(except for the very poor) and unrelated to property, has 
replaced  local  property  taxes  ("rates")  on  residential 
housing. 
Special tax treatment is accorded to household income 
and savings, as well as to housing. Up to the 1989-90 tax 
year, the wife's income was added to the husband's who 
received a married man's allowance, and a separate per-
sonal allowance was granted to the wife. This system was 
intended to treat income earned on an individual basis 
and to limit the disincentives for married women to join 
the labour force, and, at the same time, treat the family as 
a unit However, these objectives could only be satisfied 
in a compromise manner. With effect from April  1990 
spouses  are taxed independently on all incomes, includ-
ing capital gains, while a personal married-couple allow-
ance is retained. 
The 1990-91 budget announced the introduction of  Tax 
Exempt Special  Sa~gs Accounts  (TESSAs) effective 
January 1,  1991. Up to UKL 9 000 savings will be tax-
exempt if held for five years; UKL 3  000 may be de-
posited  in  the  fJrSt  year.  Provided  that  no  capital  is 
withdrawn for five years, interest earned will be exempt 
in its entirety. 
Owner-occupied  housing  consumption  remains  un-
taxed, capital gains on the principal residence are tax-
exempt, and mortgage interest payments of up to UKL 
30 000 can be deducted from the, personal tax liability. 
Furthermore, pension fund contribUtions can be deducted 
from taxable income while capital income earned by pen-
sion funds  and  lwnp-sum withdrawals  (up  to  25% of 
value) from the fund are not subject to tax. 
Impact of the reforms 
The  tax system affects economic behaviour by intro-
ducing a "wedge" between the private value of an econ-
omic activity  and its  tax-inclusive price, and plays an 
important role in the allocation of resources. Since it is 
designed to meet several objectives, including resource 
allocation, the complexity of the tax system is such that 
reported tax parameters, and/or revenue transferred to the 
state, underestimate the true cost of tax-induced distor-
tions to society. An important objective of tax reform has 
been to reduce or eliminate these distortions and, accord-
ing to some estimates, the welfare gains in the case of  the 
United Kingdom could amount to between 6% and 9% of 
GNP. 
One source of gains is the potential increase in labour 
supply- even though the after-tax increase in household 
income could adversely affect female participation and 
lead to a perverse decrease in labour supply - and the fos-
tering of enterpreneurial incentives; another is the more 
favourable treatment of  savings. Reform of corporate tax-
ation has contributed to efficiency and has improved in-
centives  favouring  equity  fmancing.  The  use  of 
depreciation allowances has reduced differences in effec-
tive tax rates on real assets and has limited discriminatory 
tax treatment of investment in a variety of assets.  Re-
form of local business taxation may be beneficial to the 
extent that differential regional rates are abolished. 
Tasks remaining 
Some important deficiencies remain to be addressed. 
Housing represents the most important component of  per-
sonal wealth, reflecting partly the favourable tax  treat-
ment  accorded.  Since  this  has  contributed  to  a 
(tax-induced) bias in the composition of porfolios and 
has raised residential investment, reform of measures af-
fecting housing can improve the allocation of  capital and -38-
affect the economy's intertemporal performance, by en-
couraging a more enterpreneurial distribution of savings. 
More equal treatment of different forms of personal sav-
ing would be a step in correcting this distortion.  How-
ever,  incentives  to  channel  savings  through  the 
institutions (insurance and pension funds) may partly be 
offset by ad hoc measures such as personal equity plans 
and the business expansion scheme. 
Since effective personal tax rates can differ significant-
ly from nominal ones, integration of the various sources 
of income is desirable. In particular, the social security 
system could be integrated with the personal income tax 
to minimize distortions and remove the disincentives in-
troduced by the interaction of the two separate systems. 
There continues to be a bias favouring debt fmancing 
arising from the deductability of interest costs. While the 
relief of dividend taxation removes some of the disincen-
tives associated with equity fmancing, the possibility of 
further cuts in personal tax rates (at which the dividend 
credit is imputed) implies that the tax advantages of debt 
financing will increase. 
To remove these anomalies further integration of the 
personal and corporate tax systems would be desirable. 
In addition, since inflation can raise the tax burden in the 
absence of indexation,  further steps could be  taken  to 
bring the basis for personal and corporate taxation closer 
to real capital income. 
The rate of indirect taxation in the United Kingdom is 
low in comparison with the rest of the OECD countries. 
VAT is levied on about 56% of  conswner spending, leav-
ing 30% taxed at zero rate and the remaining  15% tax-
exempt. Benefits could accrue from a broadening of the 
tax base. 
One objective of public fmance is to promote equity 
and, in this respect, tax reform has not been a contribut-
ing factor. The adoption of flat personal tax rates implies 
that the progressivity of the tax system is severely cur-
tailed.  At the same time, the increase in indirect taxes in 
1979 had a regressive character. While it could be argued 
that the increase in consumption taxes would discourage 
spending, raise savings, and promote economic growth, 
pesonal sector savings in the UK have not responded to 
these  tax  incentives.  Viewed  from  the  perspective  of 
equity  considerations  alone,  the  tax  reform  measures 
have made the tax system much less progressive and, ac-
cording to Layard and Nickel (1989), have been  a key 
factor in a significant increase in inequality since 1979. - 39 
BOX2.2 
PRIVATIZATION 
Over the period since 1979 the British government has 
privatized more than 41  entities,  19 of which took the 
!onn of security sales on the London Stock Exchange 
whil~  the remainder have ~  ~agement  buyouts and 
private ~es.  The stock market proceeds exceed UKL 18 
billion while total privatization proceeds - including pro-
ceeds for the 1989/90 fiscal year- amount to UKL 27,7 
billion. In comparison, equity funds raised over the same 
period by private companies amount to around UKL 24 
billion. Privatization has reduced the state-owned compo-
nent of industry by 45 percent since 1979.  The accompa-
nying table presents key data on the British privatization 
record. 
ln the  miual  stage  an  important  argument  ~as that 
through privatization the power of public sector unions 
would be restrained. Additional argwnents in favour of 
privatization  have been  the  beneficial  impact  of asset 
sales on the public sector fmances,  particularly  in the 
context of the MTFS, widening of share ownership, and 
increased  corporate  efficiency.  However,  in  the  early 
1980s the privatization policy was only a relatively minor 
component of the government's economic agenda.  The 
successful sale of British Telecom in 1984 and its popu-
larity with private investors provided the impetus to em-
bark on a more ambitious privatization programme. 
In addition to the sale of public enterprises, there have 
also been substantial sales of local authority-owned hous-
ing  to  tenants  (capit~ receipts for housing  of English 
local  authorities  amo~ted to over UKL 18  billion be-
tween 1981182  and 19$9190),  and many local  authority 
and hospital services previously provided by public em-
ployees have been opened to private tender. 
Privatization proceeds are ~eated as negative expendi-
ture in the government's spQnding plans and they effec-
tively reduce the reported PSBR and can distort the data 
on the level of public expenditure. The privatization pro-
ceeds initially were a major help in reducing the PSBR, 
and they now continue to swell the size of the public sec-
tor surplus, (although public fmances  are at present in 
surplus even if  privatization proceeds are excluded). 
In the  UK, and in Western Europe more generally, 
public sector provision of various goods has been justi-
fied by actual or perceived failure of private markets to 
operate efficiently; a prominent type of this is the case of 
natural monopoly. However, privatization of  such entities 
may not improve efficiency unless their monopoly posi-
tion is open to challenge to the extent required to produce 
a competitive outcome. Failing this, regulatory measures 
have been used  extensively.  Privatization of regulated 
firms- telecommunications, gas, airlines, etc.-poses spe-
cial problems since the incipient gains may offend the 
objectives protected by regulation.  In  this respect,  the 
govermnent retained special rights with nine of the pri-
vatized firms, and has placed limits on the size of single 
shareholdings on several of th~  even though these pro-
visions  are expected to lapse in the long run (as  was 
allowed in the case of  Jaguar, permitting its sale to Ford). 
lnlroducing competition in certain public sector acti-
vities in the UK bas improved efficiency as regards, for 
example, refuse  collection and  some hospital  services. 
However,  the  existence  of natural  monopoly  requires 
policies to distance the  owner of the natural monopoly 
from  activities  where  competition  is  possible  since, 
otherwise, the monopolist would acquire the whole mar-
ket.  Such separation bas occurred in the case of British 
Rail and the road-haulage and ferry businesses. It has not 
happened in the case of British Telecom and British Gas, 
where each now-privatized entity holds a dominant post-
tion in the  industry.  However,  the Office of Telecom-
munications and the Office of Gas have been established 
to regulate prices and promote competition, even though 
the domain of the latter Office is restricted to promoting 
competition in the domestic market. 
Has privatization contributed to economic efficency in 
the United Kingdom ?  It is difficult to offer an unam-
biguous answer since a mixture of privatization of firms, 
operating already in a competitive environment, and of 
natural monopolies accompanied by regulatory rules, has 
occured and the net impact on efficiency is unclear.  At 
the same time,  purchases of fixed  assets by privatized 
fmns have almost tripled, while value added by public 
corporations  has  declined  significantly;  approximately 
750 000 employees have been transferred to the private 
sector; profits have increased; the stock market  has re-
ceived privatization issues with enthusiasm, and equity 
prices of  privatized fmns have traded initially well in ex-
cess of issue quotations; new managerial qualities have 
emerged and a re-orientation of public sector corporate 
culture has taken place. 
The setting of the issue price appears to have been a 
major difficulty in the privatization process. The diffi-
culty relates to the fact that assets of uncertain value are 
offered to the market : significant initial discounts have 
been necessary. Mayer (1987) estimates that, relative to 
normal discounts, the cost of privatization in the United 
Kingdom has amoWlted to over 10% of gross proceeds 
and relative to zero discount approaches 20% of gross 
proceeds. 
Despite the increased share ownership brought about 
by privatization, the dominant shareholders in privatized 
,,  fmns are fmancial institutions. Concentration of share-
, ownership has in fact increased further during the years, 
of privatization, and the influence of small investors in 
managerial matters has hardly changed as a result of pri-
vatization. 
The water industry was privatised in December 1989, 
following a fmancial restructuring involving the writing--40-
The British privatization experience, 1979 - 1990 
1 
Financial Year  Finn 
Total gross proceeds 
2 
(UKL million) 
1979180  British Petroleum  377 
1980/81  British Aerospace 
National Enterprise Board Holdings  210 
1981/82  Amersham International 
Cable and Wireless  493 
1982183  Associated British Ports 
Britoil  455 
1983184  British Petroleum 
Britoil 
Cable and Wireless  1139 
1984185  Associated British Ports 
British Telecom 
Enterprise Oil 
National Enterprise Board Holdings  2050 
1985/86  British Aerospace 
British Telecom 
Britoil 
Cable and Wireless  2 707 
1986187  British Airways 
British Gas 
British Telecom  4460 
1987/88  British Airport Authority 
British Airways 
British Gas 
British Petroleum 
British Telecom 
Rolls-Royce 
Royal Ordance  5 140 
1988/89  British Airport Authority 
British Gas 
British Petroleum 
British Steel 
British Telecom  7073 
1989190  British Petroleum 
British Gas 
British Steel 
Water  3 580 
27684 
1) Including sales of  government-owned shares in established public companies e.g. British Petroleum pk. 
2) Including later  instalments of  receipts from sales in earlier financial years. 
Source: HM Treasury (1990): "The Government's Expenditure Plans 1990-91 to 1992-93", January. 
Table 2.6 : The British privatization experience. -41-
off of almost UKL S billion of debt. The ten water auth-
orities were sold as separate entities. The initial payment 
for the 2,18 billion share$ was UK.L 1,00 pre share;  the 
cost of floatation was estilnated at UKL 62 million.  The 
govermnent has announced the establishment of the Of-
fice of  Water Services whose main function is to regulate 
price increases. The next major candidate for privatiza-
tion is the electricity industry. The sale of the electricity 
industry  will  be  the  largest . privatization  so far.  The 
generation and supply distribution sides of the industry 
are to be split up to encourage competition. Further away 
the sales of British Rail and British Coal are in  prospec~  .. 
The  shares still held by the government in already-pri--
vatized companies,  e.g.  49% of British Telecom, may 
also be sold The government's expenditure plans indi-
cate that privatization pr0Ceeds are projected to continue 
at about UK.L S billion per year (roughly  1% of GDP) 
until at least 1993-94. -42 
--:CIIAPTER3 
THE UK AND COMMUNITY ECONO-MIC POLICIES 
3.1 Macroeconomic policy and 
performance compared 
Chapters 1 and  2 have surveyed UK economic policy 
and  performance  from  a  domestic  standpoinL  In  the 
Community  perspective  both  are  distinctive  and  un-
doubtedly strongly interconnected. Macroeconomic pol-
icy has been dominated by an overriding difference from 
the  UK'  s main Community partners : the decision not to 
participate in the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS 
and  Lo  rely  instead on the government's own medium 
term  financial  strategy (MTFS).  This in turn has  con-
tributed to the UK'  s having a cyclical performance and 
inflation record also quite different. The decision to re-
main outside the ERM has also reinforced the differences 
in performance  arising  from  the  UK's  particular  em-
phasis on structural reforms such as fmancialliberalisa-
tion and the consequent growth of credit. While the EMS 
issue is discussed primarily in the following section, its 
bearing on most aspects of performance should be borne 
in mind in what follows. 
Table 3.1 summarises UK performance relative to the 
rest of the Community since 1979 (the asswnption of of-
fice by the present government and also the inauguration 
of the EMS), including Commission forecast data to the 
end of 1991. for five of the chief aspects : growth, price 
stability, current account balance and employment and 
unemployment. 
Over the ten year period to 1989, and before making 
any allowances for cyclical differences, the record was 
broadly similar  in important respects.  Annual  average 
GDP growth  in the UK and  the ERM countries taken 
together  was  virtually  identical,  at  about  2  1/4%  p.a. 
(Graph 3.1)./njlation in the UK, as measured by the pri-
vate conswnption deflator, was only slightly higher: 7% 
p.a. compared with 6  1/2% in the other countries  (be-
tween which, however, performance was very disparate). 
Showing greater contrast, employment growth in the UK 
was significantly higher : about 6% for the period com-
pared with 3 1/4% in the ERM bloc. The UK unemploy-
ment rate was on average higher, 9 3/4% against 8 1/2%, 
but was  lower by  1989 : 6  3/4% against 8  1/2%.  The 
average  annual  UK  cu"ent account  balance,  which 
moved from a large oil and recession-induced surplus in 
the early years to a very large deficit at the end of the 
period, was a deficit of a little under 1/2% of GDP; this 
compares with an annual average for the ERM countries 
of a marginal surplus. 
GDP  at constant market prices 
(Index: 1979 = 100) 
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Tabk 3.1 :Main macroeconomic indicators 1979-91, UK and  the Community 
(i)  GDP at market prices 
1 
UK2 
ERM countries 3 : 
-D 
-F 
-I 
-0ther4 
Total 
EUR 11 5 
(ii)  Inflation : private consumption 
deDator 
1 
UK 
ERM countries 3 : 
-D 
-F 
-I 
-Other4 
Total 
EUR 11 5 
(iii) ~mployment 
1 
UK 
ERM countries 3 : 
-D 
-F 
-I 
-Other4 
Total 
EUR 11 5 
(iv) Unemployment 
6 
UK 
ERM countries 3 : 
-D 
-F 
-I 
-Other4 
Total 
EUR 11 5 
(v)  Current account balance 7 
UK 
ERM countries 3 : 
-D 
-F 
-I 
-Other4 
Total 
EUR 11 5 
*) Forecasts, April-May 1990 
1 ) % p.a. change 
2 ) Average m~ure 
1989n9  1989 
2,2  2,3 
1,8  3,4 
2,1  3,5 
2,5  3,2 
1,8  3,8 
2,1  3,4 
2,1  3,6 
7,0  5,8 
2,9  3,1 
7,2  3,5 
11,2  6,0 
4,4  2,6 
6,5  3,9 
7,4  4,7 
0,4  2,8 
0,2  1,4 
0,1  1,7 
0,8  0,2 
0,2  0,9 
0,3  1,1 
0,3  1,6 
9,6  6,7 
6,5  5,5 
9,4  9,5 
9,5  11,0 
10,9  9,5 
8,8  8,6 
10,0  9,5 
-0,4  -4,1 
2,0  4,5 
-0,5  -0,4 
-0,9  -1,3 
0,4  2,0 
0,3  1,3 
0,0  0,6 
1990*  1991*  1981/79  1988/81  1991/88. 
1,6  2,4  -1,8  3,3  2,1 
3,7  3,7  0,8  1,9  3,6 
3,2  3,2  1,4  2,0  3,3 
3,1  2,8  2,6  2,4  3,0 
3,2  2,8  0,6  2,1  3,2 
3,3  3,2  1,4  2,1  3,3 
3,4  3,2  1,3  2,2  3,4 
6,6  5,1  13,6  5,3  5,8 
2,8  3,0  5,9  2,0  3,0 
2,9  3,0  13,2  6,1  3,1 
5,5  5,0  19,3  9,7  5,5 
2,6  2,8  8,4  3,6  2,6 
3,5  3,5  11,8  5,4  3,6 
4,3  4,2  12,7  6,3  4,3 
1,5  -0,1  -2,1  0,7  1,4 
1,7  1,7  0,2  0,0  1,6 
1,5  1,4  -0,3  -0,1  1,5 
0,7  0,5  1,0  0,7  0,5 
1,0  0,7  -0,6  0,3  0,9 
1,3  1,1  0,6  0,2  1,2 
1,4  1,2  -0,1  0,3  1,3 
6,1  6,3  9,8  10,8  6,4 
6,0  6,2  5,8  6,8  5,9 
8,8  8,1  8,0  9,9  8,8 
11,0  11,0  8,4  9,9  11,0 
9,1  8,8  10,5  11,1  9,1 
8,5  8,4  7,8  9,1  8,5 
9,4  9,2  8,6  10,4  9,4 
-3,0  -2,8  2,0  -0,6  -3,3 
4,3  5,1  -1,3  2,5  4,6 
-0,3  -0,2  -0,7  -0,4  -0,3 
-1,1  -1,5  -2,2  -0,4  -1,3 
2,0  1,9  -2,2  1,0  2,0 
1,3  1,4  -1,6  0,7  1,3 
0,5  0,6  -1,8  0,4  0,6 
3) Countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism of  the EMS (excluding Spain) 
4) B, DK, IRL, L, NL 
5) EC excluding UK 
6)% of  civilian labour force, SOEC standardised basis 
7) %of  GDP at market prices 
Source : Commission Services; 
Table 3.1  : Main macroeconomic indicators. - 4L;-
Cyclkal differences  were,  however,  important,  such 
that the foregoing aggregate figures convey little indica-
tion of the very different path followed by the UK econ-
omy during this-j)eriod. In the UK the 1980-81 recession 
was  particularly  deep,  with  GDP falling  3  1!2%  and 
manufacturing output 10%, and with the unemployment 
rate rising to over 10% (as explained in greater detail in 
Chapter  1).  In the  continental  economies  the  growth 
pause was more subdued but also longer lived. Growth 
was bit by the second oil shock, but there was nothing 
corresponding to the  severity of the  real exchange rate 
appreciation experienced by the UK. Domestic demand 
growth continued to be feeble, and thus the 1982 US re-
cession was significant in aborting an incipient recovery : 
German GDP actually contracted in that year. Growth re-
sumed in 1983, but initially only very weakly as the reo-
rientation of French macroeconomic policy in that year 
hit output in France and Belgium. 
The most recent UK cycle in tenns of output growth 
thus began from a trough in 1981 and peaked in 1988; the 
employment  growth  cycle  lagged  by  about  two  years 
(spring 1990 seems to mark the trough of unemployment, 
following the 1988 cyclical peak in output growth). The 
ERM  countries  have  experienced  a  more  attenuated 
cycle, from a trough in 1983 building up towards strong 
growth in 1988 with a clear peak not yet having clearly 
been reached (a weakening  in the second half of 1989 
may have represented  a  peak,  with  strong  growth ex-
pected this year representing fresh impetuses from struc-
tural changes in eastern Europe and from anticipation of 
the single market); employment consequences have also 
been lagged.  Current short-term prospects suggest that 
depressed conditions in the UK may only lift after a year 
or so, while growth in the ERM countries will  remain 
reasonably buoyant. 
Depending on which periods are selected,  UK-ERM 
comparisons will thus vary considerably, with inclusion 
of the 1980-81 periods and 1989 onwards, when the cy-
clical and policy-induced slowdown began to take effect, 
proving less flattering  to the UK.  The approach taken 
here  is  to  refrain  from  over-emphasising  such  period 
comparisons. Nevertheless, some such are hardly avoid-
able. Table 3.1 gives data with sub-periods largely based 
on UK experience : 1981n9, 1988/81  and  (using Com-
mission forecasts for 1990 and 1991) 1991188;  the mis-
matching with cycles in other countries should be noted. 
The middle period is obviously when UK performance 
appears most relatively favourable. GDP grew by 3 1/4% 
p.a. against 2% p.a. for the ERM bloc. Employment, still 
declining in 1982 and 1983, grew on average by 1% p.a. 
compared with a bare  1/4% p.a. in the ERM countries. 
Unemployment declined from  1986 from a higher pro-
portion of the civilian labour force than in the ERM bloc 
to a smaller proportion by 1988. In 1987 and 1988, em-
ployment creation in the UK was greater than in the rest 
of the ERM countries taken together. Only Spain among 
the larger countries (and outside the ERM until1989) has 
recorded  a  higher  rate  of employment  creation  since 
1986,  while growth  in Germany  and France has  been 
much more modest. 
The chief obvious failing in this qtherwise mainly im-
pressive performance was in price liability. By 1988 UK 
inflation as measured by the private consumption deflator 
was clearly higher than in any of  the ERM countries (5% 
p.a. compared with 2 3/4% on average and 4 3/4% p.a. 
for Italy, the highest rate). However, this failure was only 
evident towards the end of the period, and  clearly had 
much to do with the large sterling depreciation of late 
1986  and  the  overheating  which  then  gathered  pace. 
From 1982 to 1986 UK inflation was actually lower, on 
average, than in the ERM countries (7% p.a. against al-
most 8 1/4% p.a.). Nominal unit labour cost growth in the 
UK was even lower, 4  3/4% p.a., with the recovery in 
profitability achieved partly through higher margins con-
tributing to inflation. That the later acceleration in infla-
tion was not higher owed much to the deterioration in the 
current account, which reached a measured deficit of al-
most 2% of GDP in 1987 and over 4% in 1988, after a 
rough overall balance in the 1982-86 period. This com-
pares with an average annual current account surplus of 
3/4% for the ERM contries (2 1!2% for Germany alone). 
A relatively successful performance for the UK in the 
middle of the decade was thus not uniform. Drastic disin-
flation and more rapid growth in the early years  were 
achieved partly at the price of the particularly deep reces-
sion in 1980-81. In turn this success was progressively 
eroded from 1986 onwards by overheating and exchange 
rate instability; fmal domestic demand growth rose from 
4  1/4% in 1986 to 5  1/4% the following year and over 
7% in 1988. This compares with unspectacular but more 
consistent performance by the ERM countries. 
Recent relative performance and short-term prospects 
represent an attempted unwinding in the UK of the earlier 
overheating, together with downward cyclical influences 
that would probably have arisen even with earlier stea-
dier growth.  In contrast growth has increased in buoy-
ancy in the ERM countries, from 2-2  1!2%  p.a.  in the 
mid-1980s to around 3 1!2% p.a. from 1988. Unemploy-
ment has remained very high but has been edging down. 
Employment growth has accelerated. Inflation has accel-
erated modestly, as in most industrial countries. The cur-
rent account surplus, dominated by a growing imbalance 
for Germany, is rwming at around 1-1  1/2% p.a. Against 
most yardsticks economic performance has qualitatively 
improved (significantly for certain smaller ERM coun-
tries)  but is  not signally  different  from  earlier  in the 
1980s. 
The different pattern of  demand growth since 1979 can 
be seen by comparing Graphs 1.6 and 3.2 What distin-
guishes the UK's experience, beyond its pronounced cy-
clical  character,  is  the  strong  relative  role  of private 
consumption growth, a product of both rapid real wage 
rises and a falling household saving ratio, and vigorous 
investment.  While  the saving  ratio has fallen  in other 
Connnunity  countries  dwing  the  1980s  (especially  in 
France and Belgium), the severity of the decline in the 
UK has not been matched elsewhere. 
That private  demand  growth,  particularly  of private 
consumption, could be, and was, so much stronger in the -45-
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UK reflects to a unique degree institutional features and 
experience during the  1980s. The strength of consumer 
spending owed much to the combination of  fmanciallib-
eralisation, the entrenched use of the housing market for 
the holding of household wealth and the marked change 
in expectations  once  employment  began  to  rise.  The 
strength of household credit growth, partly through the 
mechanism  of  "equity  release"  for  existing  property 
owners  (the  taking  out of second or higher mortgages 
with collateral provided by rising  property prices,  the 
credit proceeds of which were then partly channelled into 
other consumer spending), had no parallel elsewhere in 
the Community.  In these other countries, however,  the 
pattern of  demand growth has not been uniform. Some si-
miliarities to the UK's experience of rapid domestically 
led growth can be found in the experience of  Italy and the 
new members, Spain and Portugal. Here, too, there have 
emerged tensions on the current external balances. In the 
ERM countries taken together, growth, lower overall in 
1982-1988, has been more balanced between internal and 
external demand. The recovery of fJUd investment ex-
penditure has also been  a  general  phenomenon in the 
Connnunity  and  elsewhere,  helped  by  a  recovery  of 
profitability, but the growth has been less vigorous than 
in the UK. Public consumption growth in the ERM bloc 
has been only a little less than GDP growth. 
The foregoing  comparison of the UK with its Com-
munity neigbours at the whole economy level does not 
~  Fixed Investment 
~  Goods 8t  serv. bal. 
Graph 3.2: Contributions to GOP growth: EUR-11. 
yield unambiguous judgements : the underlying problems 
at the beginning of the decade were different in the UK in 
nature and scale. This could be seen most clearly in the 
initially weak condition of UK IIUJnufacturing, hit hard-
est during the 1980-81 recession. A slimmer manufactur-
ing  sector  survived  to  achieve  substantial  output  and 
productivity growth during  the  1980s,  and  even for  a 
time expanded employment (Table 3.2); profitability rose 
towards international levels. In international comparison 
UK mmufacturing productivity growth in the 1980s, at 
about 5 1/2% p.a. after 1981, comfortably exceeded that 
in other major  industrialized  countries,  where  growth 
slowed from the pre-1973 period. The unweighted aver-
age for Germany, France and Italy, for example, is under 
3% since 1979 compared with about 5% up to 1973 and 2 
1/l% in the intervening period Nevertheless, there has 
been a strong cyclical element in UK performance which 
has weakened with slower growth of  production. 
Connnission data  also  conflllll that  in the industrial 
sector alone the UK still records substantially lower pro-
duetivity than in all three other countries, reflected in a 
lower  level  of employee  compensation.  In  1988,  for 
example, UK industrial productivity was about one quar-
ter below the level of France and Germany and a flfth 
below that of Italy. On the other hand, compensation per 
employee was also higher outside the UK, ranging from 
some 10% higher in Italy to approaching 40% higher in 
Germany. As noted in Chapter 1, service sector produc--46-
Ttlble 3.2: Manufacturing in the UK, Germany, France and  Italy 
(i)  Output 1 
UK 
D 
F 
I 
(ii)  Employment 1 
UK 
D 
F 
I 
(iii) Labour Productivity 1 
UK 
D 
F 
I 
*  Forecasts, April-May 1990 
1)% p.a. change 
Source : Commission services 
1989n9  1989 
1,3  4,8 
1,0  4,8 
0,6  3,8 
2,6  5,3 
-2,8  0,5 
-0,6  1,6 
-2,0  0,4 
-1,4  0,6 
4,2  4,3 
1,6  3,1 
2,7  3,4 
4,1  2,7 
tivity growth has not undergone any dramatic change in 
recent years.  Levels of whole economy productivity in 
the UK thus remain generally lower than in other major 
countries with the exception of  Japan (Graph 3.3). 
The strategic policy choices made by the UK in the 
1980s to tackle its underlying problems were very dis-
tinctive and the consequent cyclical divergences, still to 
be played out to a point where simple comparisons are 
not  inevitably  misleading,  are  significant  It  is  clear 
nevertheless that there has been an important relationship 
between policy and performance, and  also  clear in the 
UK case that there were serious policy errors, both active 
and passive,  from  1986 onwards.  UK macroeconomic 
policy both contributed directly to overheating and are-
surgence of inflationary pressure,  and  indirectly  in its 
lateness to recognise and react to the strength of over-
heating. 
What is less clear in the policy/performance nexus is 
whether recent UK errors were strategic (the choice of  an 
independent MTFS rather then ERM strategy) or more 
tactical (operational) in nature. For example, would an 
MTFS restricted to fiscal policy, an analogous approach 
to monetary Policy  directed by an independent central 
bank, and perhaps a slower pace of fmancial liberalisa-
tion, have been more successful in delivering low infla-
tion ? The issue is important in the Community context, 
and underlies much of the ERM debate discussed in the 
next section. Again, conclusions cannot be clearly drawn, 
and risk being only of  historical importance given the UK 
commitment to ERM participation during Stage One of 
1990.  1991*  198tn9  1988/81 
1,2  2,0  -7,3  3,3 
4,5  4,5  -0,8  1,0 
3,7  3,5  -1,1  0,7 
2,9  2,7  1,7  2,8 
-1,0  -1,5  -6,3  -2,3 
1,7  1,8  -1,0  -0,9 
0,5  0,5  -2,3  -2,3 
0,2  0,2  -1,1  -1,8 
2,2  3,5  -1,1  5,8 
2,8  2,6  0,2  1,8 
3,2  3,0  1,2  3,1 
2,7  2,5  2,9  4,6 
Table 3.2 : Manufacturing. 
EMU. Nevertheless, the UK authorities could convinc-
ingly point to success in the early to mid-1980s, conti-
nued  strong  output  and  employment  growth 
subsequently, and evidence of a higher path of potential 
output growth as broadly justifying their approach. The 
failure to carry forward early success in establishing price 
stability needs to be seen in this overall context, as does 
thus the currently main alternative approach- ERM par-
ticipation - to reestablishing it 
In the UK the resurgence of  inflation has tended to em-
phasise the importance of exchange rate and monetary 
policy at the expense of the broader thrust of  macroecon-
omic and public sector policy. Here, however, from the 
beginning of the 1980s the contribution of the present 
government's approach in helping to lead a reorientation 
of  policy within the Community has been significant : the 
'conventional wisdom' has changed in consequences. 
There have been a number of strands. One of the main 
is to stress the greater efficiency and thus desirability of 
the private (roughly equated with market) sector vis-!-vis 
public (equated with non-market) sector. Much of this 
policy reorientation is microeconomic in nature but with 
important macroeconomic consequences. Thus one mess-
age was that the government should in the first instance 
reduce and then contain the size of the public sector, both 
as regards the direct absorption and management of re-
sources  and public  transfers.  State enterprises  are pri-
vatised;  public  expenditure  growth  is  restrained.  This 
permits a combination of a reduced tax burden and re-
duced deficits and hence debt burden, transferring greater -47-
Relative productivity levels, 1986 
GDP  per pers. employed &  per hour worked 
whole economy 
UIC  • 100 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
UIC  D  F  USA  CAN  J 
- per person employed  ~  per hour worked 
Source: OECD 
resources to the private sector. Within a reduced public 
sector economic efficiency is emphasised. Public admin-
istration is made more efficient by limiting staff numbers 
and to some extent simulating market mechanisms. So-
cial transfers are the object of severe restraint The tax 
system is overhauled and  generally made simpler and 
less discriminatory,  a combination of fewer allowances 
and rates and thus permitting lower schedules. 
Much of this approach was also led, outside the Com-
munity, by the US, a classic example being the tax re-
forms enacted in 1986. The joint example of these two 
countries,  and  the fervour  with which reform was  es-
poused in the UK, were undoubtedly influential in chang-
ing  the mood within the Community.  Impatience with 
growing public deficits, debt and lla burdens hardened. 
General  government  expenditure  as  a  proportion  of 
GDP reached a peak of SO%  for the EC-11 in 1985 and 
has been edging down since; current receipts have been 
stabilised at 44-45% of  GDP since 1983. General govern-
ment deficits peaked at 6 1/4% of GDP for the EC-11 in 
1983 and by 1989 were under 4%; the reduction in the 
primary deficit (excluding debt interest) is greater, from 
2  1n% of GDP in 1981 to a surplus of over 1 1/4% in 
1989.  Cowttries  where  policy  recognisably  changed 
stance include Germany (1982), France (1983), Belgium 
(1985) and Ireland (1987), fu the latter two cases because 
of threatening public fmance and external debt servicing 
situations. 
Graph 3.3 : Relative productivity levels, 1986. 
The changes recorded above for the rest of the Com-
munity in aggregate have been less dramatic than in the 
UK (probably reflecting, inter alia, differing abilities and 
wishes to effect radical political change). In  many instan-
ces progress elsewhere seems undesirably slower, as for 
example the reduction of  industrial subsidies or the reten-
tion of tax systems  incompatible with greater interna-
tional economic integration. Progress in improving the 
structural efficiency of their public sectors (government, 
agencies and utilities) appears much less impressive in 
other Community cowttries, even when the intent is ac-
knowledged. In many of these areas an agenda estab-
lished in the early 1980s, notably by the UK, is still being 
pursued. 
The UK approach to macroeconomic policy itself was 
discussed in Chapter 2. Emphasis in public expenditure 
planning and taxation pOlicy is given to a medium term 
approach, the progressive attainment of  targets relating to 
the size of the public sector or the level of public deficits 
and debt/GDP ratios. Short-term fiscal activism is thus 
explictly shunnecl.  as being unlikely to be operationally 
beneficial given the uncertainty and variability of lags in 
the system. Monetary and exchange rate policy have been 
oriented explicitly to price stability. Given the obvious 
difficulties  the  UK  has  experienced,  it  is  here  that 
policies have been most subject to revision, from an orig-
inally fairly  simplistic monetarist approach in the first 
MTFS (1980) to an almost completely judgemental ap-
proach in the recent years. -48-
Strategic policy in this field in the other countries has 
also bent towards the UK approach, but far more selec-
tively. A medium-term approach to fiscal plans accords 
with the needs of budgetary constraint in several coun-
tries,  while others (Germany, for example),  have only 
ever exceptionally attempted short-term stabilisation via 
changes in fiSCal stance. The most obvious difference is, 
of course, the role of the EMS  and the  exchange rate 
mechani~  and it is this to which attention is now given. 
3.2 The UK and the EMS 
3.2.1 Exchange rate policy and developments 
Following the removal of  exchange controls in October 
1979, and of  other barriers to free capital movements, the 
external value of sterling was left to be determined by 
market conditions without intervention to influence cur-
rency movements. Consistent with monetarist principles, 
sterling was left to appreciate, reaching its peak at the be-
ginning of 1981. This occurred during a period of declin-
ing interest rates. In subsequent years, the realisation that 
monetary targetting could not be relied upon to signal 
adequately the course of nominal income led the govern-
ment to extend the range of monetary and economic indi-
cators used to evaluate economic policy. The exchange 
rate became a key indicator in the post-1982 period, and 
gained further prominence in the period following  the 
Plaza Accord (September 1985). 
The real  exchange rate  appreciation  in the  1980-82 
period contributed significantly to the difficulties in in-
dustrial adjustment but was also a key factor in the disin-
flation achieved. However, the experience suggested that 
foreign exchange markets could take currencies persist-
ently far  from fundamental  equilibrium,  and the beha-
viour of the dollar offered further support to this view. In 
the post-September 1985 period policy aimed at stabilis-
ing the external value of sterling, in sharp contrast to the 
1979181  period when the Chancellor opposed interven-
tion. During this latter period the exchange rate became a 
central element of monetary policy.  The currency suf-
fered a particularly sharp decline in 1986 associated with 
the collapse in oil prices, and interest rates were raised in 
response. 
The objectives of  exchange rate policy became particu-
larly uncertain in the period between March 1987 and the 
spring of 1988. Initially, the stock market collapse of  Oc-
tober 1987 provided the rationale for interest rate reduc-
tions;  subsequently,  sterling  was  trading  in  a  narrow 
range against the DM, and when it rose above 3.00 DM 
interest rates  were  cut or intervention was  intensified. 
This shadowing of the DM restricted the leeway with 
which these instruments were used. Expectations that the 
exchange rate would be maintained led to large capital 
inflows. The incipient appreciation was offset through in-
tervention  which  led  to  an increase  in money  supply 
growth. The implied policy conflict was resolved in the 
summer of 1988  when  interest  rates  started rising  in 
stages to tighten monetary conditions  and  sterling was 
allowed to appreciate. 
The currency came under continuing pressure from the 
end of 1988. The key factor was the deterioration of in-
flation expectations and of expectations for depreciation 
in an enviromnent of robust domestic demand In  No-
vember 1989 sterling weakened when the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Mr.  Lawson, resigned over the implicit 
issue of the degree of priority to be given to sterling's 
joining the ERM. The currency has remained weak in the 
fli'St half  of 1990 and has displayed considerable vulnera-
bility to adverse expectations concerning domestic econ-
omic prospects. The debate about whether and when the 
UK should join the ERM became increasingly intense as 
the absence of a nominal anchor and of a commitment to 
sustain  an  exchange rate  target  came  to  be  accorded 
greater importance as factors underlying much of the re-
cent resurgence of  inflation. 
3.2.2 The UK and the ERM 
The UK participates in two features of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) : the European Monetary Co-
operation Fund (exchanging  20%  of gold and foreign 
currency reserves for ECUs), and the ECU of which ster-
ling forms part of the basket of  currencies. The UK is not 
a member of the the central Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM); both the Labour government in office at the time 
of the EMS's inception (March 1979), and the Conserva-
tive govermnent which succeeded it in May 1979 chose 
to stay outside the ERM. 
The urgency in deciding whether to join the ERM or 
not has become particularly pronounced in the post-1988 
period. During this period the monetary aggregates have 
failed to serve as an adequate intermediate target to con-
tain inflation : the MTFS framework has been of dubious 
value to stabilise expectations and wage and price press-
ures have intensified in response to earlier overheating. 
All these are in sharp contrast to the experience of the 
ERM economies. In addition, the accelerating process of 
European integration has focused attention on the press-
ure for the UK to join the ERM and become a more ac-
tive actor in the emerging institutional arrangements. The 
success of the ERM in promoting exchange rate stability 
and convergence,  and  the  deterioration in UK macro-
economic  conditions,  were  key factors  in the govern-
ment's  commitment,  made  in  the  Madrid  European 
Council of June 1989, for sterling's participation in the 
ERM when certain conditions had been fullfilled 1• 
Arguments against membership have been numerous; 
some have focused on maintaining freedom to improve 
1)  Aocording to the government, the following conditions shwld be satisfied before UK membenhip becooles effective :a  decline in UK 
inflation; removal of exchange controls by EMS manben; sufficient progress towards completion of  the internal market; liberalization 
of fmancial services; and agreement on competition policy. -49-
competitiveness  through  exchange  rate  depreciation, 
others on the special role of sterling as a major invest-
ment  currency  (and  formerly  on  its  petro-currency 
status). As regards the frrst argument, it should be noted 
that real, not nominal, exchange rates determine competi-
tiveness  and,  in this  respect,  pegging  the nominal  ex-
change rate requires a reduction in inflation to improve 
competitiveness. This is consistent with the counter-infla-
tionary performance of the ERM. However, nominal ex-
change rate adjustment could change the real exchange 
rate in the short-run, even if the effect is not sustained. 
Clearly, nominal exchange rate adjustments fully offset 
by price changes do not constitute changes in competi-
tiveness. 
Sterling's role as an investment currency can be exag-
gerated.  It is clearly not commensurate with London's 
importance as a fmancial centre, where much internation-
ally oriented business is conducted in other currencies. 
Nor is  sterling  a  major  store  of international  wealth. 
Rather the risk seems to be that the relative breadth and 
liquidity of  sterling markets could lead to particular vola-
tility. Nevertheless, ERM participation could reasonably 
be expected to reduce this. 
A more critical argument notes the previous extensive 
reliance on capital controls in certain ERM countries as a 
means of maintaining a greater measure of monetary in-
dependence.  However,  in  the UK controls  have  been 
abolished; a tendency towards (uncovered) interest parity 
must then hold if the sterling exchange rate is fixed with-
in the ERM 2• In other words, since interest differentials 
in a  world of unrestricted capital  mobility  reflect  ex-
pected  depreciation,  fixing  the  exchange  rate  exerts 
pressure on nominal interest rates between countries to 
converge. This convergence of UK to continental interest 
rates may be inappropriate for domestic macroeconomic 
objectives. In particular, if nominal interest rates in the 
UK were to converge to levels prevailing in low-inflation 
countries, this may cause UK monetary growth to accel-
erate with further inflationary implications. Alternatively. 
an  inflationary  shock,  with  quasi-fixed  interest  rates, 
would lower the real rate of  interest in the country experi-
encing an inflation acceleration;  this is contrary to the 
monetary  contraction  required  to  offset  the  shock.  In 
these circumstances the system would be unstable as ex-
pectations for realigmnent  and  depreciation of sterling 
would emerge, leading to balance of payments crises as-
sociated with reserve losses occurring in an attempt to 
support  the  parity.  Outside  the  ERM,  an  inflationary 
shock could be countered by interest rate increases  as 
well as currency appreciation. Thus ERM participation, 
while it could possibly  contribute to  lowering  interest 
rates and inflation in periods of stability, could also play 
a destabilizing role in periods of  turbulence. 
This argument is important in view of current counter-
inflationary policy in the UK. Since fiscal policy is deter-
mined by the MTFS  targets, the burden of combatting 
inflation has been carried by monetary policy. For short-
tenn  stabilization  purposes,  an  inflation  acceleration 
would reduce the value of the fiscal surplus in real tenns 
and would lead to a perverse movement with regard to 
the stabilization objectives.  As  interest rates  would be 
largely determined by ERM obligations, there would be 
no instruments available to respond to the inflationary 
shock. This may become an an important restriction on 
the country's ability to contain inflation, but is a conse-
quence  of the  chosen  policy  design.  As  Artis  ( 1989) 
points out, the particular policy mix is politically deter-
mined and there is no reason why more flexibility in fis-
cal policy should not be used to support monetary policy. 
It could also be argued  that,  since ERM participation 
could yield substantial credibility returns,  the commit-
ment to medium-term fiscal targets could to some extent 
be relaxed without destabilizing the expectational envi-
ronment. Finally. ERM membership would still leave a 
margin for exchange rate adjustment since at present the 
system is far from a fixed exchange rage arrangement. It 
would, therefore, leave considerable room for UK inter-
est rates to continue diverging from interest rates in other 
ERM countries with the extent of the divergence depend-
ing on the permitted fluctuation margins. The experience 
of the ERM countries shows that divergences in national 
interest rates continue to exist, reflecting not only ex-
change rate uncertainty but also country-specific policy 
and  other  characteristics  (tax  laws,  discriminatory 
measures, controls on investment flows, high indebted-
ness, etc.), as well as imperfect substitutability between 
various imancial assets. While a tendency towards inter-
est rate  convergence has  occurred over the  post-1979 
period, UK interest rates could enjoy some degree of in-
dependence which could be used for domestic stabiliza-
tion. 
The sustainability of exchange rates in the ERM de-
pends also on the extent to which UK and other coun-
tries'  macroeconomic  structures  and  policy  objectives 
differ  and,  consequently,  influence  exchange  stability. 
With respect to the latter, UK policy objectives could be 
regarded as identical with those of the ERM countries, 
thus removing one source of  macroeconomic disturbance. 
However, when macroeconomic structures differ, fixed 
exchange rates are suboptimal, even in the  presence of 
common policy objectives, in the event of shocks. Real 
exchange rate realignments are then an essential mechan-
ism to redistribute the costs of  disturbances among mem-
ber countries when production cannot be relocated 3• 
Two considerations can be invoked to support the ar-
gument that the UK and the EC economic structures dif-
fer.  F'rrst,  the  UK  labour  market  is  characterised  by 
various rigidities which, even in the presence of supply-
2)  These points have been associated with Sir Alan Walters' opposition to ERM participation. A related discussion can be found in F. Gia-
vazzi (1987). 
3)  See F. Giavazzi (1987) : op. ciL -50-
side reforms, continue to play a  key role in the wage 
determination process. In particular, skill imbalances and 
the housing market limit labour mobility : both would 
thus  accentuate the inflationary  or deflationary conse-
quences of an external shock and  could contribute  to 
undue strains on the exchange rate. 
Secondly, there are arguments based on optimal cur-
rency area criteria. For example, Holmes (1989) notes 
that, unlike Germany, the UK has a greater propensity to 
import goods, and a surplus on the invisibles account; the 
structure of the British balance of payments is such that 
the deficit in visible trade is partially offset by the surplus 
in invisibles;  the opposite holds for Germany. Holmes 
concludes that the German economy is less open than the 
UK.  --
Both considerations would tend to be less important 
over the medium term. Improving labour market flexi-
bility is a continuing concern in all member states, but 
relative to other countries it could yield substantial effi-
ciency gains in the UK.  Significant improvements are 
likely to take place in the coming years, partly  in re-
sponse to the  completion of the internal market, even 
though an important degree of inertia may continue to 
characterize labour markets.  These improvements  will 
lessen the impact of deflationary or inflationary shocks, 
as labour (and capital) move towards the expanding sec-
tors with greater ease and limit the need for exchange rate 
changes. 
The degree of  opemess of an economy has been an im-
portant consideration in the theory of optimum currency 
areas. According to McKinnon (1963) the need for ex-
change rate changes in response to external shocks is a 
diminishing function of the extent to which the country 
in question participates in international trade.  As each 
country produces tradable goods and services and non-
tradables, and since factor mobility between the two sec-
tors may be limited, fixed exchange rates are appropriate 
for countries which consume a  basket of goods where 
tradables  are prominent;  for countries which consume 
primarily non-tradables flexible exchange rates are ap-
propriate. This is due to the fact that fixed exchange rates 
imply fiXed real balances in terms of tradable goods, for 
given prices of tradable goods; while flexible exchange 
rates imply variable real balances in terms of tradable 
goods. Contrary to Holmes' argument, the openess of the 
UK economy strengthens the case for its participation in 
the ERM since the value of money in terms of tradables 
would then be fiXed. Fmally, the programme for the com-
pletion of the internal market and liberalization of capital 
movements will  enhance the openess of all EC econ-
omies and will have an important impact on the pattern 
of their international transactions; this development wea-
kens substantially arguments based on differential trade 
structures. 
Improving the economy's flexibility through structural 
policy initiatives such as those pursued by the UK, raises 
the economy's ability to adjust to an exogenous shock. 
Limiting exchange flexibility could nevertheless raise the 
costs of adjustment Were the UK to join the ERM, an 
important policy instrument would not be available to re-
store equilibrium in the event of a shock. This, however, 
must be viewed in the light of  the increased flexibility of 
the UK economy over the 1980s. A fiXed exchange rate 
for sterling is primarily for this reason more sustainable 
at the beginning of the 1990s than in previous years :the 
economy is more flexible. Since exchange rate flexibility 
and allocative flexibility can substitute for each other to 
achieve economic stabilization, as shown by the theory 
on optimum cummcy areas, it is likely that the potential 
stabilization costs may be less than conventionally as-
sumed. Limiting exchange flexibility in these circumstan-
ces could then enhance the potential of counter-inflation 
policy because the need for currency realignments would 
correspondingly decline as the exchange parity became 
sustainable and therefore credible. 
The balance of the arguments for and against UK par-
ticipation in the ERM indicates that substantial benefits 
could be reaped if  such a step were taken. The key argu-
ment against membership,  the insufficiency  of instru-
ments to control inflation when domestic interest rates 
coverge towards rates in other ERM countries, is import-
ant only to the extent that the limited role of  fiscal policy 
in stabilization in the  UK is politically determined. On 
the other hand, the exchange rate regime could become a 
critical disinflationary vehicle by anchoring expectations 
and thus changing wage and price behaviour. 
Since  the Madrid European Council  additional  pro-
gress has been made in furthering European integration, 
and the conditions set by the UK for ERM membership 
have substantially been met, with the exception that UK 
inflation has accelerated. In recent official statements the 
deterioration in inflation performance has been the key 
argument for postponing membership, while noting that 
joining the ERM during stage one of the move towards 
monetary union, beginning on July 1, 1990, remains the 
govermnent's objective. The UK has chosen to lower in-
flation outside the ERM, rather than join the ERM at the 
current rate of  inflation and disinflate within the system's 
constraints. With downward wage and price inflexibility 
and with UK inflation differentials worsening, it might 
appear  suboptimal  to  abandon  the  option  of gradual 
nominal exchange depreciation to restore  competitive-
ness. However, this can become entrenched behaviour, as 
the experience of the past two years has shown. At the 
same time, comparing the experience of the ERM coun-
tries and the UK during the 1980s, it is evident that the 
former have achieved remarkable stability and that the 
ERM has  promoted  convergence  among  the  member 
states, while the UK has displayed greater macroecon-
omic instability. In the absence of a credible counter-in-
flationary policy commitment, as currently appears to be 
the case, ERM membership could speed up the process of 
disinflation by offering the most convincing policy op-
tion for economic stabilisation. 
3.2.3 Some evidence on the impact orERM 
membership 
Medium-term simulations of  full ERM membership for 
the UK economy have been performed by the NIESR 
(National  Institute for Economic  and  Social Research) -51-
Table 3.3: NIESR Simulations: The consequences of  EMS membership, 1989-1993 
Effective exchange  Short-term  Real short-term  Unemployment  Retail price 
rate  interest rate 
(1985=100) 
B  ERM  B 
1989  93,7  94,3  13,5 
1990  88,8  96,8  14,0 
1991  85,1  98,3  13,0 
1992  81,3  99,0  13,0 
1993  77,4  99,4  13,0 
B = Base case forecast 
ERM = ERM participation simulation 
1) Calculated with the RPI inflation 
(%) 
ERM 
13,3 
11,4 
7,4 
5,3 
5,2 
Sollt'ce: B. Anderson, A. Britton, and P. Gregg (1989). 
using their UK econometric model (see National Institute 
Economic  Review  (1989)).  Sterling  was  assumed  to 
move in line with a  weighted average of the DM, the 
French franc,  and the lira relative to non-ERM curren-
cies. It was further assumed that UK short-term interest 
rates moved gradually over a period of  two years towards 
the average of  European rates. ERM participation was as-
sumed to begin in the fourth quarter of 1989. The results 
of this simulation were contrasted with those of the main 
NIESR forecast. 
Key  variables  from  these  projections  are  shown  in 
Table  3.3.  The results  suggest  that  Britain's  inflation 
problems would be alleviated and a period of  rapid disin-
flation and declining interest rates would emerge. Under-
lying  this  is  a  projected exchange  appreciation  (5,4% 
between 1989 and 1993 in the ERM case against a 17,4% 
depreciation projected in the base case) 
4 and an assumed 
fiscal contraction which leads to a public sector surplus 
(PSDR) of  6% of  GDP, compared to 3% in the base case. 
The contractionary effect of exchange appreciation and 
of  fiscal restraint is more than offset by the decline in in-
terest rates so that the output and employment effects of 
ERM participation appear to be small. Real interest rates 
are significantly lower than in the base projection, and 
follow a declining path; in 1993 the real short-term rate is 
three percentage points lower than in the base projection. 
What difference would ERM participation have made 
to British macroeconomic performance over the past ten 
years ? In a retrospective simulation made by the Na-
tional  Institute,  which assumed that  membership com-
interest rate 
1 
(millions)  inflation 
(%)  (% p.a. change) 
B  ERM  B  ERM  B  ERM 
5,7  5,6  1,8  1,8  7,8  7,7 
7,3  7,4  1,6  1,6  6,7  4,0 
7,5  6,8  1,7  1,7  5,5  0,6 
8,7  6,2  1,8  1,9  4,3  -0,9 
8,5  5,5  1,8  1,9  4,5  -0,3 
Table 3.3 : NIESR Simulations. 
menced in 1979, it was suggested that this would have in-
itially worsened the inflation situation but subsequently 
have reduced it significantly. This reflects the fact that 
the exchange rate would have been lower than the actual 
rate in the early 1980s, and an important disinflationary 
mechanism would not have been operative. The opposite 
occurs in the period 1986-1988. While the performance 
of the real economy in the ERM case is very similar to 
what actually happened, membership would have further 
increased inflation when it was high and would have re-
duced it further when it was low. It can be argued that the 
UK avoided the implied inflation variability by not join-
ing the ERM in 1979. This simulation indicates that the 
timing of  UK ERM participation should be considered in 
the light of domestic inflation developments, since ex-
change rate appreciation remains an important disinfla-
tionary  instrument.  Its  importance should be balanced 
against the effect participation could have on inflation 
expectations. H the latter effect is substantial, an ERM-
induced  disinflation  could  develop  irrespective  of the 
current rate of inflation. However, it is not possible to 
quantify the effects of the change in the exchange rate 
regime on wage and price behaviour. 
Abolition of controls over international capital move-
ments was a major policy initiative by the UK govern-
ment,  and  an  important  step  in  advancing  fmancial 
market integration in the EC. However, free capital mo-
bility and participation in the ERM are complementary 
policies,  in that  the  prevailing  system permits  capital 
market liberalization in the context of exchange rate sta-
bility,  and  requires  closer  policy  cooperation  to 
strengthen the system. The Commission itself has argued 
4)  The exchange appreciation is based on an assmned depreciation of  the US dollar during this period. -52-
that sterling's absence from the ERM poses problems for 
the  UK,  its  closer  trading  partners,  and the  EC  as  a 
wholes. Other commentators have argued that the UK, 
while tacitly pursuing a policy of exchange rate stability 
against key EC currencies, does not enjoy the benefits of 
policy credibility arising from the formalization of the ar-
rangement, even though "the credibility of the exchange 
rate commitment is far more valuable than the credibilitt 
of the  MTFS  in affecting  inflationary expectations"  . 
Among the difficulties caused for other countries, ster-
ling's non-participation in the ERM has made it difficult 
for Ireland to proceed with the removal of  exchange con-
trols. For the Community as a whole, plans to go beyond 
an area of free trade, towards a system of closer policy 
coordination, have been rendered more difficult as a re-
sult of  sterling's absence from the ERM. 
UK participation in the ERM will thus benefit not only 
the country but also the EC as  a  whole.  The govern-
ment's clear undertaking to join the ERM, made at Ma-
drid  in  June  1989  and  reconfrrmed  subsequently, 
represent an important development in this respect. 
3.3 The UK and the Single Market 
3.3.1 From domestic supply-side reform to the 
Single Market 
The programme envisaged for the completion of the in-
ternal EC market involves removal of all visible national 
barriers to trade in products, standardization of trade in 
services, abolition of qualitative restrictions on trade and 
removal of preferential treatment of  national fums by na-
tional governments. By unifying the twelve national mar-
kets into one large, EC-wide market, the objective is to 
exploit scale economies and associated cost declines, to 
promote efficiency by fostering competition, and to en-
hance the growth and job-creation potential of the mem-
ber countries in an environment of  stable prices. 
The  United Kingdom government has been  a  strong 
supporter of the  internal  market progranune.  Its  own 
early emphasis on domestic supply-side measures to im-
prove economic performance extended naturally to es-
pousing  a  wider  Community  approach  aimed  at 
competitive deregulation and  the removal of non-tariff 
barriers to trade which are at the heart of the single mar-
ket process. UK official support is thus partly philosophi-
cal. However,  an appreciation of national interest also 
undoubtedly plays a role, as in an expectation that, for 
example, certain UK industries such as fmancial services 
will  benefit from more open markets within the  Com-
munity. In practical terms the UK has been the  leading 
member country in terms of adopting single market di-
rectives in national legislation. As of the end of February 
1990, of 158 directives passed at Community level (out 
of the 279 in the 1985 White Paper), the UK had legis-
lated in respect of all except nine. This compares with a 
gap of  51 in the case of  Italy, for example. 
There are,  however, obvious areas of concern to the 
UK (and often other countries') authorities. This applies 
particularly when Community proposals are thought to 
impose unacceptable constraints on national sovereignty. 
Issues relating to flSCal  harmonisation, discussed below, 
are a case in point. Another, related rather than integral to 
the internal market, is that of the "Social Charter" which 
is thought to run counter in philosophy to the govern-
ment's deregulatory approach to employment legislation 
and the provisions of which are regarded as potentially 
damaging to employment if  put into practice. 
3.3.2 UK policies and the Single Market 
Certain policy areas stand out for their relevance to the 
single market progranune while not always formally part 
of it. They include liberalisation of  capital flows, taxation 
and competition policy. The UK's approach has been dis-
tinctive in all three areas. 
Liberalisation of  capital movements 
With certain exceptions for Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, all international capital flows should be freed 
from control from 1 July 1990. In the UK, however, all 
controls were removed in 1979 and the UK became the 
leading example within the EC in the liberalization of 
capital movements. The measures in question were ap-
plicable to portfolio and direct investment, holdings of 
foreign currency deposits by residents, and sterling lend-
ing to non-residents by UK banks and by the non-bank 
sector.  Restrictions on sterling-fmancing of third-party 
(that is, non-UK) trade is thought to have diminished the 
international role of  the currency. 
In the pre-1979 regime, foreign currency required to 
fmance portfolio investment by domestic residents had to 
be obtained from the sale of  existing foreign-currency de-
nominated assets  or from foreign  currency borrowing, 
thus  contributing  to the  creation of an investment cur-
rency market. In this market investment currency was at a 
premium which on occasion was in the range of 30-50%. 
Foreign currency holdings by domestic residents were re-
stricted  to  those representing  working  balances,  while 
sterling lending to non-residents was restricted to trade-
related  requirements.  Direct  investment  flows  were 
generally restricted when the foreign currency required to 
finance overseas investment was obtained at the official 
sterling exchange rate, unl'ess it was shown that the trans-
action had a positive balance-of-payements impact; bow-
ever,  currency  obtained  through  borrowing  or  in  the 
investment currency market was free of controls. It was 
also required that at least two-thirds of after-tax profits 
were repatriated. The impact of regulations on direct in-
vestment transactions is estimated to have been minimal. 
5)  See "Creation of a European Financial Area", Ccmmunicatim from the Commissim to the Council, November 1987. Reprinted in Eu-
ropefJil Economy, (1988b  ). 
6)  S. Fischer(1987). -53-
The controls were aimed at the fmancing rather then the 
level of direct investment abroad and their impact on the 
net flows was small. 
· The abolition of controls regulating monetary transac-
tions had a significant impact on some key variables. M3, 
the  aggregate which includes foreign currency deposits, 
advanced rapidly, while interest differentials between d~ 
mestic and offshore deposits declined significantly in the 
post-1979 period. In addition, there was a significant de-
cline in the volatility of domestic/off-shore interest dif-
ferentials in the post-abolition period. 
Removal of controls on international capital transac-
tions is a prerequisite for the integration of fmancial and 
capital markets; umestricted capital movements expand 
the  opportunities for international portfolio diversifica-
tion, and improve the allocation of international savings. 
These objectives are part of the EC programme for the 
completion of the internal market. The UK experience 
suggests that the abolition of controls strengthened the 
process of deregulation of fmancial  markets  and con-
tributed to London's importance as an international fm-
ancial  centre.  Furthermore,  liberalization  stenuned the 
long-term decline of sterling in international finance : for 
example, sterling-denominated bond issues rose signifi-
cantly in the post-1979 period. The character of  monetary 
policy also changed, in that quantitative and legal restric-
tions ceased to be regarded as  possible instruments of 
monetary management. The UK experience confums that 
domestic interest rates converged towards international 
interest rates in the post-1979 period, implying some loss 
of  monetary autonomy. 
Since liberalization of capital movements can be ex-
pected to affect the distribution of  fmancial activity in the 
Conununity, the government has taken a key interest in 
the progress of  liberalisation (making progress elswhere a 
condition of ERM participation, for example). Removal 
of discriminatory  policies  should strengthen  the  com-
parative advantage aspects of international fmancial ac-
tivity. The UK government expects this will contribute to 
London's position as the dominant fmancial centre in the 
EC. Experience and tradition in international fmancial in-
termediation are important elements of comparative ad-
vantage;  London has  a  long  history of serving  as  an 
international fmancial centre, and it is indeed possible 
that its position will be consolidated within the  Com-
munity. 
Taxation in the Community 
In  the Community context there are three areas of taxa-
tion policy which have attracted particular attention be-
cause  of  their  potential  significance  for  the  internal 
market programme. These are indirect taxation (VAT and 
taxes on alcohol, tobacco and mineral oils), the taxation 
of  savings and corporate taxation. Under the Single E~ 
pean Act Council decisions on taxation need to be unani-
mous and are thus difficult to reach. This is both because 
governments  resist  measures  that  threaten  a  loss  of 
revenue, economic activity or price rises in their country 
and also because of objections to the intrinsic  loss of 
sovereignty in accepting a role of Community decision-
making. The consequence is that only limited progress 
has been  made in reaching agreement on Conunission 
proposals in these areas. For indirect taxation agreement 
on a regime with few immediate significant implications 
for the UK is now probable; by contrast common regimes 
for the taxation of saving or for corporate income (apart 
from the changes noted below) seem likely to fmd agree-
ment only with greater difficulty. 
Indirect taxation 
In the field of indirect taxation the Commission's ap-
proach has been based on the principle of abolition of  fis-
cal frontiers within the internal market. This would imply 
the total freedom to buy anywhere within the Community 
and transfer goods into the country of fmal consumption 
without frontier checks. For this to be achieved without 
undue distortion of trade the Commission's initial propo-
sals envisaged rates of VAT and other major indirect 
taxes  approximating  at certain levels or within certain 
ranges. Levying of taxation would be based· in practice 
on the  'origin', rather than as  at present,  'destination' 
method, although the latter would be retained as the basic 
principle for the distribution of total receipts within the 
Conununity. Thus a system of compensation- a clearing 
mechanistn - to offset the impact on national treasuries of 
the difference between production and consumption of 
goods  and services  on national  territory  would be in-
stituted. 
The Commission's proposals for tax harmonisation re-
main under discussion. Original proposals included two 
VAT bands of  4-9% (reduced rate) and 14-20% (standard 
rate). Zero-rating was to be abolished. For alcohol, tobac-
co and mineral oils, unique rates or bands would apply 
chosen by reference to some compromise between the 
widely different current levels in different Conununity 
countries. 
These proposals  were  strongly  opposed  by  the UK 
government on the grounds that such a  degree of har-
monization was unnecessary. Objections raised the issues 
of tax sovereignty, social impact (continued zero-rating 
of food and children's clothing for VAT purposes has 
been given as an election conunitment), health concerns 
(the Commission's proposals would have meant steep re-
ductions in spirits  and tobacco duties) and practicality 
(whether the clearing mechanism was feasible). The UK 
instead proposed a looser system based on the continua-
tion of a destination principle and zero-rating for exports. 
In  May 1989 the Conunission submitted revised propo-
sals  which  attempted  to  accommodate  UK  and  other 
countries'  objections.  Without proposing details of re-
vised tax rates, both VAT and other indirect taxes would 
offer scope for marked inter-country differences. There 
would be a minimum but no maximum standard rate of 
VAT,  while  some  zero-rating  would  continue  to  be 
allowed as a  'temporary derogation'. Taxation by desti-
nation would apply for mail order purchases, transport 
equipment (mainly cars) and exempted bodies (the public 
sector- e.g. hospitals- and insurance companies). There 
would be direct  clearing  for  large  international  com-
panies (again virtually amounting to taxation by destina--54-
tion). For alcohol and tobacco the absence of maximum 
rates would allow local high tax regimes (such as the 
UK  's) to continue, with retail sales controlled by a device 
such as excise stamps, but with complete freedom for in-
dividual travellers to import. For mineral oils unique or 
narrow band ranges would be retained. In May 1990 a 
second set of revised proposals dealt with the collection 
system. These broadly followed the UK position, in re-
taining, at least until 1996, the existing destination and 
zero export rating system, and relying on direct informa-
tion from trading companies to fill the gap in fiscal con-
trol left by abolition of  frontier customs documents. 
For the UK it appears that such proposals would have 
no  major  macroeconomic  impacL  Small  potential 
revenue increases are likely to arise from realignment of 
mineral oil duties with perhaps more significant product 
price changes (cheaper diesel oil, possibly encouraging 
higher imports of diesel-powered cars, a sector where the 
UK industry is weak; petrol duty might increase). Higher 
VAT revenue would arise to the extent that some pro-
ducts lose their zero-rating, although here, too, the impact 
is unlikely to be severe if the UK obtains continued dero-
gation for a wide range of goods and services. For com-
parison, ending zero-rating without allowing for changes 
in consumption patterns suggests a revenue increase of 
about  1%  of GDP for  1989-90. Existing standard rate 
VAT, alcohol and tobacco duties are unlikely to be di-
rectly affected by the proposals, although unlimited im-
ports  by  individual  travellers  would  put  downward 
pressure on rates. 
It should be emphasised that these effects are only ex-
tremely indicative, based on the assumption of  agreement 
on a likely package of measures. Present indications are 
nevertheless  that  an eventual  system would  allow  for 
more inter-country differences than originally proposed 
and for  the  UK  would  impose  minimal  disruption  to 
existing tax practices. Such a Community system would 
then resemble the present US situation, where constraints 
on tax rates are competitive in nature (allowing signifi-
cant differences between states), inter-state conunerce is 
free  and  enforcement  of  the  destination  principle  is 
undertaken on a pragmatic case by case basis. 
The taxation of  income from savings 
Commission  proposals  to  introduce  some  minimum 
harmonization of the taxation of  income from savings (an 
interest withholding tax) have not been pressed. The pro-
posals were partly stimulated by fears that liberalization 
of capital movements throughout the Community would 
encourage a flight of  tax  -evading capital from high tax to 
low tax countries (e.g. from France to Luxembomg). The 
essence of  the proposals was to introduce a minimum rate 
of withholding tax on interest from deposits and bonds 
for all Community residents, supplemented by facilitating 
the exchange of information between the different Com-
munity tax authorities. Non-Community residents would 
be exempt from the tax. 
In the UK the proposals met with opposition from both 
the authorities and the banking community. Apart from 
the familiar gromd of the sovereignty principle, objec-
tions were based principally on the fear of driving out 
savings  from  the  Conununity  with  consequences  of 
higher interest rates and the loss of fmancial business. 
Within Europe Switzerland and the sterling offshore cen-
tres have been cited as potential alternative havens for 
tax-shy funds. Germany's experience of substantial capi-
tal outflows (especially to Luxembourg) after introduc-
tion of a  withholding  tax in January  1989, forcing  its 
subsequent repeal, was also noted. 
In point of practice it seems doubtful whether a Com-
munity withholding tax regime, if ever introduced, would 
have substantial implications for the UK. For domestic 
residents, the UK already has such a system for bank and 
building society interest (reformed in the 1990 Budget), 
supported by tax reporting arrangements of long stand-
ing, while London's importance as an international bank-
ing  centre is based essentially  on wholesale  interbank 
business which would not be affected by such a tax. The 
incidence of a new tax would thus be limited to tax-shy 
fmds from other Community residents  : for the UK it 
seems \Dllikely that these are important relative to overall 
business. 
Corporate ttJmtion 
Corporate taxation is, after indirect taxation, the second 
fiscal  area where the internal market White Paper held 
out the prospect of a Commission initiative. It is equally 
an area where unanimous Council agreement has proved 
elusive.  The  White  Paper  focussed  on  measures  to 
remove obstacles to cooperation between enterprises in 
different  member states;  outside  the  1992 programme 
proper are general harmonization issues such as the base 
and rate of  corporate taxes and the relationship with indi-
vidual shareholder taxation, where there is no particular 
timetable constraint. 
As long ago as 1969 the Commission tabled two draft 
directives.  The first presented profosals to ease cross-
border mergers and asset transfers  . These proposals at-
tempted to deal with two main issues, first, the taxing of 
the difference between the market and book values of as-
sets  acquired through the merger, treated as  a  national 
capital gain; and secondly, the taxation,  and potentially 
double taxation, of post-merger profits.  As regards the 
first problem, the Commission proposed that tax should 
be deferred until capital gains are actually realised, while 
for the second the proposal was to restrict national taxa-
7)  Draft directive on tax treatment of mergers and transfers of assets between two or  more finns residing in more than one member state 
(COM(69)5, base art. 100 EEC). -55-
tion to profits generated within a particular member state, 
excluding profits  generated by a  subsidiary in another 
state. This fell short of proposing fully consolidated ac-
counting, in which losses from a foreign subsidiary could 
be offset against parent company profits, although this 
had been included in earlier drafts of th~ propoSals and 
has been reintroduced during recent discussion of  .a Euro-
pean compmy  statute.  1be second proposed directive 
aimed to prevent double taxation occurring in the case of 
a  company's  ~uity stake in a  business in a  different 
member state 8• In general, income from corporate risk 
capital would only be taxed where the income arises, not 
again after repatriation of profits on which tax has  al-
ready been paid A third draft directive dating from 1976 
was for a binding arbitration procedure on national tax 
authorities to prevent double taxation in the cases where 
one authority adjusts declared transfer prices between in-
ternationally associated companies in its favour (boosting 
profits in the area under its jurisdiction) without offsets 
elsewhere 9• The three directives were fmally passed in 
June 1990; Germany will be allowed until 1996 to com-
ply fully with the frrst of  these. 
The more general issues of  corporate taxation - the rate 
of tax and withholding taxes on dividends- were the sub-
ject of a draft directive in 1975 
10
• This proposed estab-
lishing  a  compulsory band (45-55%) for corporate tax 
rates md a common imputation regime (again with a 45-
55% band) for a withholding tax. However, the draft di-
rective did not deal with the base of corporate taxation 
and for this reason the European Parliament refused to 
deliver its opinion, legislatively deadlocking the propo-
sal. Recently the Commission has reexamined the issue 
of the taxable base and new harmonised rules may be 
proposed. 
From the United Kingdom point of view there seem 
strong grounds for facilitating tax treatment of  cross bor-
der mergers md investment activities, given the outward 
orientation of UK enterprises and the future importance 
of acquisitions to take advantage of the single marteL 
The three directives passed in June 1990 seem attractive 
for these reasons. However, this is less obviously true of 
the 1975 proposals as originally drafted. In the interven-
ing period the UK has followed the US lead in consider-
ably  broadening  its  corporate  tax  base,  introducing 
economic depreciation  and reducing  the  corporate  tax 
rate (from 50% to 35%). These proposals were contained 
in the  1984 Finance AcL  In  addition the corporate tax 
regime for smaller business has~  considerably light-
ened. The UK has thus a particul~y light regime of cor-
porate taxation within Europe, even\ taking account of  the 
trend in other countries towards widening corporate tax 
bases md reducing rates 11•  'Harmonization' might thus 
pose particular adjustment problems for the UK. In addi-
tion, the unanimity requirement for subsequent changes 
of  rate bands could effectively stall substantial tax reform 
on the scale engineered by the UK since 1984. 
Competitio11 policy, deregulatio11 a11d liberalizotio11 
Policies  furthering  competition  include,  as  well  as 
competition policy strictly defmed i.e. monopolies, mer-
gers md restrictive practices legislation, measures in fa-
vour of deregulation  and  liberalization.  Such  policies 
thus  come fmnly  within the  ambit of the supply side 
policies discussed in Chapter 2.4. In this section more at-
tention will be given to the Community context.  · 
As regards competition policy,  the  Delors report on 
economic md monetary union emphasised the need to 
deal with conventional restrictive practices and abuse of 
market power.  In  addition mergers,  takeovers  md ex-
cessive use of govenunent subsidies were cited 12• This 
view follows a period during which, on the basis of  exist-
ing powers, the Commission has taken a more active in-
tervention role in blocking new anti-competitive moves 
md in attempting to roll back existing restrictive prac-
tices.  Recent examples affecting  the UK include inter-
vention  by  the  Commission  to  scale  down  the  debt 
write-off assistance provided by the UK government to 
British Aerospace on its acquisition of the largely public-
ly-owned Austin-Rover motor vehicles group (from UKL 
800 million initially to UKL 469 million) and more strin-
gent  vetting  of the  conditions  of takeovers  having  a 
potential Community impact (such as of British Caledo-
nian by British Airways). The regulatory climate has thus 
tighte~  both as regards intra-private sector moves md 
state aids,  with more attention directed from  m  early 
stage of any new proposal at the likely Commission re-
sponse. 
The impact of this trend is likely to be marked in the 
UK, for two main reasons. Frrst, as noted in Chapter 2.4, 
UK  competition  policy  has  traditionally  been charac-
8)  Draft directive on oommon tax arrangements applicable to parent companies and subsidiaries of different member states (COM(69)S, 
COM(85)360, base art. 100 EEC). 
9)  Draft directive on the  adjustment of profits  (elimination of double taxation) between usociatcd companies (arbitration procedure) 
(COM(76)611, base art. 100 EEC). 
1 0)  Draft directive on the hannonization of systems of  company taxation and of withholding taxes on dividends (COM(75)392). 
11)  In tenns of pre-tax profits the UK had the lowest tax burden for all five manufacturing sectors surveyed in a 1989 inter-counuy com-
parison including Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, the USA and Japan. DIW (Gennan Institute for Economic Research), Die Bestew-
rllllg iMr UI'IUrne~tugewinM:  7/ntlustrie/4N.Ur im Vergleich (The taxation of  corporate earnings: 7 industrial countries compared). 
12)  Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989), para. 25. -56-
terised by considerable executive discretion as to the im-
pact on the  "public interest"  rather than explicit legal 
criteria; this contrasts with the more formalised approach 
of the Commission based upon the EEC Treaty (Article 
85 and 86 for companies and 92 and 93 for state aids) and 
legally enforceable (by national courts, the Commission 
and ultimately the European Court). Secondly, takeover 
activity involving large enteprises is far higher in the UK 
than other member states, and for international takeovers 
UK companies are by far the most active of any member. 
In 1988, for example, UK companies spent USD 44 bil-
lion  on  foreign  acquisitions  (three-quarters  in  North 
America, a  tenth elsewhere in the Community). French 
companies, the next most acquisitive, spent USD 11  bil-
lion,  again chiefly in North America but with  almost 
USD 4 billion in the Community (against USD 4 1n. bil-
lion by UK companies) 13• Takeovers within the UK are 
also higher by number and value although here the dif-
ferences are smaller : in 1988 over 1 200 companies were 
acquired with a value of over UKL 22 billion; for com-
parison in France there were some 800 acquisitions with 
a value ofFF 180 billion(= UKL 17 billion) 
14
• 
There are a number of reasons why takeover and mer-
ger activity should be more pronmmced in the UK than in 
the other member states - the size and  depth of equity 
markets in relation to GOP 15, the legal form of the enter-
prises and the openness, in both directions, to companies 
in other English-speaking countries. While mergers and 
acquisitions, national and international, can be expected 
to increase in most member countries in consequence of 
the 1992 programme, this differential will probably per-
sist. In this respect an important step was the Council's 
adoption of the merger control regulation in December 
1989.  This  instituted  a  'one-stop'  system  of control, 
meaning that only one authority (the Commission or na-
tional  authorities)  will vet any  particular merger.  The-
sholds for the Commission's involvement have initially 
been set fairly high (ECU 5 billion, to be lowered after 
four years).  At national  level,  the  pressure for reform 
with greater legal clarity (for example, whether the im-
pact on competition is assessed in national or Community 
terms) might thus be expected to increase. 
In other areas of competition policy the UK has been 
more clearly a  leader within the Community. Thus the 
general supply side orientation of economic policies has 
led to a significant reduction of state aids, a consequence 
of the shrinking of the public enterprise sector and a re-
13)  P. Buigues (1989). 
14)  BritishBusiness,10February 1989(seealsofootnote 13). 
luctance to subsidise the private sector. Significantly, the 
subvention to British  Aerospace  to acquire the  Rover 
group was associated with the latter's transfer to the pri-
vate sector, while somewhat similar assistance is being 
given to the water authorities on their privatization. Pub-
lic procurement policy, particularly defence procurement 
and the wish to favour domestic suppliers, might cause 
more tension. The 1980s, however, saw a ·definite move 
toward less protectionism in this respect 
UK and Community policies are  also  in broad con-
formity in two areas where the Commission has taken a 
particularly active role in promoting competition : tele-
communications  and  air  transport.  In both  industries 
Community prices are in general conspicuously higher 
and output lower than what would be expected in a uni-
fied market 
16
• In most member states  telecommunica-
tions  are provided by a  single state corporation, often 
also the postal service, with cross-subsidisation between 
local and trunk and international and between telecom-
munications and postal services common. In air transport 
"flag"  carriers, partly or exclusively state-owned,  typi-
cally receive protection on internal routes and operate bi-
lateral cartels on intra-European routes. 
In the UK British Telecom was privatised in 1984 and 
British  Airways  and the  British Airports  Authority  in 
1987 (see Box 2 on privatisation in Chapter 2); regula-
tory  action  (licensing  new  market  entrants)  aimed  to 
guard against monopoly abuses. In telecommunications 
user equipment choice was freed and a second company 
(Mercury) licensed to compete for use of basic wired ser-
vices.  Two competing systems have been licensed for 
basic cellular services. In air transport BJ!tish Airways 
was required on privatization to surrender some routes to 
a  second British carrier (British Caledonian) while the 
authorities have taken a liberal attitude to licensing addi-
tional carriers on international routes. The UK has thus 
increased in importance as  a  hub for  international ser-
vices offering cheaper fares and greater route choice than 
most rival centres.  However, the domestic competition 
regime did not prevent the subsequent takeover of British 
Caledonian by British Airways,  thus severely reducing 
competitive pressures from a second national carrier. 
15)  The UK is by far the largest European marlcet in terms of traded companies and capitalisation, the latter representing about half of 
GOP; by contrast only some 1 080 companies trade on the eight German stock exchanges, representing about a quaner of  GOP. 
16)  More cost competitive telecommunications tariffs would benefit consumen by 4 billion ECU p.a., acccrding 10 the Cecchini report 
(1988, op.  ciL). However, it should be noted that the Commission's 1987 Green Paper on telecommunications proposed leaving the 
existing industry largely intact for 'reserved' (ie. basic) services, particularly voice telephony. Potential savings on 'oompetiuve• ser-
vices (VANs, etc.) would nevertheless still be substantial (2 billion ECU p.L), as would be direct equipment costs savings from grealer 
standardisation. 1be Commission's approach 10 air transport liberalization bas also avoided full-scale deregulation on US lines, prefer-
ring phased weakening of existing bilateral agreements for intra-Community routes and greater freedom regarding fares and route ac-
cess. A 1986 report in The &onomist estimated variable route costs 10 be typically 20% higher in Europe than the US while fares were 
35-40% higher (quoted in European Economy (1988a)). -57-
3.3.3 The costs and benefits of  the Single 
Market for the UK economy 
The overall impact of  market completion is expected to 
be significant for the performance of  the UK economy. A 
successful response to the single market, in the UK and 
elsewhere in the Conmunity, would imply higher domes-
tic production in aggregate while prices would be lower. 
The economy's ability to compete internationally should 
improve, easing pressures emanating from the external 
sector. These benefits should be reflected in employment 
gains and in public fmances. While the short-term impact 
of  market completion may cause significant restructuring 
and  dislocation,  benefits  should  be  particularly  pro-
nounced in the medium term. 
Static effects 
The static effects of  the completion of the internal mar-
ket on the UK economy refer to the once-and-for-all im-
pact  of  removing  barriers  to  market  integration  on 
production and consumption. These are the frrst-round ef-
fects and represent a frrst approximation of the overall 
impact of  market integration. 
Market fragmentation is regarded as an important trade 
barrier by UK businesses. In surveys conducted in the 
context of the  1992 project UK fums ranked national 
standards and teclmical regulations frrst in a list of trade 
barriers,  followed  by  various  administrative  barriers, 
while frontier delays and costs ranked third (the respec-
tive ranking of these barriers by all surveyed EC fums 
was similar but reversed the order of  the frrst two). 
Research undertaken for the Cecchini study 17 revealed 
that in 1986 national customs practices EC-wide cost be-
tween ECU 8,4 and 9,3 billion. The administrative costs 
to UK rums per consignment in intra-EC trade were ECU 
75 for imports and ECU 49 for exports (the respective 
Conmunity averages were ECU 67 and ECU 86). Trans-
port costs are also raised by customs formalities, with de-
lays in delivery of goods within the UK market being 
significantly shorter than those for delivery to an equidis-
tant destination on the continent. One consequence of 
these costs is that the volume of trade between the UK 
and the rest of the EC is lower than in the absence of 
market fragmentation.  According to survey results, EC 
importers were estimating a 1,0% increase in import vol-
umes, and exporters a 3,2% increase in export volumes, 
upon completion of the internal markets. These results 
underestimate  the potential  increase  in intra-EC  trade 
since fums not currently engaged in trade, particularly 
small fums, would be likely to fmd it profitable to ex-
pand their activities beyond national borders. 
17)  See P. Cecchini (1988). 
18)  See European Economy, (1988a), Table 3.4.4. 
19)  SeeP. Cecchini (1988) : op. ciL, Table 1.1. 
Purchases by public entities are important components 
of  demand in the EC. However, procedures and standards 
differ widely.  Public procurement in a  fragmented EC 
market tends to favour domestic producers over foreign 
suppliers and, as a consequence, the benefits arising from 
competition are foregone.  In the UK total public pur-
chases in 1984 amounted to ECU 118,9 billion (21,8% of 
GDP) while total public procurement (that is, that part of 
public purchasing which is subject to contracts) was esti-
mated between ECU 54,2 and ECU 76,2 billion (10% to 
14,1% of GDP).  Removing barriers to public procure-
ment is regarded as an important step in the completion 
of internal market Estimates by the Commission suggest 
that the gains to the UK economy would amount to ECU 
3,4 billion, or 0,6% of 1984 GDP. These gains consist of 
cost savings due to lower prices (ECU 1,0 billion), im-
proved efficiency due to wider competition (ECU 0,3 bil-
lion), and cost savings due to restructuring of fums where 
the public sector is a dominant agent (ECU 2,1 billion)18• 
British fums ranked differences in VAT rates as the least 
.  barri  b  .  19  Important  erto  usmess  . 
Some indications of the effects on manufacturing in-
dustry is given by the resUlts of a contribution by the UK 
Department of  Trade and Industry to a joint Community-
wide study using a unifonn methodology 20• This study 
frrst selected "sensitiv~" industries on the basis of the sig-
nificance of  non-tariff trade barriers. These accounted for 
about one half of total manufacturing output and employ-
ment. Industries were analysed at the three digit NACE 
level (corresponding to broad product groups, e.g. "agri-
cultural machinery"). These industries were then classi-
fied according to different indicators of competitiveness 
based on relative trade performance and relative output 
levels. Four such indicators were aggregated to produce a 
"score" indicating overall competitive strength, both on a 
"static" basis, and on a "dynamic" basis (the latter look-
ing at changes to performance in the period  1982-87). 
UK industries identified as having the strongest "static" 
competitiveness included computers, telecommunications 
equipment,  pharmaceuticals,  chemicals  and  measuring 
equipment. At the other end of the scale were glass, tex-
tile machinery, domestic electrical applicances, motor ve-
hicles, cotton goods and footwear. In total sixteen "below 
average" industries accounted for 20% of manufacturing 
output and 22% of manufacturing employment in 1987; 
the  fifteen  "above  average"  performers  accowtted  for 
21% of output and employment. "Dynamic" scores were 
fairly similar, although there was a less pronounced tend-
ency to extreme values  and measuring equipment and 
footwear moved into the average category. Another com-
parison relates UK trade performance to overall EC de-
mand growth in the 1980-85 period  Interestingly, UK 
relative manufacturing strength is somewhat biassed to-
wards high demand growth sectors, with the outstanding 
20)  "Sectoral impact of  the internal market on industry", European Economy (forthcoming). -58-
exception  of motor  vehicles,  where  poor  UK  perfor-
mance in tbe 1980s coincided with high demand growth. 
\ 
Such analysis is, however, necessarily based on past 
data and to some extent backward-looking. A more for-
ward-looking  approach  can  be  gained  by  looking  at 
trends in direct investment, though here the latest data re-
late to 1987 and thus can barely reflect single market fac-
tors. Investment from elsewhere in the Community in UK 
manufacturing was small (UKL 0,2 billion) and has  in-
creased negligibly (investment for all sectors was UKL 
2,9 billion in 1987). More significant has been nlanufac-
turing projects from outside the Community, notably in-
vestment  by  Japan.  The  inward  flow  from  Japan 
exceeded UKL 750 million in 1987 and since then major 
projects have been announced by Toyota and Honda, fol-
lowing the earlier establishment of the Nissan car plant 
In total about 45% of  Japanese direct investment in 1987 
and  1988  in the  Community  was  located  in the UK, 
higher than the UK's cumulative share of Japanese in-
vestment (under 40%  ). 
Outside  manufacturing,  fmancial  services  should 
become cheaper. A potential price reduction of 13% is 
envisaged, with the centre point of the range of estimates 
being 7% 21• The extent of potential gains here reflects 
the fact that the abolition of exchange controls and the 
liberal fmancial regime prevailing in the UK has already 
yielded many benefits. Nevertheless, a 7% decline in the 
price of  fmancial services is estimated to amount to 0,8% 
of  GDP in terms of  value-added for fmancial services and 
also in terms of the gain in consumer surplus.  At the 
same time, adjusting for the size of the fmancial service 
market, the UK gain in consumer surplus from the inte-
gration of credit and insurance markets is estimated to 
rarik first at ECU 5,1 billion, representing over one-quar-
ter of  the estimated total Community gain. 
Dyllllmic effects 
These effects refer to the impact of market integration 
on the exploitation of scale economies due to increased 
market size, and on competition. These are more elusive 
and less subject to precise quantification, partly because 
they are interdependent. However, they constitute poten-
tially the most important consequence of the 1992 pro-
ject 
Dynamic gains can be classified into three categories : 
(a) the decline in costs associated with larger volume of 
output and restructuring of production; (b) the decline in 
costs and prices arising from wider competition; and (c) a 
series of non-price effects  associated  with  competitive 
pressures to improve quality and encourage innovation. 
Evidence indicates  that the potential gains from ex-
ploiting scale economies can be very substantial for UK 
iums. The UK market size is too small compared to the 
minimum efficient scale of production for many indus-
tries and this has been estimated to raise production costs 
by up to 25%. In the case of cars, for example, the mini-
mum efficient scale is 200% of UK production and 20% 
of total EC production; in computers, aircraft, cellulose 
fibres, and rolled aluminium it exceeds 100% while it is 
less than 20% relative to EC totals 22• Scale economies 
can also be present in the service sector but these  are 
much more difficult to evaluate. At the same time, the 
likely effects associated with learning and experience can 
be very substantial as well. 
An indication of the prospective gains from enhancing 
competition is existing EC price differentiation for the 
same goods.  In  1985,  for  example,  the  (tax-inclusive) 
price dispersion for total imal consumers'  expenditure 
(goods and services) measured by the standard deviation 
was  about  22% of the  average Community price;  the 
price dispersion for consumer goods alone (excluding en-
ergy  and  services)  was  almost  20%.  These  measures 
overestimate the true dispersion measured between coun-
tries and by product to some extent Differences in indi-
rect  taxes  contribute  significantly  to  raising  these 
dispersion measures, although substantial price differen-
ces remain after tax differentials are removed (the coeffi-
cient  of variation for  consumer  goods  ex-tax falls  to 
15,2%).  The gains  from  convergence of the  prices of 
goods and services are estimated to be between 2,1% and 
8,3% of EC GDP, depending on the convergence hypo-
thesis asswned. 
Additional competitive implications relate to the disci-
plinary effects international trade brings forward, which 
are  expected  to  promote  cost-minimization  in  Com-
munity fmns. Fmally, there is evidence that an uncompe-
titive enviromnent is unfavourable to innovation in the 
UK 23• Improving competition could yield significant ex-
temalies in innovative behaviour, further reinforcing the 
virtuous circle which appears to characterize competition 
and innovation. 
Table 3.4 sununarizes views by UK fmns, as well as 
those for the EC as whole, concerning the impact of  mar-
ket integration. In many cases the proportion of  UK fmns 
expecting improvements is greater than the EC average. 
A reduction of  costs is expected by a net 58% of  respond-
ents with the majority projecting slight cost reductions. A 
substantial increase in sales to the EC is reported as well, 
while a net 61% expect the opportunities to outweigh the 
risks for their own fli'ID,  and a net 45% expect the oppor-
tunities to exceed the risks for the whole economy. 
21)  This retlecta the fact that financial product prices in the U.K. are 2-12% higher than the thcoretically lowest price, with the centre of  the 
possible ranae being 7%. The U.K. ranks second to the Netherlands in tenns of  the smallest difference between acwal and theoretically 
lowest price in financial services. See European Bc::oncmy (1988a), Table 5.1.4. 
22)  See Ewopean Ecorwmy, (1988a) Part D and Tables 6.1.4 and 6.1.5. 
23)  SeeP. Geroslri (1988). -59-
Table 3.4 : UK and  EUR12 business opinion regarding completion of  the internal market 
UK  EUR12 
Cost reduction 
1 
- Very significant  8  25 
- Slightly significant  50  37 
-Net  effect 2  -58  -60 
Increase in sales volume 
3 
- Exports to EC countries  78  64 
- Exports to non-EC countries  12  24 
-Total sales to all markets  68  54 
Opportunities and risks 4 
-Forownimn  61  49 
- For the economy  45  36 
1 Survey response in percent 
2 Percentage difference between firms expecting a reduction (-) in costs and fll11lS expecting an increase (  + ). 
3 Percentage difference between firms expecting an increase (  +) in sales and firms expecting a decrease (-). 
4 Percentage difference between fll11lS expecting greater (  +) opportunities and firms expecting greater risks (-). 
Source: European Economy (1988a), Tables 8.1.1, 8.1.2, and 8.1.4. 
Of the principal reasons for  the expected increase in 
sales, UK imns ranked the improved ability to enter new 
markets  irrst,  followed  by  improvements  in  non-price 
competitiveness (for example, changes in product range), 
and by reduction in product prices in existing markets. 
These results indicate that the market integration effects 
are expected by UK producers to be significant 
Similarly encouraging results were obtained by a Bank 
of England survey of the implications of market integra-
tion for the UK fmancial service industry 24• The survey 
indicated that fmancial institutions were generally posi-
tive about 1992 prospects, expecting an increase in econ-
omic activity  to  levels  which would have taken much 
longer  to  reach  without  the  market  completion  pro-
granune, and projecting greater opportunities and greater 
competition for the industry. While a true single market 
in financial products was viewed as remote, a common 
market in corporate fmancial services was expected  to 
develop  frrst;  on the other hand,  respondents  believed 
that retail fmancial  services  would  continue to remain 
fragmented along national lines for some time,  despite 
the removal of  restrictions on market entry. 
Some macroeconomic implications 
of  market completion 
The gains from market integration will be reflected in 
the behaviour of the major macroeconomic variables. An 
24)  See Bank of England (1989). 
Table 3.4 : UK and EUR12 business opinion. 
assessment of the overall macroeconomic performance of 
the UK was undertaken by the Commission in the context 
of the 1992 project. Table 3.5 summarizes the results for 
key variables. 
The impact effects of the 1992 measures are small, as 
shown in the table, even though most macroeconomic in-
dicators register noticeable improvement. However, em-
ployment  and  the  public  sector  and  external  balances 
relative to GDP post some deterioration.  On the other 
hand, gains in labour productivity raise real wages which, 
in tum, contribute to private consumption and become 
the key growth factor over the medium-term.  Real in-
come gains are also made as a result of the decline in 
prices associated with removal of market barriers. Once 
the economy has adapted to the new environment, and in 
combination with the interdependent dynamic effects of 
market integration, the medium-term performance of the 
UK economy is decidedly superior to that in the absence 
of the 1992 measures. Real GDP and the real wage are 
projected at four percentage points and at 2,  7 percentage 
points higher, respectively, six years after the completion 
of the internal market, while employment is projected to 
be greater by almost 400 000.  Important constraints on 
the macroeconomic enviromnent, arising from the public 
and the external sectors, appear to be easing as the share 
of these  balances  in  GDP  improves.  Overall,  the  im-
proved domestic and EC-wide macroeconomic environ-
ment should raise the well-being of UK citizens both as -60-
Table 3.5 : The impact of  market completion on the UK *  : 
Year I  Year2  Year6 
\ Perceatage dift"erences in leveJs 
RealGDP  0,81  2,44  4,00 
GDP deflator  -2,52  -4,72  -8,06 
Private consumptim price  -2,55  -4,33  -7,43 
Real wage rate  0,94  0,65  2,71 
Labour productivity per head  1,79  2,95  2,91 
Employment  -0,64  -0,08  1,39 
Absolute differences 
Employment ('000)  -157  -16  385 
Budget surplus (%of  GDP)  -0,06  0,71  1,80 
External balance (% of  GDP)  -0,33  -0,32  0,61 
*)The results show the effect of  the completion of the internal market on the variables in question, compared to a non-com-
pletion scenario. 
Source: M. Catinat, E. Domli, and A. ltalianer (1988), Table 6.1. 
1  producers  and  consumers  once  the  internal  market  is 
complete. 
Cafeats 
Economic  change results  in winners  and losers  and 
while the programme for the completion of the internal 
market is projected to yield important benefits to member 
countries, transitional costs associated with the restruc-
turing of individual economies are possible. The Cecchi-
ni report and model simulations have already indicated 
that during the transitional period employment may ac-
tually decline before it rises again once the adjustment 
period  is  over.  This  section  discusses  some  possible 
qualifications to the gains discussed in the previous sec-
tion. The discussion is general and not limited to the UK 
alone. 
Completion of the internal market will redistribute pro-
duction between countries and also between different re-
gions  within  a  country.  The  reason  for  this  is  that 
specializatim will take place according to factor endow-
ments, and sectoral redistribution of production will be 
intensified. Declining sectors will experience losses and 
expanding sectors will reap gains. Broadly speaking, the 
gains from free trade should be sufficiently large to com-
pensate the losers and leave the country better-off com-
pared to the situation of restricted trade. To effect this 
redistribution of gains mechanisms at ~e  national and at 
the Community level will be required~\, For example, na-
tional policies  which promote regional and sectoral la-
bour mobility must be implemented. Equally important, 
Connnunity policies  enforcing competition must be in 
place to prevent fmns from exploiting unfairly the ad-
vantages of  market enlargement. 
Table 3.5 : The impact of market completion on the UK. 
The complementarity of national policies and policies 
directed at enlarging the internal market are particularly 
relevant in the case of the UK. There is evidence that one 
of the factors explaining the persistence of regional dis-
parities in income and unemployment in the UK is the 
housing market. Labour is immobile, despite adverse sec-
toral and regional fortunes, because of the tendency of 
housing prices to rise faster than nominal wages in areas 
of strong housing demand These difficulties could wors-
en in the context of  market integration and for this reason 
the need to review housing policy is urgent. 
The Single European Act introduced important provi-
sions to strengthen the Connnunity'  s economic and social 
cohesion, and the Delors report noted that, in the process 
of economic and monetary union, an optimum allocation 
of resources and improved distribution of welfare would 
require regional and structural Community programmes. 
In  February 1988 the European Council voted to enhance 
the Community's regional and structural policies in sev-
eral respects  :  the size of the structural funds  will  be 
doubled over the period to 1993; emphasis will shift from 
project to programme fmancing;  a new form of partner-
ship between the Community and the receiving regions 
will be established;  adjustment through movements of 
capital rather than labour will be promoted; and policies 
improving infrastructure, research and technological de-
velopment will be pursued. In September 1989 an alloca-
tion of ECU 793 million from structural funds was made 
for the UK for regional development. Fmally, co-ordina-
tion of  macroeconomic policies will also help ease transi-
tional difficulties. -61-
There is some evidence, however, that the traditional 
view of market integration overestimates the adjustment 
costs involved. In particular, it is more realistic to assume 
that specialization takes place within an industry rather 
than at a regional level; therefore, redistribution of pro-
duction and labour will  take place within the industry 
and/or the finn. Furthermore, scale economies, strategic 
behaviour, and research and development are more im-
portant than factor endowments in detennining the pat-
tern of specialization;  as a  result, it is not possible to 
determine a  priori  which countries  and which regions 
will in fact succeed in an integrated market. Both these 
considerations cast doubt on the traditional view which 
regards economic change u  inflicting substantial losses. 
It is likely that adjustment to a complete internal market 
wlll be less costly than initially estimated -62-
CHAPTER4 
THE UK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s 
4.1 The legacy of  the 1980s 
The 1980s saw fundamental changes in UK economic 
policy,  accompanied by bold initiatives to improve the 
supply potential of the economy, strengthen incentives to 
produce, and reduce the role of the state in economic ac-
tivity. As seen in the previous chapters, however, macro-
economic  performance  deteriorated  in  the  post-1987 
period,  and  questions  have  been raised  about  whether 
policy  in  the  1980s  has contributed  to  a  fundamental 
change in the UK economy, or whether the long recovery 
of the 1980s is simply an extended normal upswing. 
It is difficult to answer this question. At the same time, 
it is likely that the period prior to the Conservative gov-
ernment's assumption of office (May  1979) constitutes 
an entirely different sample of economic and,  perhaps, 
social values.  The government's economic policies  at-
tacked the prevailing post-war consensus by strengthen-
ing  economic  activity  along  market,  and  away  from 
interventionist,  lines.  As  a  result,  productivity  perfor-
mance  has  improved relative  to  the EC countries.  Al-
though  unemployment  initially  increased,  employment 
gains have been substantial. However, the course of infla-
tion is of extreme concern. fu  addition, fiScal  prudence 
has been accompanied by private dissaving. fucome in-
equality has increased. fu the late 1980s macroeconomic 
stability and the balance of payments have, once more, 
become  areas  of concern. Thus fundamental  questions 
about the economy remain. 
First, wage inflation has been a persistent feature of the 
1980s despite high unemployment, and more recently has 
intensified. While this is a nonnal development in cir-
cumstances of rising employment, skill imbalances and 
regional labour immobility associated with the boom in 
the housing market 
1 have also played a contributing role. 
Such skill shortages may also threaten productivity per-
formance. 
Second, employment may have become more vulner-
able. While the cycle in output explains the greater vari-
ability of employment, labour market reforms may not 
have gone sufficiently far in securing labour market flexi-
bility in so far as wages are concerned. fu particular, the 
three  employment acts of the early  1980s (1980,  1982 
and 1984) preserved trade union immunity from civil ac-
tion on pay and working conditions but not on organisa-
tion and manning levels 2, implying that higher wages in 
the  unionised  sector would produce greater short-term 
employment losses as firms found it easier to adjust pay-
rolls. The legislation has thus been important in influenc-
ing labour utilization, but has not affected union mark-up 
on wages  and, hence, has not contributed to narrowing 
union/non-union wage differentials. Some observers have 
attributed persistent wage inflation to this failure. 
A third area of concern is the behaviour of the external 
accounts and its message regarding short-term economic 
stabilization. The balance of payments moved into a sub-
stantial deficit  in the post-1987 period, reflecting  to  a 
large extent excess demand  in the  domestic  economy. 
While it is evident that stabilization would contribute to 
reversing the deficit, the behaviour of the balance of  pay-
ments viewed through the 1980s reflects more fundamen-
tal imbalances.  Frrst,  the real  appreciation  of the early 
1980s was, paradoxically, accompanied by a surplus on 
current account which persisted up to 1987. The persist-
ence of the current account surplus was due to the con-
tribution of North Sea oil; in the absence of the oil factor, 
the balance of payments  would probably have been in 
substantial deficit. This oil-induced surplus permitted dis-
inflation to be pursued through (the partly induced) ex-
change  rate  appreciation.  fu  its  absence,  Layard  and 
Nickell (1990) note that inflation would have been sub-
stantially higher, especially if fiscal and monetary policy 
had aimed at producing the actual balance of payments 
and unemployment record of the 1980s. If, as they con-
tend, the disinflation of the 1980s was achieved only be-
cause  of  the  oil  factor,  it  is  possible  that  the  basic 
problem of achieving macroeconomic balance and low 
inflation remains to be tackled. Secondly, current account 
imbalances  reflect  imbalances  in  domestic  absorption 
relative to output, or disequilibrium in investment spend-
ing relative to the supply of domestic savings to fmance 
it. A remarkable characteristic of the second half of the 
decade has been the sharp decline in the personal saving 
rate, a development also prominent in other economies 
1)  The evidence on the interdependence of the labour and housing markets is discussed in a symposium published in the Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics (1989). See also Pis  sa  rides and Wads  worth (1989). 
2)  This point is made by Matthews and Stoney (1990). See also Brown and Wadhwani (1990) for a related discussion. While the legisla-
tion may have contributed to greater employmmt variability in the 1980s compared to earlier periods. the amplitude of output fluctua-
tions has been also greater in the last decade. The coefficient of  variation for civilian employment (the ratio of  the standard deviation to 
the mean of the variable) is : 
1960: 1- 1969:4 = 1.63% 
1970: 1 - 1980:4 = 1.48% 
1981 : 1 - 1988:4 = 2,22% 
1982: 1 - 1988:4 = 2.33%. -63-
which have undergone fmancial deregulation. The sur-
plus on public fmances,  the wider private expenditure 
deficit and the consequent payments deficit are sugges-
tive of the need for better macroeconomic balance to be 
pursued in the 1990s. 
The other Community countries are together the UK  's 
largest trading partner. Further market integration within 
the  EMS  framework  implies closer synchronization of 
economic activity which will be further reinforced at the 
policy  levels.  Flexible exchange rates  make monetary 
policy independence possible in the short-term, but rarely 
permanently  affect  the  real  exchange  rate.  Persistent 
divergence in the UK from the behaviour of wages and 
prices  in  the ERM countries  through  exercise  of the 
short-term freedom to inflate would contribute to macro-
economic instability by raising the volatility of inflation, 
interest rates, the exchange rate and output. The associ-
ated uncertainty, in sharp contrast to the ERM countries, 
would have adverse implications for economic perfor-
mance. 
4.2 Stabilization questions 
The UK economy peaked in  1988.  Policy  has  been 
aimed at restoring non-inflationary conditions and revers-
ing the balance of payments deficit. The policy approach 
to promote adjustment has been via changes in interest 
rates. However, the monetary squeeze implemented over 
the past two years has been slow to produce the intended 
results.  Inflation has been persistent,  influencing  wage 
settlements, expected depreciation, the level of interest 
rates and, ultimately, the credibility of government pol-
icy. These developments occurred in an economy where 
a  veritable  change in regime  took place in  1979  and 
where important supply-side initiatives  have been  im-
plemented  Furthermore,  despite  the  anti-inflation 
rhetoric and a policy design of promoting price stability, 
the  UK is entering the  1990s in some macroeconomic 
disarray, where the risks of slow growth and stubborn in-
flation for the foreseeable future have intensified. Why 
has this happened? Answering this question is critical to 
understanding the crucial policy options in the near fu-
ture. Key to these is the credible anchoring of expecta-
tions. 
The model of disinflation adopted by the UK govern-
ment in 1979 was that of a sharp disruption of inflation-
ary expectations through monetary and fiscal contraction, 
in which currency appreciation played an important role. 
This  model  quickly  establishes  policy  credibility  and 
causes  rapid  expectations  adjustment.  In contrast,  the 
strategy  of  those  countries  which  have  successfully 
achieved disinflation within the ERM involves a gradual 
adjustment  of expectations  and  a  slow  acquisition  of 
credibility since substantial exchange rate appreciation is 
not available to the member countries. The ERM strategy 
for the more inflationary economies is characterized by a 
protracted  deflationary  period  where  currency  adjust-
ments are minimized; the UK strategy, on the other hand, 
entailed a  quick adjustment in output and expectations 
brought about in part by an overshooting exchange rate
3 
• 
The longer-term implications of the two strategies are 
quite different.  The experience of the ERM countries 
shows that while credibility is slow to develop, once in 
place it is difficult to lose; consequently, inflation and in-
flation expectations remain subdued. The UK experience 
shows that credibility, which can be gained at substantial 
short-term output cost, can be lost because of either sys-
tematic policy errors (inadequate policy tightening in the 
early stages of the post-1986 boom related to underesti-
mation of  excess demand) or because there is no nominal 
target sufficiently reliable to commit policy and promote 
macroeconomic stability. As a result, inflation and infla-
tion expectations can become fumly embedded in private 
contracts. 
UK wage and price inflation in the beginning of the 
1990s has also been affected by expectations that cur-
rency depreciation will ultimately offset losses in compe-
titiveness  associated  with  excessive  wage  and  price 
increases. Incipient real exchange appreciation has been 
countered through nominal exchange depreciation, while 
domestic wage and price setting appear to be inelastic 
with respect to real exchange rate increases 
4
• This pro-
cess is only a special case of inflation inertia in an econ-
omy where expectations  are forward  looking,  and the 
cost of failing to accommodate inflationary behaviour is 
severe in terms of output lost. In the UK, the current pol-
icy is to deflate the economy gradually and minimize out-
put losses. But because there is no constraining discipline 
on monetary policy (such as provided by fixed exchange 
rates or by an independent central bank), the policy of 
gradualism could be reversed towards expansion again; 
in other words,  the annmmced precommitment can al-
ways  be  reneged  upon  and  the  policy  may  not  be 
credible. 
Thus, unlike the disinflationary episode of the early 
1980s, the UK strategy to contain inflation in the early 
1990s is that of gradualism. However, unlike the ERM 
strategy, there is no nominal anchor to secure price sta-
bility.  In view of the failure of monetary targetting  to 
serve as an anchor to expectations, and as the MTFS has 
been of  past limited success as a stabilisation mechanism, 
there  is  a  strong  a  priori  case that  the exchange rate 
should become the intermediate target. Clearly, in order 
to avoid the inflation and disinflation cycles which have 
become characteristic of recent economic performance, 
some permanent commitment to sustain an exchange rate 
objective would be required. From the perspective of  pol-
icy commitment, participation in the ERM now repre-
sents the most credible option. 
3)  de Grauwe (1989) discusses this comparison extensively. See also Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988) on this issue. 
4)  Some preliminary evidence is reported in Belessiotis (1989) on the behaviour of prices and of the monetary authorities in periods of 
real appreciation and real depreciation. -64-
4.3 The UK and European Monetary 
Union 
Decisive  steps  to  achieve  economic  and  monetary 
union in the EC have already been made. In  particular the 
Delors report envisaged a three-stage process by the end 
of which exchange rates would be irrevocably fixed and 
decisions on monetary policy and aspects of  national fts-
cal policies would be transferred to Community institu-
tions. UK policy regarding EMU stands in sharp contrast 
to the majority of member countries. The UK has ob-
jected to  the  centralization of decision-making  power 
away from elected national representatives to institutions 
in Brussels and, in particular, to the possibility that na-
tional ftseal policy may be subject to binding rules of a 
supranational authority. The government bas argued that 
ftseal  coordination is not essential for monetary union 
and, with monetary policy tied to the monetary union, 
that ftseal independence is the only instrument available 
to respond to external shocks and restore output. These 
arguments imply a less centralised currency union where 
fiscal independence remains with the national authorities 
and market forces are relied upon to provide the necess-
ary policy discipline. At the Madrid conference of June 
1989, the government, while setting out conditions for 
participation in the ERM, objected to the notion that im-
plementing stage one of the Delors report necessarily im-
plied that the subsequent stages would follow. 
A  British proposal, sketching  an alternative route to 
monetary union, was presented by the then Chancellor of 
the  Exchequer,  Mr.  Lawson,  at  the European fmance 
ministers meeting in Antibes in September 1989, and was 
subsequently published by the Treasury s.  Tile proposal 
centred on the notion that prudent monetary policy would 
lead to currency competition, and together with market-
imposed fiscal discipline, would drive out of circulation 
high-inflation  currencies  in  favour  of one  or  several 
whose characteristics as money were superior. Drawing 
on ideas enunciated by Hayek (1976a, 1976b) the propo-
sal envisages that high-inflation countries will see their 
currencies gradually replaced by more stable currencies, 
thus imposing a  significant discipline on the monetary 
authorities of the former. Ultimately, currency competi-
tion could lead to a cmrency union because the more an 
individual  currency  is  used,  the  more  useful  it  is  as 
money, and the greater the domain over which an indi-
vidual currency is used  the greater the scale economies 
accruing to the users. These scale economies are social 
and individual, and extend over space and time. Currency 
competition might ultimately lead to one currency serv-
ing as money in the EC, or, alternatively, several might 
continue to coexist, because of national characteristics 
continuing to impinge upon the demand for money. The 
Chancellor did not speculate about the full implications 
of currency competition for monetary  union.  The UK 
proposal might thus be seen as an evolutionary alterna-
tive to stage 2 of the Delors report in which non-infla-
tionary monetary policies dominate. 
5)  See HM Treasuay (1989). 
This proposal is not, however, in the spirit of the De-
tors notion of monetary union Unlike the latter, no spe-
cific steps or institutions are envisaged to strengthen the 
process of currency union. In essence, currency competi-
tion represents an alternative to the Delors Report propo-
sals, and it is uncertain that it could lead to a monetary 
union. 
Independently of whether the UK proposal is consist-
ent with the Delors report,  there are several problems 
with the process of currency competition. First, the pro-
posal may not be consistent with prospective develop-
ments in the EMS, since the increasingly flXed exchange 
rates aspired to virtually amount to one currency while 
the condition of currency substitution required for com-
petition to be effective would not be satisfied. Secondly, 
from the perspective of the liquidity service of money, 
fma.ncial  deregulation bas led to a large fraction of the 
national money stock becoming interest-bearing. Differ-
ent inflation rates fully reflected in nominal interest rates 
have thus become less intrinsically problematic; rather, 
what is important is the predictability of the currency's 
purchasing power. The implication is that the resources 
required to establish the most predictable currency may 
significantly  outweigh  the  prospective  benefits.  Klein 
(1977) notes that currency substitution and switching to 
new monies appears to be highly inelastic with respect to 
the currency's inflation rate. Even in high inflation coun-
tries the extent of currency substitution occurring largely 
reflects  the  store of value rather  than  medium of ex-
change function of  money. 
Thirdly, an argument also due to Klein (1977) points to 
the fact that the demand for currency depends on such 
non-economic characteristics as confidence, which is not 
simply related to inflation and which may be difficult to 
establish through currency competition. Finally, in view 
of the scale economies in the use of money, money ap-
pears to be a classic case of natural monopoly. Thus, in 
the ultimate state, the central bank whose currency has 
dominated will  become the regional  bank determining 
monetary policy for the EC. While this outcome is the-
oretically possible, evidence from the monetary history 
of various countries indicates that the likelihood of this 
happening is very remote. Even if it were to happen the 
externalities associated with money would require that 
the regional bank be "nationalized", or some EC auth-
ority  would be required to determine monetary policy. 
Thus even the logic of currency competition may require 
the establishment of  an EC-wide institution. 
In the Conunission's opinion, made public in March 
1990, the process of monetary union should involve a 
new Community institution responsible for monetary pol-
icy (the Eurofed), close dialogue between this institution 
and member states on economic and  fmancial policies, 
and coordination of budgetary  policies  to  ensure  co-
herence  with monetary policy,  including  voluntary re-
straints on fiscal action (rather than centrally determined -65-
rules as in the Delors report); a single currency (the ECU) 
was  also envisaged.  These proposals  are more flexible 
than those of the Delors Committee; at the same time, the 
macroeconomic benefits from policy coordination among 
member states will be enhanced,  and there is room for 
market forces  to exert discipline on fiscal policy. Even 
though  these  proposals  view  the  process  of monetary 
union from a sharply different perspective from the UK, 
there is opportunity for UK views to continue to receive 
attention  within  a  more  flexible  framework of debate. 
However, to enhance its influence, the UK needs to show 
commitment to a clearer and feasible vision of monetary 
union to be achieved in the 1990s. 
An intergovernmental conference to discuss amending 
the Treaty of Rome and lay the foundations for monetary 
union is to begin at the end of 1990. The British govern-
ment is preparing to offer new proposals in the interven-
ing  months  which,  while  falling  short  of proposing  a 
single currency, are expected to be a significant advance 
over the initial evolutionary vision of  European monetary 
union 
6
• This initiative possibly signifies greater accept-
ance by the UK of a type of  monetary union closer to that 
currently envisaged by the other EC countries. More im-
portantly, it signals the desire to exert greater influence 
through positive contributions to the continuing dialogue. 
This is a welcome development, which is likely to enrich 
the intellectual character of the debate  about European 
monetary union. 
6)  In June 1990 the Chancellor of the Exchequer outlined proposals, amplified by the Bank of England, for stage 2 of EMU during which a 
"Hard ECU" would be issued as  a new common (but parallel) wrrency by a "European Monetary Fund". These proposals followed 
preparation of  this draft. -66-
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